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Abstract 
Gang violence in London is an increasing problem that has gained momentum 
in the last two decades. Finding workable solutions to reduce gang violence or 
interventions in the current economic climate is a constant challenge for 
practitioners. This study examines the use of mediation as a tactic for 
reducing gang violence. Through data analysis, outcomes of this intervention 
are explored. The initial research conducted shows that there is a significant 
correlation between reductions in violent reoffending between those referred 
for mediation and those not referred. Further analysis of 17 semi-structured 
interviews conducted in the UK suggests that individuals do not have to 
engage in the mediation process for it to have an effect. Very often, the fact 
that an individual has been referred will be sufficient to deter continued violent 
offending. This research suggests that the implications for practice requires a 
unified co-ordinated response to violence that includes the proactive provision 
of joined up activity from the authorities, such as education, housing, health, 
social services and employment agencies.  Their services need to be 
adequately funded, properly resourced and intelligently delivered in order to 
provide the necessary support required to end the cycle of gang related 
violence and offending generally. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
“"There is no bigger challenge or threat to the whole of London, perhaps 
with the exception of terrorism, than youth violence"” 1  Sir Ian Blair, 
Metropolitan Police Commissioner (2005-2008) 
In the last two decades, there has been increasing concern about gangs and 
gang violence in the UK. Every day the media reports on violent incidents 
where a young person has been assaulted, stabbed, or worse, murdered by 
packs of feral youths, described as gangs, in the Capital. Violence has been 
at the forefront of British media, but no more so than in August 2011, when 
riots erupted on the streets of London and the rest of the UK, particularly in 
areas where gangs were known to operate.  
 
In a Home Office report, Ending Gang and Youth Violence (Home Office, 
2011), London gangs are said to be responsible for 16% of the capital’s total 
drug supply; 22% of serious violence; 4% of all sex offences, 14% of rape and 
17% of stabbings. Gangs are also widely involved in firearms offences. 42% 
of shootings are associated to a victim or suspect who is a member of a gang.  
 
The challenges facing those charged with keeping communities safe seem to 
be more complex than ever, and with the added burden of fiscal parsimony 
affecting the public sector, particularly the Metropolitan Police (MPS) and 
																																																								
1	The	Times.	28th	March	2008.	Retrieved	from	aftermathnews.wordpress.com/2008/07/page/19	
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Social Services, innovative opportunities to deal with this ever increasing 
social issue are having to be explored. As of 31st August 2015, Police Chiefs 
reported an expected 25% cut to their overall budgets, which represents a 
22000 cut in police officer numbers (The Guardian, 2015). 
 
In February 2012, the MPS launched the Trident Gang Command, to manage 
and co-ordinate centrally, information, intelligence and activity against those 
associated with criminal gang activity, and in particular, those who posed a 
significant threat to the community. Criminal Justice partners together with 
local authorities are working together in order to effectively deliver appropriate 
responses to gang behaviour in the city. The Mayor of London chairs the 
London Crime Reduction Board, where agencies are brought together and 
activity is coordinated. Tackling criminal gangs is the main priority of all 
concerned and the objectives of the board are to focus activity on reducing 
reoffending and anti-social behaviour, through the provision of strategic 
leadership. 
 
In May 2012, the Delivery Management Group of the London Crime Reduction 
Board implemented pan-London partnership strategy with an aim to tackle 
criminal gang activity across the capital adopting the Trident Gang Command 
approach. The strategy aims to monitor the effectiveness of enforcement 
activity against gang members; the effectiveness of multi-agency 
arrangements to manage risk associated with criminal gang members or 
those at risk of becoming involved; the effectiveness of prevention and 
diversion activity aimed at reducing the numbers of individuals involved in 
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criminal gang related offending; the overall impact of current activity in order 
to reduce gang related offending, such as serious youth violence. (London 
Councils, 2012) 
 
The aim of this thesis is to explore the outcomes of mediation as an 
intervention with gangs in the context of consistently high occurrences of 
youth violence in London2, with a view to assessing its impact on violence 
reduction. In order to do this, it is necessary to understand the make up of 
gangs in London; where and how they operate, what is their motivation for 
existing and how they are organised. 
This research aims to address the gap that exists in academic literature 
around outcomes of violence reduction and violence prevention using 
mediation as an intervention. 
The purpose of this thesis is achieved by asking two research questions; how 
do members of gangs in London engage with mediation tactics when 
instigated, and what are the outcomes of successful mediation? These 
questions will be answered by addressing four key objectives that deal with 
specific aspects of the research. These distinct objectives will not be 
examined in isolation, as the outcome of each objective is entwined and 
impacts on subsequent phases of the research strategy.  
 
The first objective is to determine how mediation was established as a tactic 
for diffusing gang tensions and reducing violence. This is discussed in the 
																																																								
2	3%	increase	in	Serious	Youth	Violence	between	2008‐2012("London	Serious	Youth	Violence	Offences	2001	to	2012,"	
2012).	Violence	against	the	person	is	up	21.3%	according	to	the	MPS	as	of	November	2015	(MPS,	2016).	
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context of how mediation as a tactic was introduced into the Metropolitan 
Police Area at a time of perceived rising incidents of violent intra-gang 
disputes and falling public confidence in the police pre and post the London 
riots. 
 
The second objective arising from the analysis of Metropolitan Police data will 
be to explore the varying depths of the gang member engagement with this 
process, and critically assessing the outcomes. 
 
The third objective is to determine the outcomes, benefits and limitations of 
mediation and transformational services and examines how immediate and 
practical interventions can be implemented if inappropriate responses 
develop, or reactive behaviours become apparent during the mediation 
programme.  
 
The fourth objective drawing on the outcomes of 1 to 3 above and congruent 
with the aims of a professional doctorate is to identify the implications for 
practice. 
The findings and validity of this thesis covers the period up until August 2015. 
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Preview 
This thesis is arranged over 8 chapters.  Chapter 2 explores what is a gang 
and explores the world of gang membership, with a particular focus on street 
gangs in London.  
 
Chapter 3 establishes the theoretical framework for the research through 
examination of types of gang interventions and the outcomes they appear to 
be looking for, before moving on to discuss mediation as a tactic to reduce 
gang violence in London. 
 
Chapter 4 provides a comprehensive account of the research design, looking 
at data sources and methods used. It is intended to provide a clear and 
transparent account of these methods, without compromising police 
methodology and intelligence gathering processes.  
 
I describe the research process from the outset and discuss my approach to 
the analysis. The journey of interviewee selection to practicalities around the 
actual taped interview process. There is a section on ethical matters, which 
required careful consideration. Samples and the sampling strategy, the 
parameters of the research site and the limitations of the analysis will also be 
presented.    
 
The substantive analytical work begins in Chapter 5 with a quantitative 
investigation into the outcomes of mediation and in particular, the difference in 
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outcomes on reoffending for those who were referred for mediation and those 
who were not. The results of the data sets are analysed. 
 
Chapter 6 explores the qualitative research conducted, Interviews were 
conducted with a former gang member who after serving time in prison, now 
devotes his time to diverting individuals away from criminal gang activity.  
Police officers and youth workers also involved in prevention and diversion 
were interviewed. Common themes emerge from the semi-structured 
interviews conducted and these are analysed in more detail. 
 
Chapter 7 is a discussion about the implications of the findings in relation to 
answering the overall research question. 
 
Chapter 8, the Conclusion, is a reflective account of both the overall 
processes and particulars of the study, and discusses the practical 
implications of the research. This final chapter further positions this study in 
the context of escalating youth violence in London and asks judicious 
questions about the future opportunities for gang desistance and workable 
interventions. 
 
It is now time to make a more detailed examination of mediation and explore 
its outcomes when used as an intervention to reduce gang violence. 
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Chapter 2  Research Context 
“There is no generic form of gang, only similarities among diverse forms” 
(Klein, 1996:71).  
 
This chapter will outline why this research is so important in the current 
climate. It will explain the motivation behind this study and demonstrate how 
experiences guided this investigation towards gangs and interventions to 
reduce violent offending. The examination of a single intervention, mediation, 
and its outcomes when directed at those involved in gang violence will also be 
explored. The significance of etymology associated with the word gang will 
also be examined in order to demonstrate the level of interventions and 
resources authorities are willing to commit when tacking gang related activity, 
particularly in London. The make-up of gangs in London will be explored and 
an examination of the various groups that co-exist cheek – by – jowl on 
London’s streets. 
 
Positioning myself in the research 
As a serving officer, A Detective Superintendent, in the Metropolitan Police 
Service (MPS), having been involved in prevention and enforcement activity to 
reduce gang violence in one role or another for 24 years, I am acutely aware 
of the impact crime and gang violence has on communities. It is hoped that 
the findings of this research can ultimately be used to inform those involved in 
commissioning, directing and funding successful workable interventions that 
will have the most significant effect on issues surrounding gang membership 
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and crimes committed in London. Additionally, the findings could be used to 
provide the various Local Authorities with a more informed view, which is 
necessary when making decisions on where to direct or divert resources and 
funding on initiatives to tackle serious youth violence and prevent further 
murders of young people by young people in the capital.  
My motivation for this research stems from a study completed as part of my 
initial Professional Doctorate studies, where I examined re offending levels on 
gang members in Camden (Phelps, 2011). I had become interested in gang 
intervention programmes since 2009 having had responsibility for promoting 
mediation as an intervention tactic across 32 boroughs in London, without 
really establishing what the critical success factors were and what was its 
impact on violence and local crime patterns. Working with several partner 
agencies in Camden, proactive teams were deployed and utilised to disrupt 
gang-related offences. From a professional perspective, many violent 
incidents occurring in London are gang related. Often violence is used “ to 
achieve and maintain status and respect ” (Harris, Turner, Garrett , & 
Atkinson, 2011: ii). 
 
The police role I have had has given me access to how gangs are policed and 
controlled from a variety of perspectives and because of my position and 
responsibilities within the MPS, I have worked with Probation; the Courts; the 
Crown Prosecution Service (CPS); the Department of Children and Young 
Families (DCYF) and Youth Offending Services (YOS), I have been given 
access to a plethora of professionals with many years’ experience in dealing 
with young people and crime. For this research project, advantage of the 
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connections made was taken in order to tap into the reservoir of knowledge 
from those working at the coalface of crime prevention. 
One of the most engaged roles I had with gang related violence and 
subsequently interventions to reduce offending was in Camden in 2011. As 
crime manager ( Detective Chief Inspector, managing a team of over 150 
people, with responsibility for serious acquisitive crime investigation and 
reduction, I saw how these units contributed to the enhancement of police 
knowledge of gang activity and youth offending in general. The burglary and 
motor vehicle unit dealt with investigations concerning these crime types. 
Empirically, police intelligence suggested gang members are involved in this 
type of crime at all levels. The burglaries are often opportunistic and the thefts 
of vehicles such as mopeds are used to facilitate their robbery activities. 
There is an on-going trend in Camden for gang members to ride pillion on 
stolen mopeds and ride past unsuspecting victims in order to snatch their 
smart phone, which is the item of choice for today’s robber. 59% of all 
robberies between 1st August 2007 and July 2010 targeted phones (Coulson, 
2010). 
The robbery unit is made up of a robbery response patrol and an investigative 
branch. The former was set up in order to provide a fast-time response to 
victims of robbery, in the hope that by facilitating a “drive-around”, the recently 
robbed victim is able to identify individual(s) responsible for the act soon after 
it occurs.  The Warrants unit executes arrest warrants, and their primary 
function is to detain individuals, often gang members, responsible for large 
numbers of crimes and to produce them at court at the earliest opportunity, 
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thereby reducing their opportunity to re-offend. The Borough Intelligence Unit 
collates, assesses and analyses the intelligence coming into the Borough on 
gang activity. They have other responsibilities, but in relation to gangs they 
create a nominal list of the most prolific and known offenders. They also 
collate information about gangs; produce a weekly gang tension monitoring 
report and look at cross-border activity. They also provide detailed quantitative 
analysis on crime patterns, comparing past data and looking forward, 
predicting offending patterns based on identified trends. This analysis assists 
in decision making around future operations and deployment of resources. A 
Test Purchase unit put together operations aimed at capturing first-hand 
evidence on drug dealing. These operations are extremely successful in drug 
hot spots such as Camden, which has one of the largest open drug markets in 
Europe (camden.gov.uk 2008-11) The issues surrounding gang membership 
in Camden, a single borough in London, are many and varied, but that is not 
to say empirically unique.  
According to the Camden Treatment Plan Strategic Summary of Adult Drug 
Misuse 2010/2011, 
“Camden has a high prevalence of drugs misuse. Camden’s estimated 
prevalence of crack and/or opiates use is the fifth highest in London. 
There are an estimated 26 problem drug users (PDUs) per 1,000 
Camden residents aged between 15-64. Camden also has the highest 
rates of injecting drug use in London – 43% (1,872) of estimated drug 
users are thought to be injecting” (p1).   
Drug dealing is an integral part of gang culture (Siegel & Welsh, 2011).  
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Prior to undertaking the Crime Manger’s role in Camden, I worked as 
Operations Lead as a Detective Chief Inspector at the Specialist Crime 
Directorate at New Scotland Yard. One of the roles was to deliver mediation 
as a tactic to Borough Detective Chief Inspectors. The Metropolitan Police 
Authority, together with the Department for Communities and Local 
Government (DCLG) set up a community interest company called Capital 
Conflict Management (CCM). This non-profit making company employs 
mediators who specialise in resolving inter and intra-gang conflict.  
For the thesis, the author decided to return to this tactic to review its 
effectiveness in greater detail. This research will explore this single 
intervention method, namely mediation and present the yet unknown 
indicative outcomes of this tactic, when used as an intervention for violence 
reduction in the community, through detailed analysis.  Thorough research 
identifying the outcomes and potential benefits of mediation as an Intervention 
to reduce gang violence is lacking in the UK, and indeed, worldwide. This 
research aims to close the gap that exists regarding the outcomes and 
benefits of mediation when used to reduce violence through a mixed method 
approach (Robson, 2011) . 
Data from 123 individuals referred for mediation have been analysed and the 
results will be published here for the first time. To bolster the validity of the 
analysis, this thesis also provides interview data from those conducted with 
conflict engagement specialists; crime analysts, police officers and staff 
involved in the referral process, including an interview with an ex-gang 
member, in an attempt to appreciate the process and outcomes from their 
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viewpoint.  
National data of referred subjects into accredited conflict resolution 
programmes has, up until now, not been widely available for scrutiny or 
examination and any benefits or good practices identified as a result, has yet 
to be shared or developed further to inform public policy. The MPS 
commissioned an evaluation in 2010 conducted by an external consultancy 
company, Tribal, that evaluated 11 referrals. This evaluation did not 
sufficiently measure over a significant period of time the outcome of such 
referrals. It only conducted checks on nominals over a 3-month period to see 
if they had committed an offence, which barely reflects a meaningful analysis 
and is rather limited. 
In order to access the necessary information I would need in order to carry out 
this research, i.e. data concerning individuals referred and not referred for 
mediation, it was necessary to contact the MPS research and development 
strategy department for ethical approval. One goal was to examine how this 
research could advise those involved in commissioning intervention projects 
and those involved in violence reduction, towards making informed evidence 
based decisions, on the appropriate measures required to reduce gang 
violence.  Cognisant that any type of research should address a knowledge 
gap, (Ellis & Levy, 2009) a survey of relevant journal articles revealed an 
intensely detailed area of study which focuses on gang membership and 
violent offending levels in London and more generally, the UK (Pitts, 2007; 
Harding, 2014; & Densley, 2015).  
Mediation is seen as a powerful intervention, used at the highest level as an 
		 20	
intervention to stop major world conflicts. (West, 2012)3 . For example, the UN 
appointed Sir Tony Blair as the Special Envoy for the Middle East for the 
Quartet, a post he held until recently, following his resignation as Prime 
Minister of the U.K. in 2007, to assist with Arab-Israeli Conflict using 
mediation. The Quartet on the Middle East, sometimes called the Diplomatic 
Quartet or Madrid Quartet or simply the Quartet, is a foursome of nations and 
international and supranational entities, involved in mediating the peace 
process in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Quartet is made up of 
representatives from the United Nations, the United States, the European 
Union and Russia. The group was established in Madrid in 2002 as a result of 
the escalating conflict in the Middle East (Quartet, 2012). If Mediation is a 
suitable intervention for resolving world wars between warring nations, why 
would it not be suitable for resolving local turf wars between rival gangs? 
One of many issues identified in this study is the scepticism surrounding 
mediation as useful tactic for resolving violent conflicts, from Government 
level to local authority level across London (West, 2012). It is slowly gaining 
recognition with chief officers in the MPS, who currently are gatekeepers to its 
future, being the major funders of mediation in London. A few innovative local 
authorities have seen the benefits and commit minor investment, providing 
those green shoots of hope for future growth and acceptance. Other local 
authorities within London who suffer major gang issues, have not 
commissioned mediation (Simons, 2015). The reasons for this is outside the 
scope of this study, but from personal experience and interaction with those 
responsible for commissioning interventions, the reasons appear to be 
																																																								
3	Interview	with	Bethan	West	CCM	November	14th	2012.	
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centred around fiscal constraints; scepticism surrounding the delivery of the 
tactic; or a belief in better alternatives currently being delivered in the USA, 
such as iterations of Operation Ceasefire favoured by the current Mayor, Boris 
Johnson. 
There are some distinctive aspects of mediation, such as working with groups 
and specifically gangs that require particular attention and approaches. 
Conventionally, a general approach to managing youth violence was to build 
relationships between individuals (interpersonal conflict resolution). In the past 
five to ten years, there has been a significant increase in not – for - profit 
agencies and individuals working in communities, refining the mediation 
process. Gang intervention specialists believe that group decision-making 
process have a positive impact in resolving gang - related violence. Gang 
intervention specialists or conflict engagement specialists, interact with street 
gangs so that they can get involved when conflict does occur between rival 
gangs and therefore prevent an increase in hostility. This mediation occurs in 
the context of violence, either existing or pending.  
 
Capital Conflict Management (CCM) has identified various categories of 
mediation in the youth context. They include specific mediation between 
peers, youths and the adults in their daily lives. They deal with individual 
mediation concerning conflict between individuals because conflict 
engagement specialists are frequently called upon to resolve this type of 
conflict.  
CCM has a cadre of trained conflict engagement specialists with the 
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necessary understanding of the local gang structure and dynamics 
specifically. Many have a background which allows them to provide the 
necessary support to individuals and youth generally in the areas where they 
operate and as time goes on, these individuals build the necessary contacts 
and knowledge that support exit strategies for individuals wanting to exit 
gangs. They are able to provide support about the availability of alternatives: 
alternatives to violence and alternatives to their current lifestyle, such as 
community, leisure and employment opportunities.  
In general, mediation requires going to each side of a dispute, and then to and 
fro between the groups (Shuttle Mediation).  Locations for meetings are very 
important, and should be neutral.  Initially, a conflict engagement specialist will 
often be required to go into the gang area of each party, although alternative 
neutral locations can often be arranged. For instance, CCM’s offices may be 
suitable, as well as recreation centres, libraries, coffee shops etc.  
The facilitative approach to mediation is the approach adopted by CMM.  
Mediators using this style of mediation do not judge the actions of the warring 
parties and neither do they offer recommendations for solutions to the conflict. 
The role of the mediators using the facilitative style is to structure and lead the 
process of interaction between the parties, to ask questions, help clarify the 
issues, search for common interests. Their goal is to help the parties create a 
final agreement. CCM’s conflict engagement specialists believe that this 
approach generally leads to a mutually acceptable resolution, which is an 
agreement with assurances that the parties have developed on their own and 
that they will therefore most likely adhere to.  
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The Conflict engagement specialists delivering mediation in intergroup 
conflicts can be former gang members who have become gang intervention 
specialists. They can do what law enforcement cannot do because of their 
status as former gang members who are trusted by their neighbourhoods. 
Law enforcement generally cannot go into these communities and mediate 
peace between warring gangs. This is mainly due to how law enforcement 
personnel are perceived in communities - as enforcers and punishers of crime 
and also due to the fact that law enforcement officers have to act on 
information of law breaking which could be detrimental in a mediation context. 
Gangs will not approach the police to ask them to help them resolve their 
conflicts because traditionally the police have been regarded as an enemy, 
authority figure or even a gang rival. The gang intervention specialists at CCM 
have the community’s trust and generally have or can get the requisite 
knowledge about the community where the conflict is occurring. They often 
know whom to contact to help get a resolution in difficult situations. They are 
able to enter a conflict situation in a community and enter into dialogue with 
residents who may be too afraid or not wish to communicate with authority 
figures. Conflict engagement specialists can be effective by upholding a key 
principle of mediation, which is confidentiality, which allows them to gain full 
trust in the communities where they operate. 
 
Mediators are neutral and have no stake in the outcome. The warring parties, 
not the mediator, decide the outcome. The parties themselves must come up 
with how and what they will agree on to resolve the issue. If mediators feel 
they cannot be neutral they step back and hand over to others who can.  
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Some mediation with gangs is achieved by going to and fro between both 
sides. There are times when both sides never actually sit together, but the 
conflict is resolved through shuttle mediation. .  
Sometimes the shuttle mediation process can take many meetings, but often it 
can be resolved in fewer sessions. It is possible to get a truce without bringing 
people into the same room. Some parties will never be ready to sit down in 
the same room with others. Sometimes it’s possible to find something to bring 
to the table, which can be brought back to the other side, for instance, to 
agree at least to stop the warring.  
The MPS first commissioned mediation in 2009 and Tribal, who evaluated the 
period of interventions for 2010, reviewed it positively. However, mediation 
was not evaluated more than once. Tribal concluded in 2010 that mediation 
had prevented one murder (2011). This was with a £600 000 investment. This 
study will provide further evidence of this. The question policy makers must 
address is how much investment are they prepared to make to save a young 
person’s life? And to put this in some context, “ a homicide costs £1,774,681 
just to investigate”  (Home Office, 2011:8). 
The police role in the mediation process is a significant one. Currently the 
MPS provides the main referral route into CMM and all the analytical and 
intelligence capability to facilitate informed risk management of the situation.  
There are those who argue the role of the police is to enforce the law or 
provide crime prevention advice or crime avoidance advice, but are moving 
into the realms of work historically dealt with by social services (Walker, 1997; 
Lipskey, 1993).  
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In an article by that appeared in the Daily Express, entitled, “The Police 
Should be Law Enforcers not Social Workers” (2013), Pollard, writing in 
response to Tom Windsor being appointed Her Majesty’s Inspector of 
Constabulary, stated that “the police are consciously behaving more like 
social workers and less like, well, police”. 
Tom Windsor speaking about the responsibilities of parents to teach their 
children right from wrong, speaking to the Royal united Services Institute think 
tank stated, “Officers should spend more time preventing crime so they would 
have to focus less on catching criminals” (2013). 
This is a debate that needs further discussion which outside the scope of this 
research, but it was a major consideration when the intervention was at its 
planning stage that the MPS should really distant itself as much as possible 
from the detail of the process. Indeed, there is a firewall that exists between 
the information that is gleaned by CCM operatives and intelligence that could 
come back into the MPS as a result of the mediation, for the sake of ethics 
and trust. CCM have to provide certain guarantees to those with whom they 
engage, namely, that the content of their conversations is confidential and the 
only time there is any breach of that confidentiality is if there is a risk of harm 
or danger to anyone (Simon, 2012). 
  
 
 
		 26	
Introducing Gangs 
This section will consider the evolving debate around the definition, meaning 
and threat posed by gangs in London.  For the most part of the 20th Century, 
gangs were certainly considered a problem particular to the United States of 
America (Klein, Kerner, Maxson & Witkamp, 2001; Klein, 2012).  Gangs 
became increasingly prevalent in London and across major cities in England 
and Scotland towards the latter part of the 20th Century. However, identifying 
what is and what is not a gang has been a specific issue for police officers, 
especially when there is little consensus, amongst academics as to what 
constitutes a gang.  Pitts (2012) proposes that the “hallmark of the 
contemporary debate about youth gangs in both mainstream and left-liberal 
criminology in the UK is its apparent scepticism about the very existence of 
such an entity” (P 27). 
This is an interesting viewpoint, but one that supports the split in current 
thinking in the UK about the gang problem. On one hand there are those who 
agree with Pitts, like former MPS Commissioner, Sir Ian Blair, and findings 
published in the Centre for Social Justice (2009) that believe the threats 
gangs pose are real and increasing, whilst others believe gangs have always 
formed part of modern UK culture (Adridge and Medina, 2008 ; Hallsworth and 
Young, 2008) but the panic mainly induced by media sensationalism makes it 
difficult to establish the true extent of the problem and what it actually means. 
(Isaacs et al, 2014). 
The fact that Home Office does not systematically collect and collate data 
specifically related to gangs  (Young, 2014) does not make it any easier to 
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determine the true extent of the gang problem in the UK today. 
However, from personal knowledge, as a senior officer in the MPS, I would 
support the argument posited by Pitts et all that says “…violent youth gangs 
do exist and their existence poses a serious threat to the safety, well-being, 
and in some cases the lives, of the children, young people and adults who live 
in gang-affected neighbourhoods (Bullock and Tilley, 2002; Youth Justice 
Board, 2007; Palmer and Pitts, 2006; Pitts, 2008; Matthews and Pitts 2007; 
Palmer, 2009; Centre for Social Justice, 2009; Balasunderam, 2009; Pitts, 
2011) ‘ (Pitts, 2012: 32). 
Significant inroads with respect to intelligence surrounding gang prevalence in 
the capital have been made. The MPS currently collates information on over 
250 gangs, identifying 60 as potentially high risk and criminally active in the 
capital.  Analysis following the London Riots of 2011 indicated that 19% of 
those arrested for the disorder, as identified by the Operation Withern 
investigation, were gang members, many of who belong to London’s most 
high-risk gangs.  If, as former Police Commissioner Ian Blair suggested, youth 
violence is the second biggest threat facing the capital after terrorism (Sunday 
Times, 2013), then more research is needed in this area to identify the effort 
that goes into supressing them. 
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Defining the meaning of “gangs” for this study 
 
Before determining the outcomes of using mediation to reduce gang violence 
in the Metropolitan Police Area of London, it is necessary to provide some 
further background into the nature of street gangs in London, in particular, 
describing what these gangs look like; how they operate; and why do people 
join gangs?  It is also necessary to describe the current gang situation in 
London today, which prompted this study. This research will not cover 
organised criminal networks, (OCNs) also referred to as organised criminal 
groups, per se, (whilst accepting that some gangs are indeed OCNs, as will 
be discussed later). This is because OCNs and street gangs have different 
risks associated with them.  
OCNs can be described as  
“Those involved, normally working with others, in continuing serious 
criminal activities for substantial profit, whether based in the UK or 
elsewhere” (SOCA, 2012).   
Shropshire and McFarquar argue that OCNs are crime firms that come 
together specifically to engage in criminal activity whilst street gangs form for 
a variety of social and psychological reasons and engage in wide range of 
group activities above and beyond their criminal dealings (Shropshire & 
McFarquar, 2002). 
Many of the street gangs in London are not OCNs even though some do run 
successful business enterprises such as a prestigious car hire rental company 
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or a gentlemen’s barbershop as evident in Camden Borough (Phelps 2011).  
A study entitled “The Gang and Beyond”, carried out by London Metropolitan 
University (LMU) contends why it is important to differentiate between street 
gangs and other organised crime groups as it  “…helps to identify the 
appropriate response and efforts that should be put towards a specific group” 
(London Councils, 2012:4).  This is a valid observation. Through better 
understanding of the type and extent of gang organization, whilst 
acknowledging their “dynamic, flexible, ever changing” nature (Sanders, 1994: 
xi), interventions can be tailored to address the threat posed.  
These Street Gangs fit the ideas expressed by Skolnick et al. (1990), Padilla 
(1993), Jankowski (1991) and Taylor (2008). They depict some gangs as 
being “well-organised entrepreneurs who employ traditional economic 
strategies of marketing, structure and amassing profits that are reinvested in 
the gang” (Decker, Bynum & Weisel, 1998: 74). 
Conversely, in more recent years however, a number of research projects in 
areas like Strathclyde, Manchester and London have identified the presence 
of gangs in the UK, as being groups of feckless youths, disparate and 
disorganised with no formal leaders. This is reflected in Mares’ (2001) 
ethnographic study of two gangs in Manchester. These gangs were both 
loosely organised and had no formal leaders. Many of the gangs that operate 
in London, in my experience belong to this feckless unstructured type rather 
than the well-oiled machines described above. 
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Recent studies by Hallsworth & Silverstone  (2009) and Densley (2013) 
describe youths as being “on road”.  This is a term commonly used by young 
people to describe a person that spends much of their time on the street. It 
has a negative connotation. Those  ‘on road’ frequently hang out on street 
corners, speaking in slang, and often engage in illegal behavior (Canaan 
Project, 2013). 
Gunter’s 2010 study posits the significance of “Road Culture” in a gang 
setting, and describes how young black people’s identities; lifestyles, 
experiences and transitions are played out in a public setting on the streets 
and in housing estates. These individuals are involved in “badness” and the 
young people themselves identify as being involved in violence, crime and 
drug dealing. They believe they have few choices in society. Either become a 
victim of crime and violence or survive (Runnymede Perspectives, 2011) 
European and UK gang research was largely influenced by Malcolm Klein 
who, via the formation of the Eurogang Project prompted European Countries 
to invest further in gang research to identify the extent and level of such 
issues in the UK and Europe, so that comparable analysis with US 
interventions could be made (Decker & Weerma, 2005).  
Smithson et al conclude that, “United Kingdom-based research has identified 
the presence of discernible groups engaged in criminal activity and weapons 
use. However, descriptions of the nature and organization of these groups 
vary considerably” (Smithson, Ralphs, & Williams, 2013). Thrasher stated in 
his ethnographic seminal study of 1,313 Chicago gangs that no two gangs are 
exactly alike. (Thrasher, 1927).  Hagedorn (1988) Klein, Maxson and 
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Cunningham (1991), describe street gangs operating independently, 
egotistically inspired by the rewards of drug dealing.  Other literature 
describes gangs as consisting of individuals who engage in exaggerated 
versions of adolescent behaviour, who rebel against their parents; use drugs 
and alcohol; and commit acts of graffiti or vandalism (Huff, 1989; Fagan, 
1989).  
 
Identifying further issues around what is a gang and what is not, one only has 
to consider an incident described by Sanday (1990). She describes how a 
well-organised group of older adolescents were accused of committing a gang 
rape in Philadelphia. She notes that prior to this incident, the group were 
already well established in the neighbourhood; notorious for having 
“problematic behaviour’.  Women had repeatedly reported verbal abuse from 
them when passing a row of benches that they frequented, establishing the 
area as their turf. Sanday notes (p71) that all members were enrolled in 
school, yet the group allocated some special status to those who performed 
poorly. New members of the community were often warned about the group 
and women were urged to consider the potential dangers of attending parties 
regularly thrown by them. Bursik and Grasmick sum up the incident by saying,  
 
“To many, this short description has all the classic popular descriptions 
of a gang…However, we have left one very important piece of 
information…these were all members of a prominent fraternity at a 
prestigious, upper-middle class university; the neighbourhood in 
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question was a campus community in Philadelphia” (Bursik & 
Grasmick, 1993:2).  
 
Sanday (1990) goes on to clarify that this incident is alleged as the accused 
were never brought to trial. She provides evidence of the discrepancies that 
exist between the rich, upper-middle classes of society and the conviction 
rates of the poorer, lower classes of comparable black youths in her study of 
gang rape in the US.  These inconsistencies in treatment between groups by 
the state may explain why perceptions of what is and what is not considered 
to be a street gang is not so straightforward.   
 
If researchers are to identify gangs as only existing in socio-economically 
deprived areas or neighbourhoods that are ethnically diverse, there is a 
danger that explanations of gang membership will be confined to these areas 
of poverty and ethnicity, the broader issue of gang membership in London as 
a whole will be become neglected. 
 
Defining gang membership can be problematic. After almost 100 years 
scholars are still unable to agree who is and who is not a gang member. (See 
Thrasher, 1927; Klein (1971); Haskell and Yablonsky (1974) Miller (1982) 
Curry and Spergel (1988) Hallsworth and Young (2008)) and there is still little 
consensus amongst practitioners as to what constitutes a gang.  
Many definitions erroneously seek to determine membership by placing 
emphasis on the number of meetings and amount of contact between 
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individual gang members (Miller, 1982; Short, 1990; Huff, 1993).  
The existence of an obvious leader is another method used to define a gang 
(Johnstone, 1981; Miller, 1982; Spergel, 1984). The volume of its members is 
another factor, and most definitions portray a gang as being a group (Decker 
& Van Winkle, 1996; Klein, 1971; Decker & Curry, 2000).  
However, Klein singles out a more coherent feature of gang 
membership, stating “The communal feature that unites the various 
definitions of what comprises a gang, require that its origins and 
essential purpose for being is its involvement in criminal activity “ 
(Klein, 1971:116).  
 
This sentiment is echoed by Spergel, who posits, “There is no question that 
the major criterion used by many audiences in the definition of gang is the 
groups’ participation in illegal behaviour” (1990:179). 
 
Klein also attempts to encompass many of the surfeits of definitions that have 
emerged over the years by describing five different types of gangs: 
Traditional, Neoclassical; Compressed; Collective; and Specialty. (Klein, 
1996:65). He believes gangs are determined by characteristics such as their 
duration; their size; presence of subgroups; age range of members; focus on 
territorial boundaries; and commission of specific crime types. Many of these 
characteristics are adopted and built upon by other academics and centres for 
research (as detailed in this chapter) in order to present their distinct 
definitions to collectively identify what constitutes a gang and what describes 
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a gang member.  No two gangs are exactly the same and whilst eminent 
scholars, like Klein find innovative ways of characterising them as a collective, 
or group, it is important, certainly for this piece of research, to describe a gang 
rather than define what is and what is not a gang or gang member.  
 
In the UK, a well-documented definition of what is a gang is attributed to the 
authors Hallsworth and Young, who describe a street gang as being  
 
“… a relatively durable, predominantly street-based group of young 
people who see themselves (and are recognized by others) as a 
discernible group for whom crime and violence is intrinsic to identity 
and practice. The minimal characteristic features of the gang then, are 
that it has a) a name, b) a propensity to inflict violence and engage in 
crime where c) violence and delinquency performs a functional role in 
promoting group identity and solidarity.” (2006: 68)  
 
This definition was one of the first to influence policy and practice in the UK 
and resulted in the Metropolitan Police Service initially identifying 171 gangs 
in the Greater London area. (Young, Fitzgibbon, & Silverstone, 2014) 
In 2004, The Rt. Hon. Ian Duncan Smith, set up the Centre for Social Justice 
and their definition of what constitutes a gang is also, often cited and 
incorporates location and conflict within its meaning: 
 
A relatively durable, predominately street-based group of young people who: 
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 See themselves (and are seen by others) as a discernible group,  
 Engage in a range of criminal activity and violence, 
 Identify with or lay claim over territory,  
 Have some form of identifying structural feature and  
 Are in conflict with other, similar gangs.  
(Centre for Social Justice 2009: 21) 
 
The UK Gangs Working Group, which formed in 2009, is made up of 
“prominent academics, practitioners and policy makers who have expertise in 
the relevant fields”. They maintain that they “consult nationally and 
internationally, especially with charities and social enterprises, who are the 
champions of the welfare society” (Centre for Social Justice, 2009:2).  
This working group attempted to introduce a common definition to be used by 
all those involved in tackling gangs to end this lexicon confusion, thus 
enabling meaningful comparative analysis between the various different 
studies and interventions in place. The current Government has continued 
adopting the Gangs Working Group’s five-point definition and it is the 
definition chosen for the recent Ending Gang and Youth Violence report 2011 
(Home Office, 2011). 
Using the definitions adopted by the MPS Specialist Crime Directorate, who 
were responsible for drafting the reference toolkit for police and partners, for 
the purpose of this research, a gang member is 
  
		 36	
“…someone who has been identified as being a member of a gang and 
this is corroborated by intelligence from more than one source (e.g. 
police, partner agencies or community intelligence)” (Tarrant, 2009:24) 
 
There are definitions that try to determine what the various factions of a gang 
are. For example, a gang associate is defined as  
 
“…someone who offends with gang members or who is associated by 
police, partner agencies, or community intelligence, with gang 
members or who has displayed through conduct or behaviour, a 
specific desire or intent to become a member of a gang”  (p.24) 
 
In December 2014, The Serious Crime Bill introduced a new simplified 
definition of a gang member: 
“… the key features of a gang under the new section would be a group which:  
consists of at least three people;  
has one or more characteristics which enable its members to be identified by  
others as a group; and  
engages in gang-related violence or is involved in the illegal drug market “  
(Serious Crime Bill, 2014: 25). 
 
Then there are definitions which seek to establish what a gang crime is. The 
Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime suggest that ‘any gang related crimes or 
gang related incidents or such events where any individual believes that there 
is a link to the activities of a gang or gangs (MOPAC, 2015:1) 
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Those who work closely with gangs identify members by the way in which 
they operate. They discuss how Street Gangs have their own identity, their 
own language, which sets them apart from mainstream society. They use 
words such as Beef to mean dispute or feud, Bling to denote their unique 
Gangster style, usually symbolised by gaudy, ostentatious jewellery.  They 
operate collectively in Crews or Posses, which are terms for Gangs. Their 
leaders are called Face and more established members called Elders and 
their followers’ who operate on the street are known as soldiers. The new 
recruits or mid-level gang members are called Youngers, whilst aspiring 
recruits, usually very young in age (under 10) are known as Tiny. Their 
territory where they hang out or operate is called Endz or Turf. There is great 
emphasis placed on Rep, which means reputation and any perceived affront 
to this is often a root cause for violence, which inevitably follows. They are 
individually identifiable by symbols such as graffiti tags or colours 4 (see also 
Hallsworth and Silverstone, 2009; Hallsworth and Young, 2011). 
 
In June 2015, the Government simplified what a gang is legislatively, to make 
it less prescriptive and more flexible (Bradley, 2015). The previous definition 
related to geographical areas and gang colours. The new definition means 
that only one of the criteria now needs to be satisfied which enables a gang 
member to be so identified by others (see above). This makes it easier for the 
authorities to apply for gang injunctions to prevent further illicit activity 
occurring through controlled measures. 
																																																								
4	Informal	conversation	with	CCM	Operations	Manager	Andy	Simon,	November	8th	2012)	
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The various definitions put forward by academics highlight the ever changing 
and ever evolving nature of what is a gang and what is a gang member. There 
has been an incessant need to capture all the relevant characteristics of a 
gang, to enable those charged with keeping communities safe the ability to 
identify the necessary interventions that would have the greatest impact. 
Some definitions, like the Eurogang definition, are flawed in that they are too 
rigid, particularly in relation to gang durability and geography. The Eurogang 
Network, established in 1997 is made up of European and American 
researchers in the field. They work together to develop a common framework 
for comparative research based on standardised methodological instruments 
and a common research design. The Eurogang network reached a consensus 
on defining a gang (Weerman et al., 2009), understanding the importance of 
an agreed definition for comparative research. In so doing, they have been 
able to produce some enlightening findings in relation to gang violence being 
more complex and destructive when compared to non-gang violence (Klein et 
al., 2006).  
 
The specific definitions of what constitutes a gang and who is a gang member 
are confusing. This is mainly due to so many interested parties (such as 
politicians, the media and academics) adopting various definitions (Ebsen et 
al., 2001; Spergel, 1995), which ultimately lead to an inaccurate media and 
public official’s view of gangs (Horowitz, 1990) 
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So, in summary and in keeping with the new Home Office Serious Crime Bill 
definition of 2014, for the purpose of this research, a gang is a group or a peer 
association of three or more people who have a common identity (often, but 
not restricted to, other visible membership symbols such as colours or graffiti 
tags); they are made up of individuals who identify with each other as being 
gang members; who operate in a clandestine way; much of what they are 
involved in is known only to the group and they are involved in illegal activity 
which includes but is not limited to drug dealing and violence.  For the 
purpose of this research it is necessary to provide a more detailed definition 
than the one presented in the serious crime bill to differentiate between low 
level youths offending generally, and gang members at the extreme end of the 
offending scale, who are the intended subject of this research. 
 
Having described what a gang is for the purposes of this research in the 
following section, the reasons why young people seek gang membership are 
examined. 
  
Why do young people join gangs? 
 
The overall aim of this thesis is not to examine in detail why young people join 
gangs. However, by way of context, it is worth touching on some of the 
theoretical perspectives that exist, in order to provide background knowledge 
against which an individual’s response to mediation can be further explored.  
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A survey of theoretical perspectives examining why individuals join gangs 
reveal a number of themes. These will be examined below. Three of the 
themes concentrate on the attractiveness of gangs and the excitement whilst 
one of the themes focuses on desistance from gangs and delinquency in 
general. Before exploring these themes further, it is worth noting the risk 
factors associated with gang membership 
 
In the USA numerous risk factors associated with individuals joining gangs, 
have been identified. These range from early exposure to violence either as a 
victim or witness,  (Kratcoski, 1982, Lewis, Balla & Shanok, 1976;, 1994; 
Kaufman and Cicchetti, 1989; Paschall, Ennet & Flewelling 1996); alcohol and 
drug abuse (Battin, Hill, Abbott & Catalano, 1998); lack of parental supervision 
or absent parent (Walker‐Barnes, & Mason, 2001); or siblings already 
involved in gangs and violent offending (Decker & Curry, 2000), to name a 
few. Young people are being also being exploited and actively recruited by 
gangs and feel pressurised into joining them (Vigil, 2002). 
 
The risk factors associated with membership can be grouped within five 
natural domains, which are individual, family, peer, school and 
neighbourhood. Those who are at high risk, thinking about some of the factors 
detailed above, will be more at risk without a counterbalancing positive 
influence who could act as a deterrent and steer individuals away from gang 
life  (such as a positive role model or teacher at school). An evaluation of over 
20 studies conducted by Klein and Maxson (2006) suggest peer networks as 
a significant high risk factor: 
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“Having delinquent friends is a noted risk factor for gang joining and 
exerts an influence net of other risk factors” (p147).  
 
A study by the Gang Free Project in Los Angeles (2013) cite six risk factors 
that increase the odds of a young person joining a gang: 
 
 Lack of jobs for youth 
 Poverty compounded by social isolation 
 Domestic violence 
 Negative peer networks 
 Lack of parental supervision 
 Early academic failure and lack of school attachment. 
 
Jankowski (1991:23-26) argues that gang members come from deprived inner 
city slums and the conditions they endure lead to those individuals having a 
particular character trait that he calls ‘defiant individualism”. These attributes 
include competitiveness, mistrust, emotional detachment, independence and 
the need to survive. Jankowski’s Darwin-type view on individuals competing 
for limited resources whilst appearing on the face of it, logical, provides little 
empirical evidence to support this.  
 
The Centre for Social Justice suggests class and anomie is one reason why 
young people seek out gang membership. 
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“Young people from dysfunctional families who live in deprived areas of 
high unemployment, crime and violence and who are marginalised from 
mainstream society can potentially find’ opportunity, status and wealth 
through joining a gang” (The Centre for Social Justice, 2009:35).  
 
If we accept that the risks identified in the United States are indeed mirrored in 
the UK, the idea that gang members evolve from low-income, diverse 
populations, living in deprived areas of the UK is wanting. This is because 
most young people from such areas in similar circumstances do not become 
gang members.  
 
As Klein (1995:75-6) notes,  
 
“ There is a selection process that results in 1 percent, or 5 percent, or 
10 or even 20 percent of gang-age youths choosing the gang option 
while the majority select themselves out”. 
 
So why do some individuals join gangs and others not? In order to develop a 
theoretical framework that examines the reasons why young people are drawn 
into street gangs, it is necessary to explore the pushing and pulling levers that 
lead to this event. Getting involved in gangs can be the beginning of a cyclical 
process that can ruin a young person’s life. With a criminal record it can be 
harder to get a job or progress into further education. Being caught up in 
violent incidents can lead to getting arrested, sent to prison, seriously injured 
or even killed. Many criminological theories exist which attempt to determine 
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why young people join gangs. Some of these theories will be explored in more 
detail below. 
 
Existing theories, which are more generally delinquency based, go some way 
towards explaining why and how individuals become involved with gangs.  
What follows is broadly four principal reasons that can describe why 
individuals become involved in gangs.  
 
The first, “control theory” explains why individuals desist from joining. These 
complex factors that prevent gang membership are seen as being opposite to 
the risk factors described above that draw individuals into the world of gangs 
(Silvestri et al., 2009:17).  Control theory seeks to examine why individuals 
keep to the rules and desist from offending as opposed to many criminology 
theories, which focus on why individuals offend. In contrast, individuals learn 
not to commit criminal acts through the development of close social bonds 
and adherence to societal norms. They accept the rules determined by 
convention and society itself. These are known as protective factors (Huff, 
1989).  
 
A reason why individuals join gangs can be attributed to the idea of rebellion 
and excitement and can be linked to “strain theory”. This idea suggests that 
the pressures and conventional norms of today’s society make youths come 
together to rebel against society. They establish their own subculture, and 
normalise their behaviour, reinforcing their hedonistic gang lifestyle (Cohen, 
1955; Cloward & Ohlin, 1960; Short & Strodtbeck, 1965). Young people join 
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gangs to relax, rebel and revel, giving the idea that to belong to a gang is 
seductive and thrilling (Reimer, 1994). 
 
Cohen (1955) observed gangs living amongst groups of disadvantaged lower 
class populations in which they desired the trappings of the middle classes.  
These youths could never succeed against the “middle class measuring rod” 
(Cohen, 1955:28).  A “criminal subculture emerged” (Fagan, 1989) where 
gangs emerged as a response to class-based social strains (Klein, 1971). 
 
In a city like London, there are extreme voids between the very richest in 
society and the very poor. There are more billionaires in London than in any 
other city in the world (Barber, 2015). The average price of a three-bedroom 
property in Central London is around £ 1 million. The Rt. Hon. Iain Duncan 
Smith suggested, ‘“that ghettos” of poor quality social housing, ignored by the 
middle classes, were a factor in the London riots of 2011(The Guardian, 
2011). “Strain theory” suggests those who join gangs do so because they 
have little aspiration or belief that they will ever get a decent education, a 
good job; or own a place of their own in the city. They rebel against what 
society norms promote.  
 
A third theme is associated with attachment and belonging. The idea of 
individuals getting involved with gangs stems from the idea first posited by 
Thrasher (1927) and subsequently by Shaw and McKay (1942) which 
suggests youth gangs evolve as a result of natural association and are normal 
characteristics in urban disorganisation and intergroup conflict areas (Hipp, 
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Tita, Bogess, 2009). This idea suggests that individuals come together out of 
a need to create order in the “community disorganisation” (Thrasher, 1926:7) 
in which they find themselves. 
 
Throughout 2013/4, The Evening Standard Newspaper ran a series of articles 
dedicated to heightening awareness of gang membership in London, 
highlighting the reality that some young people face on a daily basis. One 
such article provided some insight, depicting the life of a gang member known 
as Ricky and explored his motivation for joining a notorious London Gang 
(Cohen, 2013).  Ricky was recently released from prison following a 15-month 
sentence for causing grievous bodily harm. He had endured a violent 
childhood at the hands of his abusive father and had been diagnosed with 
ADHT at the age of six. Alienated from mainstream society and with no strong 
family ties, one “family” welcomed him in. They were known as the PDC — 
the Poverty Driven Children, Pussy Drugs Cash or the Peel Dem Crew — and 
from age 13 they became his substitute family.  
 
“It was a big gang, over 100 people, and I was just a younger. But I 
became a core member and that got me protection from other gangs 
on my back and I made easy money, several grand a week. We sold 
crack, heroin, weed, cocaine. I ain’t gonna lie, it was fun at the time. I 
felt untouchable and did my first armed robbery at 13” (2013). 
 
Young people join gangs to fulfil their basic need for attachment; to belong; to 
be intimate; to fit in; for respect. (Cresswell & Piano Clark, 2011; Maxwell, 
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2011; Christ, 2014). In London, where many families come seeking 
employment or fleeing war and persecution from overseas, many find 
themselves housed in some of the most deprived areas of London with 
fragmented communities and disparate community ties. The absence of a 
common language or culture alienates large sections of society and may 
explain why sections of society feeling marginalised by the masses, form 
close bonds and friendships with individuals in similar situations. Gangs offer 
that missing sense of commonality and belonging that the majority of society 
enjoys and through community and peer pressure, the vast majority of the 
populous desist from committing criminal or more specifically, violent acts. 
 
A fourth theme is linked to money and status. Some researchers, such as 
Pitts (2008) argue that young people build respect and achieve status on the 
street through gang membership. Status is earned through violence, which is 
usually linked to drugs, which is a very lucrative business. The Centre for 
Social Justice (2009:35) support this idea by asserting, 
 
“Young people from dysfunctional families who live in deprived areas of 
high unemployment, crime and violence and who are marginalised from 
mainstream society can potentially find’ opportunity, status and wealth 
through joining a gang” 
 
In areas of London where there is much deprivation, a lack of job or training 
opportunities, a section of society feels alienated and excluded from 
employment or education. When faced with such an existence, individuals 
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develop a deviant “subcultural solution” (Hopkins Burke, 2008:156) where 
they construct their own values and norms. The “search for respect, status 
and money” (The Centre for Social Justice, 2009:58) leads to violent 
offending. They defend their “turf” or territory in order to deal in drugs. Of 
course, not all unemployed individuals become criminals.  Hopkins Burke 
(2005) asserts that people “ can be unemployed for many years, surviving on 
a very limited income while remaining law-abiding citizens’ (p228). However, 
there are some researchers who evidence the “correlation between gangs, 
gang violence and the development of the underclass” (Burke and Sunley, 
1998:37). 
 
The Common themes running through these existing theories is the young 
people who join gangs believe they will be provided with things that would 
otherwise be unobtainable. Ultimately, all of these theories have their merits 
but are theories of delinquency and not theories associated wholly with gang 
membership.  Certain individuals have various criminogenic needs, which 
make them more receptive to gang membership, which in turn leads to pro-
offending attitudes and values, aspects of antisocial personality (e.g. 
impulsiveness), poor problem solving, substance abuse, high hostility and 
anger, and criminal associates (Chatteriji, 2005).  
 
These theories encompass the many risk factors that are associated with 
gang membership. Some of these carry more weight, and can be categorised 
as high, medium or low risk. Nevertheless, in the right set of circumstances, 
these risks and the existence of an already cohesive gang structure can pull 
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or push individuals into the street group and the downward spiral of offending 
and violence begins. 
 
When looking at reasons why individuals join gangs, it is equally valid to 
examine reasons why individuals leave gangs or desist from offending. 
Desistance may occur when an individual relinquishes membership as a result 
of employment, a relationship, or becoming a father (Pyrooz & Decker, 2011). 
Equally, desistance may occur when an individual has been prosecuted for a 
criminal offence and their activities may reduce or stop for fear of 
repercussion (Wood & Alleyne, 2010). Desistance will be explored later when 
examining interventions that are adopted to reduce gang violence. 
 
So, in summary, the reasons young people join gangs in addition to their 
criminogenic needs are wide and varied. They include; the need to belong; the 
feeling of being in a family; financial recompense; protection; peer pressure; 
feeling of excitement; or simply, the feeling of being ‘cool’. Issues such as; 
family breakdown, a lack of positive male role models, failures in the 
education system, lack of personal identity, discrimination and poverty also 
push young people into the gang way of life.  
 
It is important to identify the risk factors associated with gang membership so 
that the most appropriate individuals can be targeted with interventions at the 
earliest opportunity rather than customising intervention programmes to deal 
with problematic gangs.  Which brings us on to the specific issues London 
faces by having gangs operating within the city. 
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Gangs in London 
Existing UK literature is now able to provide a sufficiently robust theoretical 
framework, necessary to introduce an examination into the make-up and 
nature of gangs in London and as such, a discussion of the various sources of 
literature emanating from studies conducted will follow. 
According to the Metropolitan Police (May 12th, 2013) there are around 257 
recognised gangs in London, which consist of approximately 4,500 people. At 
the upper end of the spectrum are organised criminal networks, involved in 
Class A drugs supply and firearms. These types of gangs are not the focus of 
this study. At the other end of the scale are street-based gangs involved in 
high impact community crimes, such as violence and personal robbery. This 
relatively small number of people is responsible for approximately 22% of 
serious violence, 17% of robbery, 50% of shootings and 14% of rape in 
London (Dawson, Stanko, Higgins, & Rehman, 2011). 
 
Accepting that London, over the past 35 years, has seen an emergence of  
“mostly ethnic street gangs involved in the sale of drugs with strong inter-gang 
rivalry and high levels of street violence” (Shipman, 1997) as mirrored in other 
UK cities with known gang issues, the qualitative research that I have 
conducted suggests the evolvement of ethnic blurring. Gangs that once 
existed in clearly defined post coded territories, whose origins stemmed from 
ethnic origins, such as the Turkish Gangs and Jamaican Gangs, operating 
independently now seem to be moving into new areas, pooling their skills and 
resources to ensure their business model survives.  
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London, has seen the emergence of violent youth gangs posing specific 
challenges around serious youth violence, street robberies, anti-social 
behaviour, as well as violence, particularly in and around schools and colleges 
is as noticeable. It became a key issue for the Mayor’s Office in 2012, with the 
launch of the Anti Gang Strategy (2012) 
 
Many of these gangs in London can be found in areas of high deprivation, 
poverty, and immigration. Many of the street gangs evolve or continue to 
expand in the shadows of the OCNs and crime families that are already in 
existence. When looking at OCNs and gangs in London, there is a propensity 
towards “ethnic collectivism”. There are gangs dating back to the 1970s, such 
as the Ghetto Boys, Peckham Boys and Tottenham ManDem, all of which are 
made up entirely of black males and females. Asian gangs exist, such as the 
Brick Lane Massive and Tamil gangs such as Tamil Snake Gang and 
Wembley Massive. In Tower Hamlet’s Borough, it is estimated that 26 out of 
27 gangs are Bangladeshi (Sherman, Gartin, & & Buerger, 1989). 
 
In the following section, the composition of gangs based on ethnicity is 
described for background. It is largely unreported in academic literature and 
this knowledge is gleaned from MPS intelligence data basis and problem 
profiles created for police purposes.  
 
The Daily Telegraph, citing police intelligence data, reported that, of the crime 
gangs known to Scotland Yard, 24 languages are spoken and  
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“47% are classed as cultural networks whose members are bound by a 
common language or homeland” (Leapman, 2006).  
 
The article reports further,  
 
“There are Turkish, Chinese, Vietnamese and Colombian Gangs- 
whose victims are often from their own communities”.  
 
Two thirds of these gangs are involved in Britain’s £7 billion a year drug trade, 
whilst others are involved in prostitution, fraud and people smuggling. When 
the drug lord, Abdullah Baybasin was convicted in January 2006, it was 
claimed that he and his Kurdish Gang from Eastern Turkey were responsible 
for controlling 90% of Britain’s heroin supply. (Leapman, 2006) 
 
In North London, Turkish Cypriot crime families can be found, and are a 
mixture of street gangs and OCNs. Following the substantial immigration of 
Turkish Cypriots to London in the 1970s, criminal gangs comprised of Turkish 
Cypriots were formed in poorer neighbourhoods. They are mainly involved in 
drug trafficking, money laundering and armed robbery. They have more 
recently been involved in ‘tit-for-tat’ fatal shootings. Turkish Cypriot gang 
members are also believed to be heavily involved in organised crime targeting 
business premises through extortion. (Tilley, Hopkins, Edwards, Burrows, 
2007) 
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Information collated by the MPS intelligence unit have identified that Pakistani 
crime families are mostly of Pashtun or Mirpuri descent, and are involved in 
large scale heroin trafficking as well as kidnapping, extortion, weapon 
smuggling and murder. The Pakistani crime groups are one of the main 
sources of heroin trafficking in the UK, as are the Turkish mafia. They are 
usually more active in cities such as Bradford, Birmingham and Leeds, where 
considerable Pakistani communities exist. More recently, Pakistani gangs 
have been involved in sexual exploitation of predominantly white British girls 
in cities like Rotherham and Derby.  
 
The Afro-Caribbean crime gangs formed following the arrival of Jamaican 
immigrants into the UK's major cities in the 1960s. Criminal gangs known as 
Yardies were formed in 1980s. Predominantly Jamaican descended groups 
are active in drug trafficking, mainly cocaine and smuggling of weapons. The 
original Afro-Caribbean Yardie criminals have also formed groups native to 
Britain. The Tottenham ManDem is one such example, but many of its 
members are also mixed race. (Densley & Stevens, 2014) 
 
The Nigerian crime groups in London are mainly of Yoruba and Igbo ancestry 
and formed criminal gangs in neighbourhoods where there were numerous 
Nigerians of similar descent. They are mainly involved in cocaine and heroin 
trafficking, as well as weapon smuggling. Occasionally, there are violent 
clashes between them and local Afro-Caribbean gangs as is the case with on 
going battles between the mainly Nigerian Peckham Boys and the Afro-
Caribbean Ghetto Boys. The Shankstarz and Dem Africans operate in 
		 53	
Edmonton, and it is in this London borough that a 15 year old black male was 
surrounded and knifed to death in a believed ‘tit-for-tat’ gang dispute in 2011 
(Sanders, 1994). 
 
Indian crime families are of Jatt Sikh descent and are more are active in 
deprived areas of London and the UK, which have communities with a large 
Indian population, the most notable being Southall in the Metropolitan Police 
Area, and Slough, just outside in Thames Valley Police Area.  They trade in 
heroin trafficking but are also prolific in protection rackets, usually amongst 
their own community, VAT scams, credit card frauds and human trafficking. 
The Holy Smoke and Tooti Nungs are two such London gangs. 
 
The Tamil gangs come from the Tamil immigrant community that recently 
arrived in the UK, as a result of the conflict in their native Sri Lanka. They are 
known to be involved in robbery, extortion, credit card fraud and other scams, 
weapon smuggling and running protection rackets, as well as murder and 
torture. The Tamil gangs operating in London are notoriously violent and even 
though they are not majorly involved in drug trafficking, they have diversified, 
setting up high-level scams that make lots of money. A consequence of this is 
persistent violent battles in a bid to control the areas where they operate. The 
Wembley Boys and Tamil Snake Tigers are two such London gangs. 
 
Evidence of the existence of ethnic gangs as can be seen, still prevail, but in 
recent years, there has been a shift from gangs that have “a greater sense of 
territorialism” (Cox, 2011) Like the gangs or crews in New York, London 
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gangs are joining forces, pooling resources to carry out crime to ensure the 
survival of their business. 5 
 
Having discussed the make up of gangs in London, it is now necessary to look 
at the extent of violence they are involved in. 
 
The Response to Gang violence in London 
The threat that exists from London gangs changes over time, whilst gang-
related violence remains a constant, affecting more and more boroughs in 
London.  Much of the gang violence that exists in the Capital is linked to drug 
disputes and perceived territorial rights to deal within postcode areas of the 
city. 
 
According to Hobbs (2013), gangs of youths work together and are 
increasingly market savvy and ‘the drug trade offers an accessible alternative 
sphere of enterprise to declining opportunities in traditional male employment’ 
(p.116). Hobbs writes about a cluster of areas in the East End of London, 
which he calls Dogtown. He states that here, drug dealing becomes part of 
everyday life and part of its ‘fabric’ (p.124). These youths seek to ‘locate 
alternative means of constructing identity, and along the way gain status and 
respect, generate excitement, have fun – and make money’ (p.125).  
Unfortunately, along the way this offers opportunities for rivals to disrespect 
other gang members encroach on each other’s turf and contribute to the 
																																																								
5	Meeting with Detective Cesar Diaz, 27th May 2014. NYPD HQ. Brooklyn New York City, NY.	
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never-ending cycle of violence that accompanies these activities and 
behavior. 
 
The similarities between street gang entrepreneurship and the activities of 
organised criminal networks is increasing as new media savvy individuals find 
easier ways to accumulate wealth through on line fraud and can be more 
lucrative and less risky than “on road “street dealing (Power, 2014) 
 
The National Strategic Assessment of Serious and Organised Crime states, 
“Involvement in street gangs, for example, can lead to involvement in drugs 
distribution, firearms offences and sexual exploitation (The National Crime 
Agency, 2015: 8), contributing to the £24 billion a year organised crime costs 
the UK.  Street Gangs have a very significant part to play. The young people 
who “are also commonly exploited, being recruited to work as runners” (p23) 
in street gangs. “Children are perceived as inexpensive, easily controlled and 
less likely to be detected by law enforcement” (p23)  
 
 
The MPS has established a task force which purports to “work with and for all 
communities to pursue gangs and gang members, regardless of their 
background” (MPS, 2013b). This unit is called The MPS Trident Gangs Unit - 
an expansion of the MPS Trident Unit (which was established to target gun 
crime in the capital, with a particular focus on shootings related to the illegal 
sale of drugs, and crime in Afro-Caribbean communities in March 1998, 
following a series of shootings in Lambeth and Brent). The existing remit of 
		 56	
Trident has been expanded from its focus on shootings into proactively 
tackling more general gang related offending.  
 
The MPS Trident Gangs Unit aims to identify and pursue those gangs posing 
most risk to London. It is a proactive unit, which aims to dismantle gangs 
through a targeted approach. Together with partner agencies, such as 
housing, health, the department for children and families and local authorities, 
they aim to identify young people on the periphery of gang involvement and 
divert them away, by ensuring the right resources are mobilised to intervene 
(MPS, 2013). 
  
An article in the Evening Standard looking at gang violence in the capital 
reported that “ The full impact of gang crime in London is revealed … by new 
Met figures showing 6,600 violent offences were committed by gang members 
in just three years.” (Bentham, 2014; Cohen, 2013).  
 
The violent offending includes   
“24 murders, 28 attempted killings, 170 firearms offences, as well as 
stabbings and kidnappings. Other offences include grievous bodily 
harm with a weapon and also robbery. Each of the violent crimes was 
carried out by one of 3,484 gang members logged on an official Met 
database. (MPS, 2013a) 
 
The MPS recognised that gang membership and criminality associated with it, 
is not a problem it can tackle alone. Enforcement tactics when used 
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effectively, go some way towards displacing the problem, but not eradicating it 
completely.  To effectively tackle this problem the MPS sought the assistance 
of London’s communities. By doing so, they sought to increase the 
opportunities to bring offenders to justice with supporting independent 
evidence and reduce opportunities for gang criminality with a particular focus 
on violence reduction  
 
This reasonably new approach to tackling gang violence is having a positive 
effect, as the MPS modifies internal structures ensuring they are fit for 
purpose in terms of enforcement and intelligence and develops further 
partnership working, by exploring alternatives that a few years ago may have 
been unthinkable - such as independently delivered mediation targeting those 
suspected of having committed or are about to commit, serious violence.  
 
There are now dedicated gang units in every London Borough that are 
supporting the work of Trident and other police units in an attempt to develop 
a joined-up policing response, and provide consistency to partnership 
working, joining efforts to divert people from the gang lifestyle. 
 
Commander Dean Haydon, who was the head of the Trident Gangs Unit, 
commenting on the gang violence statistics for 2012/13 in London states,  
 
“We are talking about young people being shot and stabbed…If we can 
stop just one young person being shot or stabbed then it is worthwhile. 
That’s why Trident is here.” (Cohen, 2013) 
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When murders peaked in the capital in 2007 and 2008 and “ these were 
regularly … being described as "gang-related" by the media, police officers 
and senior officials” (Citizens Report, 2014),  the MPS launched an anti-gun 
and knife campaign, focusing on Serious Youth Violence reduction as a 
priority. By the end of 2009 the number of teenage murders in London had 
reduced by over 50% (from 29 in 2008 to 14 in 2009). However, by the end of 
2015, the number of teenage murders in London had risen to 17 from 11 in 
2014 (MPS, 2016). 
 
It is recognised that the majority of young people who live in the UK are not 
involved in serious youth violence or gangs (Home Office, 2011).  A UK-based 
international think-tank called the Independent Advisory Research Service 
(IARS), whose mission is, “to give everyone a chance to forge a safer, fairer 
and more inclusive society” (Gavrieldes, 2013), states that 99% of young 
people in London have never been involved in crime and the vast majority are 
law-abiding citizens making a positive contribution to communities. 
(Gavrieldes, 2012). But for those who are involved in violent offending, there 
are a number of interventions programmes that have been introduced in 
London, intended to tackle violent offending specifically caused by gangs. 
 
These programmes have divergent views, stemming from initiatives driven at 
a local level where communities muster to present organic solutions led by 
their members such as “My Gang” in Hackney (Brown and Old, 2011) and 
“Enough is Enough” (Waltham Forest Council , 2016) in Waltham Forest. In 
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contrast there are those programmes influenced from seemingly well 
evaluated solutions that have emanated from the USA, such as Ceasefire, 
and the impact and influence that these types of interventions have on the 
Mayor and Home Office when it comes to future programmes, resourcing and 
funding.  
 
In London, there is Project Oracle, a programme that “aims to reduce youth 
violence in London by developing the means by which to understand which 
interventions are effective in addressing youth crime and violence” (Project 
Oracle, 2016). The Project Oracle hub aims to improve outcomes for young 
people in the capital. By building upon the capacity of providers and funders 
to develop and commission evidence-based projects, creating an environment 
in which evidence can be more widely collected, used and shared. “It aims to 
work with specific "cohorts" or sub-sets of the sector to embed good practice, 
and at a national and international level to promote the wider use of 
evaluation and evidence. Project Oracle is funded by the Greater London 
Authority (GLA), the Mayor’s Office for Police and Crime (MOPAC) and the 
Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC)” (Project Oracle, 2016). 
Stenson and Silverstone caution when adopting, “ Off- the shelf professional 
strategies borrowed from other time zones” suggesting they “ rarely work 
unless tailored carefully for local contexts” (2013:440). 
 
Accepting that, to date that  “No single agency, community group, discipline, 
or approach alone is sufficient to successfully address a complex problem 
such as gang crime." (Spergel & Grossman 1997:469), it is now time to 
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explore one such intervention, Mediation, which relies on multi-agency 
collaboration, and to examine the outcomes when used to prevent gang 
violence.  
 
Determining gang membership for the purposes of mediation 
The Metropolitan Police Intelligence Bureau (MIB) scan intelligent reports 
submitted from across the 32 MPS London boroughs daily. These reports are 
created as a result of incoming information from members of the public; 
information from partner agencies, e.g. the local authority, fire brigade, 
ambulance service, social services; and information from informants, today 
referred to as covert human intelligence sources (CHIS). Information is also 
obtained from scanning known offenders’ social media accounts, such as 
Facebook and Instagram.  
 
MIB also identify isolated instances of violence or increasing gang tension 
from incidents occurring over the past 24 hours and look at anniversaries of 
public disorder; murders; high profile arrests to predict future potential 
escalations in violent incidents. This complex web of analysis seeks to identify 
those deemed to pose the most risk and harm to individuals or communities. 
This intelligence may come to note following a violent incident; a stabbing 
where paramedics have been called or a person presents themselves at A&E 
for example. Intelligence checks are conducted on the victims, or if known, the 
suspects and it is at this point that the MIB piece together supporting 
intelligence on the individuals; associates; addresses etc. to determine 
whether or not, in all probability, gang links are present.  
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Violent incidents or Critical incidents, are discussed at daily risk meetings both 
in the borough where it occurred to establish a borough response to 
prevention of further outbreaks of violence and detection of the original 
incident, and centrally, to provide additional asset support and discuss 
deployment of alternative tactics, such a mediation if appropriate. 
 
The MPS also has a gang matrix, which prioritises the threat of harm and risk 
amongst the various gangs in the London area, by using a series of point 
scoring based on violence and tensions, in order to prioritise preventative and 
enforcement activity. Whilst not a perfect predictor of violence, it will pick up 
emerging escalating tensions and advise the boroughs accordingly so that 
preventative action can be taken. 
 
Rarely do local authorities, probation or prison contribute fully to the picture of 
gang activity within their area of operation although, some boroughs are 
realising that they have conflict issues that requires the use of a different 
tactic. There has been reluctance, particularly amongst certain local 
authorities to acknowledge that gangs even exist in their areas. This could be 
political, in so much as Local Authorities, by recognising or acknowledging the 
issues, are legally committed to reducing crime and anti-social behaviour 
within their boroughs. By not mapping or accounting for the issues, they do 
not have to be directly dealt with.  
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However, there are a number of innovative boroughs within London who are 
covertly monitoring gang activity and have secured the services of Capital 
Conflict Management (CCM), funding lower level conflicts; ones that fall 
outside the MPS contract. They also support transitional projects, which aim 
to remove individuals from the cycle of violence. The MPS still provides the 
risk management and intelligence support to these boroughs and the Local 
authorities are able to show how they are reducing anti-social behaviour and 
harm in communities.  
 
Referring to an earlier claim in this chapter regarding what constitutes a gang 
member and reinforcing the idea that that no two gangs are the same, the 
next chapter will further expand the theoretical base for this thesis and explore 
the various interventions available and analyse what is meant by mediation in 
the context of violence reduction. It will examine the idea posited by a 
Government Study which evaluated what works, regarding violence reduction 
interventions, following a nightclub shooting incident where two innocent girls 
were killed in the West Midlands, (Pepler & Slaby, 1994) recommending 
interventions to tackle violence should tackle the crime and not target gang 
membership. 
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Chapter 3 Intervention and violence reduction  
 
“We must keep in mind that there are many paths to peace and that only one 
involves violence” Jimmy Carter, (Bercovitch, 1996:x) 
 
Introduction 
	
	
Existing literature, which evaluates the outcomes of interventions used to 
control gangs and innovative tactics to prevent and reduce violent offending 
by members of street gangs will be examined in this chapter. There will be an 
examination of intervention programmes and outcomes typically undertaken to 
reduce gang violence followed by an analysis of mediation to diffuse conflict, 
specifically in the context of gangs and violent offending, with a particular 
focus on activity in London. The issues surrounding a lack of appropriate 
evaluation of the interventions and a lack of evidence-based outcomes are 
also identified.  
 
The literature review completed at the start of this research aimed to review 
existing theories on interventions to reduce violent offending amongst gangs 
and the outcomes of such interventions. Existing literature and research, 
which focuses on the lack of evaluation for such interventions has also been 
studied. This aspect of the research involved a systematic search of the 
literature using a variety of resources, including online sources, peer-reviewed 
journal articles, Government documents and internal police reports.  
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The literature review was conducted in three phases:  
 
1)  Identifying key and relevant material from the USA, UK and European 
academic literature, policy documents and research.  
2) Quality assessment of the information to ensure that the material used 
was fit for purpose.  
3) Bringing together my findings to produce an inclusive consistent 
summary, which is incorporated in this chapter. 
 
Intervention programmes and outcomes 
“Intervention programs almost never implement controlled research designs” 
(Klein, 2012:1039).  
 
This observation about intervention programmes not being properly tested is 
something that appears as a recurring theme among those whom I 
interviewed, and will be discussed later. Klein suggests that there is little 
testing or comparative analysis to determine what does and does not work 
(2012).  Braga reports that when it comes to evaluating intervention 
programmes, “less valid answers [are provided] to policy questions when 
compared to well-designed quasi-experiments and randomised control trials” 
(Braga, 2010:173) 
 
Preventing violence committed by street gangs is essential, as recent studies 
show that gang members, although relatively few in number compared with 
the population of young people in London, account for the majority of all crime 
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among youths in boroughs that are known to have gang problems. (See 
previous chapter, Ending Youth Violence Report (Home Office, 2011)). 
 
The various strategies undertaken by the authorities and communities such as 
pursuing gangs directly; targeting gang problems within an overarching 
approach for dealing with serious, violent, and habitual juvenile crime; and 
directing activities towards gang-related violence specifically, will be explored 
in this chapter. 
 
The results of a literature review on gang intervention programmes used to 
reduce violent offending indicate that the findings of empirically validated 
research carried out to date are weak.  A very small number of field tests have 
been completed, and where evaluation has taken place, adverse outcomes 
are not uncommon, such as; individuals being disproportionately targeted, 
having been identified as gang members in the absence of any real hard 
evidence and intervention programmes being implemented that disrupt or 
detract from interventions where they are most needed.  Evaluation research 
is not always built into gang related initiatives (Stinchcomb, 2002).  
 
A wide range of strategies and interventions are available to practitioners 
concerned with gang related violence reduction and prevention. These 
interventions are implemented by individuals, communities, businesses, non-
government organisations and all levels of government in a bid to target the 
various social and environmental factors that increase the risk of crime, 
disorder and victimisation (Van Dijk & De Waard, 1991). There is an excess of 
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approaches available that differ in terms of focus regarding intervention and 
the types of activities that can actually be delivered, the theory sitting behind 
how these activities are designed to bring about the desired results and the 
mechanisms that are adopted (Morgan, Boxall, Lindeman, & Anderson, 2012) 
 
Over the years, these many varied intervention models have been developed 
to collate the broad range of activity falling within the definition of crime 
prevention (Lohrir, Farrington, & Justice, 1998) To recognise the importance 
of a particular approach to crime prevention, it is necessary to appreciate the 
implications in determining the appropriate institutional and management 
arrangements necessary to support specific crime prevention interventions 
(Telep, 2013). An understanding of the different approaches available and 
their underlying logic and principles is fundamental to the development of 
effective crime prevention programmes and projects (Weerman et al., 2009). 
 
A challenge faced by those charged with delivering interventions is 
establishing what is effective; where it will have the greatest impact and on 
whom. Klein, citing Wilson and Chermak (2011) states,  
 
“ a considerable gap exists (demonstrable in scientific terms, one 
should add). Various project reports between “promising” strategies 
and demonstrably successful programs and—most notably—
government summaries overstate promise in the face of mixed and 
negative results” (p1037) 
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 Klein (2012) goes onto say that there is  
 
“… a woeful absence of (a) well-implemented programs and (b) 
adequately evaluated programs. Indeed, one could infer from the Klein 
and Maxson summaries that almost everything is “promising” because 
so little has been tested properly.” (p1037) 
 
In the USA, The Boston Ceasefire Programme is often cited as being one of 
the most successful interventions to target gangs and violent offending. It is 
cited by many as being a success with outcomes such as a 63-percent 
monthly decrease in the number of youth homicides in Boston; a 32-percent 
monthly decrease in the number of citywide shots-fired calls; and a 25-percent 
monthly decrease in the number of citywide gun assault incidents; (Bragga et 
al, 2001) 
	
Boston’s Operation Ceasefire targeted youth and adult gang members in a 
multi-agency coordinated Youth Violence Strike Force. It was founded 
following detailed analysis of homicide among Boston’s youth. The outcome of 
this analysis determined that this violence was gang-centred, neighbourhood-
based, and concentrated in a small number of repeat-offending, gang-involved 
youth (Kennedy, Piehl, Braga, 2001:221). 
 
The Ceasefire programme started in individual neighbourhoods with an overt 
communication campaign (Wakeling, 2003). This campaign began with the 
co-ordination of community groups who subsequently carried out face-to-face 
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meetings with gang members. They delivered a consistent message. Gang 
violence would no longer be tolerated.  Gang violence had triggered a zero-
tolerance approach and that only an end to gang violence would stop 
innovative gang-focused suppression actions. Gang members found guilty of 
committing serious violence would face the full weight of the law. The 
substantial sentences that convicted gang members received were advertised 
in high-crime areas. The key elements of the programme were delivered 
through an integrated approach from grassroots organisations and the faith 
community. 
 
An important factor of the operation was for each agency involved to keep to 
their role. There was to be no blurring of areas of responsibility. The 
partnership working task force of Boston police officers and other agencies 
repressed youth and adult gang violence including gun use. These 
suppression tactics included “pulling levers” which included incitements 
intended to entice individuals into a certain way of behaviour complemented 
with “pushing levers”, which promised to deliver the full weight of the law that 
was available in the given circumstances. Costs imposed on offenders in 
relation to their habitual offending included the targeted use of serving 
warrants, enforcing probation restrictions, and deploying federal enforcement 
powers at every opportunity. 
 
In addition, another element of the programme called Operation Night Light, 
where police and probation officers, working in teams, made nightly visits to 
addresses of youths on probation to ensure they were complying with their 
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probation requirements, aided the targeting of tough enforcement sanctions 
against leaders of the gangs. City “street workers” (outreach workers, gang 
prevention specialists, and mediation specialists) also worked alongside 
police and probation officers, helping resolve conflicts and provided those who 
wanted help with much needed services.  
 
However, following an initial evaluation conducted by Braga et al (2001) it is 
certain that the initial successes could not be directly attributed to the 
programme and the intervention methods in isolation, although claimed by 
many as the panacea for solving the gang violence epidemic, Operation 
Ceasefire is not proven as a success. Operation Ceasefire was just one 
element of a collective, far-reaching strategy implemented in Boston. Others 
included Boston’s Ten-Point Coalition. The evaluation methodology is 
questionable. Braga describes it as “quasi-experimental” (Braga, 2008:315). 
 
Many researchers have examined the evaluation methodology, due to 
Ceasefire’s high profile and lauded success and are sceptical that the results 
attributed solely lie with the intervention (Fagan, 2002; Rosenfeld, Forango & 
Baumer, 2005). Braga states that the National Academies’ Panel on 
Improving Information and Data on Firearms (Welford, Pepper & Petrie, 2005) 
determined, “Ceasefire’s evaluation was compelling in associating the 
intervention with the subsequent decline in youth homicide” (p316), but 
suggested that factors affecting the subsequent decline in youth homicide 
were difficult to attribute solely to the operation, due to complex factors 
associated with youth homicide trends. The Panel also determined that gangs 
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involved in the intervention changed their offending behaviour following the 
intervention (p316). 
 
Corresponding interventions linked to Public Health (Greene, 2008) claim to 
have a significant impact on violent gangs and offending. In the follow up 
article from the Boston Globe entitled “With Youth Crime Down in Boston, 
What Do We Do For an Encore?” (Prothrow-Smith & Spivak, 1997), these 
declarations of direct impact on youth violence and in particular homicide 
reduction were being repeated. 
 
With regards to law enforcement interventions and examining what works, 
Cody Telep, an Assistant Professor of Crime and Criminal Justice at the 
Arizona State University through the National Institute of Justice Award 
conducted a systematic review to examine the effectiveness of problem-
oriented policing (POP) in order to reduce crime and disorder. Examining 
more than 5,500 articles and reports, the results of these studies indicate an 
overwhelmingly positive impact from problem orientated policing.   
 
“(The) police can be most effective in reducing violent crime when they 
are proactive, use specific (as opposed to general) strategies, focus on 
small places (or groups operating in small places), and develop tailor-
made solutions that make use of a careful analysis of local problems 
and conditions.” (Telep, 2013)  
 
He advocates, 
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“Proactive interventions challenge the reactive nature of current law 
enforcement practices. By using crime analysis to predict where, when 
and how incidents will occur, the efficacy of crime prevention strategies 
increases greatly (p1)”. 
 
Uniformly, gang members report significantly higher rates of violent 
delinquency than do non–members (Loeber & Farrinton, 1998:482) and 
therefore Telep recommends that interventions should be directed at bringing 
gangs under control. However, There are those who argue that reactive, 
arrest based approaches which focus on individuals who have already 
committed crimes are largely unsuccessful and may even increase recidivism  
(Lum, Telep & Koper, 2011).  
 
By focusing on specific interventions targeting specific types of crime (e.g. a 
focus on just gun related-homicide), specific types of people (i.e. specific 
gangs) or specific crime mechanisms / factors contributing to crime (e.g. 
emphasizing physical environmental factors that could enable crime), Lum et 
al. suggest that this will be more effective than general blanket strategies such 
as increasing the numbers of patrol officers or mandating arrests. 
 
Results from the National Evaluation of the Gang Resistance Education and 
Training (G.R.E.A.T.) programme in the USA, a school-based prevention 
program targeting middle-school students through a longitudinal quasi-
experimental research design, was conducted from 1995 to 1999. The 
researchers claim that there were “beneficial programme effects” which 
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emerged steadily over time which showed that there was, on average, more 
pro-social transformation in the attitudes of G.R.E.A.T. students than the non-
G.R.E.A.T. students four years after programme exposure.(Arksey & Knight, 
1999). What the evaluation also demonstrated was that this programme had 
no impact on youth gang affiliation and criminal behaviour (Klein & Maxson, 
2006:136). 
 
The MPS, in recent years has focused attention and resources in hot-spot 
areas and used crime pattern analysis to predict where serious crime is more 
likely to occur. These micro areas of wards within London boroughs often 
consist of only one or two streets. Statistics show most crime occurs in these 
hot-spot areas. Comparisons are made with these areas and areas where 
information or intelligence suggests that the identified criminal activity is 
strongly linked to gang activity. Very often, these areas are the same (Denzin 
& Lincoln, 2005).  
 
The MPS identified 21 wards within London where the most number of violent 
offences were occurring and where gang members were believed to be 
operating.  By so doing, in a year on year comparison of concentration of 
enforcement and prevention tactics in hot-spot areas, the MPS were able to 
show that robbery fell by 7.5%. (Robbery is a single indicator of the 
prevalence of gang activity)  By further targeting this very small area within a 
city that has violent crime – Relatively few “hot-spots” produce most calls to 
Police - 50% of calls in 3% of places. (Sherman et al., 1989) – It is possible to 
significantly reduce a city’s overall violent crime rate.  
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Even more powerful is combining the targeting of these small geographic units 
(streets, corners, clusters of addresses) with tailor-made, multi-agency, 
focused interventions. An example would be a problem-oriented approach to 
reducing crime at violent hot spots that includes gang activity. A “pulling 
levers” approach that emphasises deterring specific high-risk gang members 
has proven effective in violent crime prevention at these places. Even at the 
neighbourhood or police beat level, successful interventions were those that 
still used a more careful allocation of police resources than standard random 
preventative patrol. An example includes crackdowns in high-crime 
neighbourhoods, a kind of hot-spots approach to larger geographic areas.  
 
Speaking to The Guardian Newspaper in the aftermath of the 2011 London 
riots, the Rt. Hon. Ian Duncan Smith said the following: 
 
We can learn much from Operation Ceasefire, an effective programme 
in curbing gun violence in Boston, in the US. Mapping gangs and their 
rivalries, a clear message was delivered: violence will not be tolerated. 
If you stop we will do everything in our power to help you get out, if you 
continue we'll do everything to bring you to justice. Intensive, targeted 
enforcement was coupled with an intensive offer of support, delivered 
by community organisations, faith groups and local service providers. 
One unified message from community and police (The Guardian, 
2011). 
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The Politician’s citing of Operation Ceasefire as an effective intervention 
programme in the absence of any real evaluation or scrutiny does not deter 
Smith from hailing it as a success. It is accepted that Operation Ceasefire was 
associated with significant declines in young adult homicide in Boston, (Braga, 
et al, 2001), but, the lack of a randomized controlled design raises significant 
questions regarding the validity of the findings. Their findings did show the 
crime decline in Boston was unique when compared to other major U.S. cities 
and other cities in Massachusetts. Braga and reviewed 11 eligible studies in 
the main analysis (10 focused on policing), but none were randomized 
experiments specifically focused on policing (Weisburd, 2012). 
 
It should also be noted that focused deterrence strategies are a subgroup of 
problem–orientated policing interventions and as a result, exact strategies 
should vary city by city and should be tailored to deal with the specific problem 
(Weisburd & Lum, 2014).  
 
Braga and Weisburd conclude,  
 
In the focused deterrence approach, the emphasis is not only 
increasing the risk of offending but also decreasing the opportunity 
structures for violence, deflecting offenders away from crime, 
increasing the collective efficacy of communities, and increasing the 
legitimacy of police actions (p22). 
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Working with partner agencies that are in a position to identify and analyse in 
detail local issues, it is more likely that more appropriate tailored interventions 
are developed. This is an integral part of the effectiveness of pulling levers 
and other focused deterrence approaches (Weisburd & Lum, 2014).  
 
In Boston today, the Police Department works very closely with the clergy to 
deliver a unified warning to individuals who are on the brink of committing 
gang related violent activities. A modification of Operation Ceasefire’s 
principles has now been adopted. A meeting with Detective Sergeant Thomas 
Sexton (June 25th 2014) revealed the tactics employed by Operation 
Homefront. Detective Sergeant Sexton works closely with schools within 
Boston’s city limits and identifies children (usually under the age of 21) who 
have a propensity for committing violence. Receiving referrals from school 
administrators generally, the police together with clergy from within the 
community make a visit to the home of the offender. In a meeting with 
Reverend Leason Carmona in Boston, Massachusetts, he provided useful 
insight into this joined up community approach. Reverend Carmona told me 
that he sees his role in Operation Homefront, as providing;  
 
“Spiritual Awareness, Confidence, and Support” He continued by 
saying, it was necessary to display “openness with (these) kids.”  To 
say, “our community cares” (June 25th, 2014) 
 
In 2008, Braga et al conducted analysis on interventions in Lowell, 
Massachusetts, concentrating on area dynamics. Looking at homicide and 
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assaults, The Projects Safe Neighbourhood Task Force developed a two- 
pronged approach to deal with two very different gangs. A traditional pulling 
leaver approach was adopted towards the Hispanic Gangs. This meant 
sending a strong message that violence would not be tolerated and that the 
gang would be targeted for every misdemeanour committed and sanctioned 
accordingly. 
 
With regards to the Asian gangs prevalent in Lowell, a much different 
approach was adopted. These gangs had a tendency to be very well 
organized, secretive and not operating visibly on the streets in the same way 
the Hispanic gangs tended to do.   The Asian gangs had strong ties to 
gambling operations frequented by older Asians. The importance of these 
operations to the older generations was used as a pulling lever to use the 
older Asians to watch over the gang members. The message sent to the 
Gaming operators was very strong. If the violence continued, the operations 
would be shut down and this proved a successful deterrent. (Braga, 2008).  
 
Here in the UK, Karen Mkcluskey, as co-director of Scotland’s Violent Crime 
reduction unit, claimed in 2011 to have reduced violent offending in 
Strathclyde by 50%, adopting the US model known as Operation Ceasefire. 
After the riots in 2011, David Cameron told the House of Commons that it 
would be 'a national priority’ to follow McCluskey’s example in reducing gang 
violence (The Telegraph, 2011). 
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Research suggests that a lack of social problem-solving skills is a link to youth 
violence, (Pepler & Slaby, 1994) and youths faced with situations for which 
they are unprepared may result in a violent or aggressive response. 
(Baronowski, Perry, & Parcel, 1997). One method suggested to improve a 
youth’s ability to avoid violent situations is to improve their conflict resolution 
skills.  
 
In 2008, The Metropolitan Police Service set up a working party to look at 
conflict resolution tactics that could be used to reduce opportunities for gang 
violence.  Mediation to reduce gang violence was one such tactic explored, 
and it is that to which this discussion now turns.	
 
Mediation as an intervention to reduce gang violence 
Mediation, in the context of gang violence, can best be described as an 
informal, voluntary, adaptable procedure in which an impartial and 
independent third party, not involved in the dispute, (a conflict engagement 
specialist or mediator) assists with dialogue between parties in conflict or 
dispute. The mediator proactively supports each individual in order to reach 
the best resolution to the conflict, which is not only acceptable to both parties, 
but is acceptable to society and is within the law. 
 
The use of mediation in Great Britain as an intervention to defuse deep 
running arguments between rival gangs or groups is nothing new. For 
example, in Northern Ireland, after a loyalist arson attack at Drumcree, County 
Ballymoney on 12 July 1998, three Quinn brothers Richard, aged 11, Mark, 
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aged 9, Jason, aged 7 all died after a petrol bomb was thrown through a rear 
window at 4.30am by Loyalists during the stand-off over the Orange 
Order march. The boys' mother and family friends escaped the resulting fire 
with minor injuries. The family was of mixed religion, the father 
being Protestant and the mother a Roman Catholic, who were living in a 
primarily Protestant housing estate. The then M.P. for the area, Dr. Ian 
Paisley, visited the site of the attack and described the murders as "diabolical" 
and "repugnant". (BBC, 1988) Representatives of other groups from all sides 
of the constitutional issue in Northern Ireland also condemned the 
killings. Thousands of Catholics and Protestants attended the boys' funeral 
two days later.  The Community came to Mediation Services Northern Ireland, 
which had been in existence since the mid-1980s and asked for conflict 
negotiation intervention.  
 
A further example was seen in the West Midlands, where mediation was used 
following the murders of art students Charlene Ellis, 18, and 17-year-old 
Letisha Shakespeare, who were shot dead in January 2003 when they were 
caught in the crossfire between rival gangs in a nightclub in Birmingham. West 
Midland’s Centre for Conflict Transformation (TCFCT) was formed as a direct 
consequence of these murders and began to mediate between the two rival 
gangs. The Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) acknowledged 
enforcement was not the answer to the problem of street violence involving 
young people and sought the help of partner agencies to address this issue. 
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Mediation in London 
The Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) now known as the National 
Police Chiefs Council (NPCC) identified a gap in the provision of a high-risk 
mediation capability in London. There were incongruent third sector 
organisations purporting to offer mediation services on an ad-hoc basis, but 
they very often lacked the necessary transitional services needed to support 
individuals or families post conflict. These mediation service providers were 
treated with scepticism by local authorities, the police and those involved in 
conflict alike.  Mediation up until this point had slipped down the priority list, 
due to all the focus on American programmes such as Ceasefire.  
 
There was a need in London, for a more sophisticated, high level conflict 
resolution service, independent of the authorities but one that could operate in 
extremely challenging and high risk situations; a service that could be trusted 
by all those involved in the process. Capital Conflict Management (CCM) was 
initially set up and implemented by Peter O’Neill (who was instrumental in 
setting up the West Midlands Mediation service) with support of the 
Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) and additional support from London 
Councils and South East Network Alliance of Councils. The West Midland 
model had been developed in a less professional way, and did not have the 
full support of the police and partners. Initially, scrutinising measures which 
measured its efficacy and the International standards of quality regarding data 
collection and storage did not exist.  CCM is a Community Interest Company 
and based its business model on the Northern Ireland Service and West 
Midland’s Centre for Conflict Transformation models, both of which did have 
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high levels of successes. (Simon, 2012). CCM however, had took almost two 
years to establish itself; make itself ISO9001 complaint regarding data 
security and storage; and put a formal project board and committee in place 
which reported frequently to MOPAC before any work could be undertaken 
(Tribal, 2010). 
 
The challenges that CCM face are many. Group violence in London is 
widespread, disparate, and chaotic and covers a large geographical area. 
London comprises 32 independently run boroughs, which makes for a 
complex operating environment (Tribal, 2010). 
 
Gangs in London differ from the massive, multi-generational gangs of the US, 
but they do shy away from the state (like the US) and therefore a service such 
as mediation offered by a company like CCM can work well.  Several authors 
have written about the tit – for -tat gang violence seen in London.  
(See House of Commons Affairs Committee, 2007; Millie, 2009; D'Cruze,  
Walklate & Pegg, 2013). The violence is disproportionate, unpredictable and 
involves longstanding and endless feuds, which means that mediation is an 
appropriate intervention and has a good chance of positively impacting on the 
conflict. The violence seen in the capital can be symbolic or instrumental. The 
perpetrators lack the skills to resolve the conflicts themselves without 
violence. Mediation can provide a workable solution, as it is offers a means 
through which solutions can be reached that can be accepted by all 
concerned, rather than continue with the cyclical, pointless, symbolic conflicts 
that often stem from issues over perceived disrespect.  Mediation can help 
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diffuse instrumental violence, such as disputes over drug territory for example, 
as the participants realise that they are known to the authorities and will be 
liable to sanctions if they continue their behaviour. The events that lead to the 
shooting of Mark Duggan exemplify the type of gang conflict seen in the UK. 
He was on his way to avenge a prior stabbing of a cousin, and the police, 
following intelligence linked to this planned act of retribution (they having 
received intelligence in the days before that Duggan was trying to obtain a 
gun for the act) conducted an operation which ultimately led to his death as he 
tried to evade capture and threw away his weapon at the time of the stop 
(IPCC, 2012). 
 
Mediation services take time to launch and become embedded because 
building capacity in such a fraught and multifarious environment takes great 
care and diplomacy.  As a result of strict governance and control measures 
required by the Metropolitan Police Authority, CCM did not start delivering 
services until September 2009 despite being first registered in April 2008. 
 
The young people that come to CCM’s attention are far removed from what 
would be considered normal for many young people today. Notwithstanding 
the complexities surrounding the labelling of individuals as gang members, 
those referred to CCM are believed to be involved in violent gang activity. The 
MPS adopt the Hallsworth and Young definition when determining who is and 
who is not a gang member. (Hallsworth and Young, 2008)    
 
		 82	
A large majority of individuals involved in gangs live in constant fear of getting 
killed and are as much at risk, as they are a risk to the rest of society. The 
high level mediation that CCM provides is successful in obtaining initial 
access to these individuals, who are volatile and suspicious of those working 
for the authorities. Once trust is established, mediators are able to drill down 
to the root causes of the conflicts that brought them to CCM’s attention in the 
first place. Often, these issues are at complete variance with the issues 
identified by the authorities, and without knowing what these issues are; there 
is little chance of resolving the conflict and preventing future occurrences of 
violence. 
 
CCM, through dynamic risk assessments and high level training, is able to 
deal with some of the most disenfranchised and disadvantaged members of 
society. These mostly young black men face concerns around unemployment; 
issues of drugs; and are often in poor health because of their lifestyles and fail 
to access services provided in mainstream society. They will probably have 
been excluded from school, been marginalised by society and coexist with 
like-minded individuals with no hope or aspirations for the future (Tribal, 
2010).  
 
Referrals are made to CCM often at a critical juncture in a young person’s life. 
Predominantly, either following a series of violent activities, upon information 
of the likelihood of serious violence occurring, or at worst, following a 
homicide. Due to their training and very often life-experiences, mediators or 
conflict engagement specialists are often able to access criminal networks, 
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friends and families in ways that conventional first responders6 find difficult or 
impossible. In so doing, they can provide the initial critical response that is 
required to; understand the nature of the conflict and implement a framework 
or the initial steps towards brokering peace or preventing the conflict from 
spiralling out of control (Tribal, 2010). 
 
They offer advice, support and help, in conjunction with local service 
providers, such as those involved in the provision of services associated with 
health, housing and education in order to ensure that extremely volatile 
situations are pacified and no more lives are lost.   
 
Identifying individuals with the appropriate levels of skills and understanding of 
the lifestyle and culture of gangs can be problematic. It is important to identify 
individuals who are able to connect with those involved in gangs on a level 
that will make them a credible contact. There are many ex-gang members 
operating independently in communities in London, having turned their lives 
around and now wanting to ensure others do not make the same mistakes 
they did, but as Klein states, there are problems associated with using past 
gang members “ as instruments of change” in intervention programmes. 
(Klein, 2012:1038) 
 
This was a major issue for CCM when they recruited several ex-gang 
members who had turned their backs on their past lives and wanted to 
actively deter young people from gang involvement. CCM receive sanitised 
																																																								
6	First	responders	is	the	name	usually	associated	with	those	who	work	predominantly	in	the	Police;	fire	brigade;	
ambulance	or	social	services	departments.	
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data from various intelligence sources from within the MPS. Suitably vetted 
individuals only, can access this data.  The data very often details family and 
friends connections and sensitive data about relationship issues and past, 
present and potential conflicts, that could have devastating consequences 
should such intelligence fall into the wrong hands. Evidently, many of those 
who had been gang members in the past had long and violent criminal pasts. 
Some had ended up in jail or juvenile detention centres. This very fact would 
mean an instant rejection in the vetting process, which had a knock on effect 
and meant these individuals, could not be used as conflict engagement 
specialists in many circumstances.   
 
This was an ever present source of frustration for many involved in the 
mediation process, as it was felt that these ex-gang members truly understood 
the issues and had the clout and depth of real life experience needed to 
interact with referred individuals. Klein warns, “ …There are both advantages 
and dangers in having former gang members serve as “interventionists” 
(Klein, 2011:1038).  
 
CCM overcame this problem by appointing a single repository of the 
information that requires disclosure only to suitably vetted individuals i.e. the 
operations manager of the Company. This individual then further sanitises the 
data so that the conflict engagement specialist is provided only with the bare 
details that will enable them to form an introduction. The operations manager 
then takes all the responsibility around risk management and any subsequent 
welfare of the conflict engagement specialist for future meets. 
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The process of mediation generally involves seven main phases. First, there 
is the ‘Opening Statement’, where Introductions are made, ground rules are 
set, and the process explained.  The second step is referred to as 
‘Uninterrupted Time’. This is the Opportunity for each party to state their 
position without interruption. The third stage is the “Exchange”, which is the 
opportunity for the protagonists to exchange viewpoints. The mediator is there 
to facilitate and “referee” as necessary. Here, positions and interests are 
established. The fourth phase is called, “Setting the Agenda” where common 
positions and interests are summarised. This is followed by the fifth phase, 
which is called, “Building the Agreement”, where accommodations are 
explored that will suit everyone’s requirements where possible. 
The sixth phase involves, “Writing the Agreement” where the accommodation 
and agreements are confirmed and reinforced and consolidate in one written 
document. Finally, there is the seventh phase, which is, “Closing the 
Agreement”, where the parties involved to sign the agreement. This 
agreement is put into place and is monitored and reviewed (See Figure 1 
below).  
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Figure 1 The Seven Stages of Mediation (Tribal, 2010). 
 
 
Once a conflict engagement specialist receives a referral, police officers carry 
out intelligence checks and provide a risk assessment with a grading so that 
any planned meetings can take account of the likely risk involved and 
determine where the initial contact will take place. Ordinarily, the conflict 
engagement specialists prefer to be introduced to the referred individual 
through a contact who is known to the individual, like a family member, 
teacher or youth worker. Once this contact is identified, the conflict 
engagement specialists arrange to meet and plan the first contact. The first 
meeting is very important and will set the scene for subsequent encounters. 
The specialists always operate in pairs and prefer to have subsequent 
meetings alone with the subject, to encourage open dialogue.  Through a 
subsequent series of get-togethers, the conflict engagement specialists gain 
the trust and respect of the individual referred and delve into the origins of the 
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dispute from which the original referral emanated. They offer support and 
create a healthy environment to enable the referred individual the opportunity 
to rationalise what is happening and provide support around other issues that 
very often are occurring in the individual’s life. Many of those referred for 
mediation lead chaotic lifestyles and need much support (Simon, 2012). 
Where possible, the specialist signpost the individual for additional support  
(e.g.  housing or health). Through established contacts they are able to get 
individuals into work or education in some instances (Simon, 2012). These 
additional transformational services provide an important element for the 
mediation process in its entirety (Tarrant, 2012).  
 
Klein observes that many intervention programmes occur at peak times of 
violence or offending. He states that there is a lack of activity during periods of 
calm. After the London Riots of 2011, the UK Government seemed to embark 
on a series of initiatives and introducing additional legislation in a knee-jerk 
response to the violence that they attributed to the gangs of London.  
 
 
Klein argues that gang and violence reduction programs are usually initiated 
in response to problems that are increasing, or to address issues that have 
reached a tipping point of intolerance with regards to spiralling violence levels. 
A quiet period does not generate much intervention activity.  
 
Peaks are followed by valleys. Programs initiated at peak times will 
normally play out after peaks are reached. The appearance of success 
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may be nothing more than a demonstration of expected normal 
decrease (Klein, 2012:1038) 
 
However, the mediation project, which began in London in 2009, has seen a 
constant flow of intervention that is increasing over time, as more boroughs in 
the capital become better informed of the benefits and as trust is gained by 
those responsible for making referrals in the community. Camden local 
authority had already commissioned CCM before the riots began, in an 
attempt to better understand their specific gang problems. 
 
A further issue identified when a new programme is introduced into the 
community is; how compatible is it with current intervention programmes? The 
Police focus on deterrent activity in specific boroughs; Community Interest 
groups devise community-based responses to violence and gang 
suppression; Local authorities and social services jockey for position in an 
attempt to maintain their perceived status as the professionals who know 
which intervention is best. Politicians and Borough Commanders usually 
release a press statement to legitimize their position and garner public 
support, emphasising their new innovative ideas to tackle gang violence. 
 
Braga and Weisburd (2006) note that police agencies typically fail to conduct 
the in-depth problem-analysis advocated by Goldstein (1990). They state that 
the police  
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“ often engage in a form of “shallow problem solving” that involves only 
peripheral analysis of crime data and a largely law enforcement-
oriented response” (Weisburd, 2015). 
 
The MPS launched Operation Connect in 2011, as one response to gang 
violence in London, a city which houses a variety of diverse street gangs who 
the MPS say are significant drivers of violent crime – they also indirectly drive 
other criminality through their heavy involvement in street level drug dealing. 
 
During 2010 / 11, I chaired the MPS - wide tasking meeting (Operation Target) 
where reports of violent incidents across London were reviewed. This included 
gang violence. Decisions were made on where and how to target additional 
enforcement and prevention, which included deploying covert tactics and 
extra visible patrols in hotspot areas and increased stop and search activity 
specifically targeting those believed to be carrying weapons. I was able to 
secure the services of other departments within the MPS if available, to 
support borough activity centred on violent offending. 
 
A number of MPS departments deal with a wide range of gang related 
violence and offending in general. The Specialist Crime and Operations Unit 1 
(SC&O1) investigate homicides arising from knife injuries, potentially inflicted 
as a result of gang membership. SC&O2 investigate allegations of sexual 
offending related to gang membership. SC&O7 (also known as the Flying 
Squad), investigate armed robbery offences where a significant proportion of 
these offences are attributed to gang members. In the 12 months, until 
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September 2011 this unit disrupted 7 of the top 10 gangs in the MPS, 
recovered 196 firearms and arrested 342 gang members (MPS, 2012). 
 
SC&O8 (also known as Operation Trident), exclusively deal with reactive and 
proactive investigations related to firearms crime within London. In 2012 this 
unit dealt with 138 fatal firearm shootings and estimate that over 90% of their 
work involves street gangs and organised crime (MPS, 2012). 
 
In March 2013, Commander Steve Rodhouse, MPS lead for Gangs and 
Organised Crime, responded to reports that Trident was changing and 
undertaking new responsibilities linked to gang related activity. The media 
reported fears that the new unit would be diluted or lost (The Guardian, 2013). 
Commander Rodhouse stated that the Trident Command had 
 
“developed some significant experience around these investigations 
and has also developed good relationships with some of our BME 
communities most affected by gun crime. This expertise will not be lost 
and will still be available to investigators. Trident is changing to meet 
the current need of the MPS and all Londoners. We are in actual fact 
placing more of our resources into proactivity with the clear aim of 
preventing gun, gang and knife crime and most importantly protecting 
young people. These changes build on the successes and significant 
crime reductions of the past year and the past four years, where we 
have seen a sustained 20 per cent reduction in gun crime, whilst still 
investigating gun homicides to the highest standards. I believe that this 
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change of approach will significantly improve our ability to drive down 
levels of gun and knife crime in London” (MPS, 2013). 
 
Currently, thirty-two individual boroughs across London maintain overall 
responsibility for the initial response to all gang related violence and have a 
wide remit for intelligence gathering, proactive work and enforcement activity 
as well as partnership problem solving with external agencies.  
 
The MPS also operates and funds a range of diversion and prevention 
schemes including educational programmes, mentoring, mediation, re-location 
programmes and positive activities for young people. Although the 
coordination of these schemes has improved (historically being ad hoc 
borough based initiatives) there are still opportunities for rationalisation and 
greater integration with partners across the Capital. 
 
Operation Connect was established to provide a co-ordinated response to 
tackle gang violence and gang offending across London. Under this operation, 
boroughs are supported and given information, so that they can provide a 
consistent, targeted response towards tackling the already identified, high-
harm individuals engaged in gang - related violence. It supports and links all 
activity to ensure enforcement, prevention and diversionary activity is 
prioritised and directed against the most appropriate, gang related, person or 
location. 
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This Unit is made up of thirty Police Officers and staff who have experience in 
the development of intelligence, prevention, diversion and enforcement tactics 
and its aim is to connect what has, up until now, been the disparate activity of 
police, partners and the voluntary sector. It aims to focus co-ordinated action 
on already identified high-harm subjects who are linked to gang violence.  
 
The unit incorporates known police intelligence with partner and community 
information, to ensure their combined resources are targeted against the most 
appropriate people in a co-ordinated way. It adopts the Multi Agency 
Safeguarding Hub (MASH) principles bringing together police, probation, fire, 
ambulance, health, education and social care. This ensures agencies share 
information and are able to respond to a young person’s needs in the fastest 
and most efficient way possible.  The MPS believes that this method has 
resulted in a more effective and earlier identification of the most vulnerable 
children and reduces the amount of different professionals being involved, 
while maintaining the most appropriate professional capable of delivering the 
necessary interventions which meet the needs identified in any given case. 
 
Early successes of the operation include, supporting interventions in the 
London Borough of Waltham Forest and Haringey, where it focused on 
intelligence gathering and prioritisation of gang offenders, to support 
partnership and enforcement activity against high-harm individuals in gangs. 
 
By April 2012, Operation Connect was established within 14 London boroughs 
that formed part of the Home Office funded Communities Against Gangs, 
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Guns and Knives Programme (CAGGK). These Boroughs are; Southwark, 
Westminster, Lambeth, Lewisham, Newham, Waltham Forest, Enfield, Tower 
Hamlets, Haringey, Hackney, Croydon, Greenwich, Brent and Ealing. 
 
Its role ensures that each Borough has a continuous set of processes, which 
expedites joint agency working in order to offer assistance to gang members 
to exit offending. There is a dedicated case management system of gang 
members through either a joint agency enforcement approach or a planned 
diversion route. Each Connect member is assessed against a set of explicit 
needs criteria in order to identify the most appropriate interventions that are 
available in the given circumstances. The MPS is working with the Safer 
London Foundation (SLF) to deliver this aspect of the programme. Case 
management will be through the ViSOR 7  system, which will allow other 
agencies various access levels in order to view the records appropriately. 
 
Another of Connect’s intervention responses is an enhanced and focused 
enforcement capability. A corporate menu of diversions has been compiled 
and contains a succession of enforcement tactical options. London schools 
can request the Growing Against Gangs educational programme. This 
intervention offers support from a central team to give access to expert 
advice, checking of local compliance and national best practice.  
																																																								
7 “ViSOR provides a central store for up-to-date information about offenders that can be accessed and updated by 
the three Responsible Authority agencies – the police, the Prison Service (both public and the contracted-out estate) 
and Probation Trusts. ViSOR operates in other UK jurisdictions and it is potentially a vital component for any cross-
border transfer discussions. It is available to police forces in Scotland, Jersey and Northern Ireland, the British 
Transport Police and the Royal Military Police, as well as to all Scottish prisons, mental health bodies and Scottish 
Criminal Justice Social Work departments”. (Drisko, 2005) 
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There have been on-going evaluations of Connect’s activities. A performance 
framework to gauge progress in reducing gang criminality is integral to the 
programme. When working with the London Borough of Waltham Forest, 
Connect ran an operation to identify gang members engaged in supplying 
Class “A” drugs within the borough. Three of these members were linked to 
on-going homicide investigations and many others were associated with 
serious offences, which included firearm violations, gang related violence and 
robberies.  The operation sought to detain these individuals involved in drugs 
supply whilst also focusing on the drug users to address the demand.  It also 
worked with partner agencies to improve the environment where they were 
active, in an attempt to deter any new drug markets opening. Sixteen gang 
members being charged and remanded in custody for drug supply offences. 
30 users of class “A” drugs were also identified. They had a total of 375 
previous convictions between them including violent crime. (Gardener, 2012) 
 
A tailored service to address this particular problem was provided by partner 
agencies for each of the 30 identified drug users – including; enhanced Drug 
Intervention Team support, residential rehabilitation, warrant execution and 
preparation of gang injunctions. Connect successfully removed gang 
ringleaders and their associates from the heart of the local community. Post 
operation community intelligence has indicated that one of the most harmful 
gangs in Waltham Forest has been dismantled as a direct result of Connect’s 
targeted activity. 
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Braga and Weisburd (2012) emphasise that:  
 
“In the focused deterrence approach, the emphasis is on not only 
reducing the risk of offending but also decreasing opportunity 
structures for violence, deflecting offenders away from crime, 
increasing the collective efficacy of communities, and increasing the 
legitimacy of police actions.” Thus, increasing the likelihood of 
detection can be combined with other program components such as 
situational crime prevention (to reduce opportunities), social service 
programs (to deflect offenders away), engaging with the community (to 
build collective efficacy), and using procedural justice in 
communications with offenders (to build legitimacy)”(p22). 
 
The successes linked to Operation Connect and subsequently Trident activity 
linked to gang activity at a borough level raises concerns over efficacy, 
particularly when looking at the year on year rises of serious youth violence as 
detailed in Figure 2 below. 
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Figure 2. MPS Serious Youth Violence 2012-1015 (MPS, 2016). 
 
 
In chapter 5, I will look at the outcomes of mediation through quantitative 
analysis.  By analysing 123 cases of mediation and comparing the data with a 
controlled sample of similar individuals who have not been referred, I will 
examine the offending history 12 months following the referral/ commission of 
the violent offence. 
 
In summary, the literature examined, shows that many intervention 
programmes that are introduced, are done so in the absence of any control 
efforts or conceptually derived goals. Very little is known about what works 
and very little attention is paid to data collection and analysis before, during 
and after intervention enactment. There is little in the way of co-ordinated 
activity on a local level, let alone a London-wide level in the capital. Many 
programmes have long-term goals but those charged with commissioning the 
projects want fast time results. As a consequence, funding ceases and many 
programmes come to a halt. We can therefore rarely determine whether or not 
the intervention actually worked. Many programmes fail to articulate what 
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issues they are actually addressing. As a result, the implementation is weak 
and any subsequent evaluation inadequate.  
 
In the next chapter, I will discuss my methodology for the research into the 
outcomes of mediation as an intervention to reduce serious violence in 
London. In subsequent chapters, I will demonstrate through quantitative and 
qualitative research, how mediation in London was introduced to those 
charged with keeping London safe; how mediation has been implemented, 
and as a result of this research, present the outcomes that have emerged as a 
result. 
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Chapter 4 Methodology 
 
Details of the Research Design 
The aim of this thesis is to examine the outcomes of mediation as an 
intervention with gangs in the context of escalating youth violence in London, 
with a view to assessing its impact on violence reduction. Cognisant that 
current practices prioritise specific research methodologies when used to 
evaluate outcomes of interventions (Christ, 2014),  I chose to adopt a mixed 
methods approach to examine the outcomes of mediation to reduce gang 
violence in London. By collecting several types of data from different sources I 
aimed to enhance the studies validity. (Densley, 2011). 
The use of mixed methodologies (Chatteriji, 2005; Cresswell 2009; Greene, 
2008; Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009) is particularly useful for this specific area of 
research, studying outcomes of interventions.  The multiple forms of data 
examined provide complementing evidence regarding the outcomes of 
mediation, and testimonies from interviewees with first hand experience of 
intervention tactics used to reduce gang violence provide significant 
sustenance to the quantitative data analysis. 
Hence, for this research, I used both quantitative and qualitative methods of 
investigation. The quantitative approach where I analysed data regarding 
gang members held by the MPS in respect of mediation referrals and 
compared this data of gang members not referred to mediation interventions, 
and the qualitative approach, whereby I held 17 semi-structured interviews 
with police officers; police staff; a youth worker; and conflict engagement 
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specialists (mediators). I had meetings and discussions with 27 community 
workers; clergy; probation and others involved in gang desistance 
programmes in the USA as part of the Winston Churchill Fellowship 
programme. 
Some authors argue the design stage is vital. It provides the glue that holds 
the research project together (Guest, 2012), therefore, it was crucial at the 
design stage to clearly understand the objectives for the research. My 
research topic is quite wide-ranging and I am using qualitative research and 
quantitative analysis to produce answers to more detailed questions (Wilson & 
McLean, 1994). My research would be of a flexible design (Robson, 2011), 
which would evolve as my research progressed. My constant focus was on 
my end product. I was conscious that everything I did from this point on would 
contribute to my findings and identify implications for practice of the final 
report.  
Sampling Strategy 
I began by gathering data from work colleagues to establish my theoretical 
position. I went to the higher analyst and lead analyst who compile the gang 
risk assessment to determine who I needed to speak to and what data I could 
reasonably be expected to collect, in addition to conducting semi-structured 
interviews with the right people. I spoke with those who are exposed to gangs 
routinely, whether in an analytic intelligence gathering role or involved in one-
to-one interviews as part of the gang member’s bail conditions, for example. 
Also, I decided to adopt the snowball sample (Bryman, 1984) to be a part of 
my sampling strategy, which is a purposeful non-probability sampling 
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approach. I needed to ensure the people whom I would speak to would have 
sufficient knowledge and the necessary relevant interaction to enable me to 
collect the theory descriptions necessary for this study (Geertz, 1973). 
From the initial part of the research, I was able to set the parameters of the 
study whilst being cognisant of the limitations of the investigation with regards 
to data access and analysis. 
The Qualitative Analysis 
The first set of data originated from 17 in-depth semi-structured interviews 
conducted between March 2012 and December 2013, in London, UK, with a 
snowball sample of conflict engagement specialist and other actors, such as 
police officers and youth workers with experience of working with gangs.  
Robson (2011) identifies interviews as the most appropriate method when 
conducting exploratory, grounded theory research prior to any quantitative 
study. I looked at all the available choices for collecting qualitative data: 
surveys, focus groups and individual interviews.  Having looked at the 
research design tools on the Eurogang website, I decided I would conduct 
expert semi-structured interviews. I would interview a cross-section of experts 
that I work or have worked with; individuals with first-hand experience in 
dealing with gang members. I did not want it to be too policing - orientated, 
favouring a wider viewpoint. 
Through professional connections, I was able to identify and access key 
individuals within the Police Service, local authorities, probation service, 
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Health Service, and the volunteer section of the community. 8 
The interview records are matched by additional unstructured conversations, 
which provide a greater source of information than the interviews themselves. 
Observations of gang behaviour would also have been beneficial to this 
research. Interviews look for consistency within accounts, whereas 
observation helps look for consistency between accounts and actions 
(Bogdan & Taylor, 1975). Unfortunately, my profession precluded my ability to 
study actual gang behaviour in the field, and did not allow for routine 
observations of gang members’ lives and their interaction with family and 
friends outside of the gang. For this, I relied on the accounts of others who 
witnessed first-hand these occurrences.  
For the semi-structured interviews, my research questions and sample groups 
lent themselves to qualitative methods, as “interviews can provide the 
opportunity to explore areas of broad cultural consensus and peoples more 
personal, private and special understandings”, (Arksey & Knight, 1999:4). By 
selecting those involved in the mediation process, and giving them a free 
																																																								
8	Additional work on another project in America lent support to the hypothesis that gangs in London are very different 
to their American counterparts, regarding their size, ethnic homogeneity, initiation rituals, and inter-generational links. 
(Phelps, 2014). A further set of conversations and meetings took place in the United States, following an award of the 
Winston Churchill Fellowship.8 Having concluded that much of the research into gang initiatives are rooted in the USA 
(Hallsworth & Young, 2008), I chose to visit the cities of Boston, Chicago, New York and Los Angeles  in February 
2014 - November 2014, to speak with those involved in gang intervention programmes to reduce gang violence. In 
total, I had a further 27 meetings and conversations to gain rich data from police officers; clergy; probation; judges; 
academics and former gang members involved in community projects that aim to support gang members to exit their 
gang lifestyle. These conversations added to the research by providing information not only on their individual areas 
of work and expertise, but contributed additional information of what they saw regarding gang behaviour. (Weerman 
et al., 2009) 
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reign to add their own insight when answering questions around broad subject 
areas, I was able to add to the rich data I had already obtained. After 
transcribing the interviews, a complete thematic analysis followed and is 
discussed below. 
Taking the advice of Sudman and Bradburn (1982) regarding the wording and 
construction of the questions, I ensured my target audience would be 
comfortable with the questions being asked and would be able to provide 
relevant answers. Sudman and Bradburn caution to resist the temptation to 
formulate questions until you have carefully thought through the research 
issues.  
Using personal knowledge and experience I selected those experts who 
would have most interaction with those individuals associated with gangs. 
Robson suggests knowing what you’re looking for, and I did:  relevance; 
experience; knowledge; handpicked experts in their field.  I identified key 
people whom I would interview, my initial intention was to utilise those whom I 
came into contact with regularly through my day-to-day work due to time 
constraints and pressures of work. I had built up a rapport with many of these 
individuals and so initially decided on convenience sampling (Bryman, 2008). 
Heeding warnings around generalisability, i.e. I would not be able to say that 
my findings are representative of all experts who deal with gangs, nonetheless 
I hoped to tap into the insight of this group of experts who work with gangs 
day-in and day-out in London and so would have a unique perspective. This 
would also be non-probability purposive sampling of participants, as I had to 
ensure that I was speaking to experts who dealt with gangs in London. If I had 
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used a probability random sampling technique, this could have resulted in a 
participant with little relevance to my project I pre-determined the size of my 
sample.  
I decided that I would conduct professional interviews, identifying members 
from different agencies who were involved in gang intervention programmes 
to gain a wider expert perspective. I decided to speak with individuals, whom I 
knew well, and then adopt another form of convenience sampling, snowball 
sampling. Having made my initial contact with my small group of experts, I 
used the subsequent interviews as an opportunity to establish with whom else 
I should speak (Bryman, 2008).  Having decided to go with interviews, I then 
resolved the appropriate type for this study would be semi-structured. I opted 
for semi-structured interviews as they provide a framework within which to 
work without eliminating the possibility of introducing new concepts or ideas, 
they would identify the main issues as perceived by participants; offer new 
concepts; and identify new themes, thereby helping me to focus my study.  
Semi-structured interviews would allow me to control length and order of 
proceedings, whilst providing me the opportunity to probe further, and expand 
on given replies. I would be able to follow up with additional questions as and 
when the opportunities presented themselves (Robson, 2011 ). 
I rejected focus groups as an alternative.  As the people I would be speaking 
with all work with young people and gangs in a variety of roles, I felt the 
possibility of self-censorship and inhibition to speak out in a focus group 
situation would be too great to outweigh the benefit it may have.  They also 
did not know each other and so there could be some suspicion as to sharing 
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certain information in an open forum. Also, I chose semi-structured interviews 
to minimise the opportunity for bias. Due to participants working at different 
units all over London, each of whom would have work commitments, annual 
leave and training courses, I planned carefully to minimise the logistical 
difficulties and purchased a digital voice recorder. Having run through the 
interview a couple of times, I estimated it would last about 30 minutes.  I 
addressed confidentiality issues by having a detailed script, which I would 
uniformly read out, at the start (Appendix C). 
The Interviews 
Having been a detective for over 22 years and in that time received much 
training in interviewing techniques, I still had the PEACE9 interview model 
firmly embedded in my mind. I began the interview with a declaration. I 
explained who I was and why I was carrying out this research. I explained why 
the individual had been selected. I reminded the interviewee of issues around 
confidentiality and that I would not share any information that would identify 
the individual outside the police service. I reminded the individual that if there 
were any questions that they could not answer, just say and we would move 
onto the next area. I did not want them to guess the answer. I was after their 
expert opinion.  
I weighed up the advantages and disadvantages of asking open-ended 
questions.  Closed questions are prescriptive in the range of responses from 
																																																								
9 The PEACE interviewing model provides a structure that can be used for all investigative interviews. The components are: 
P - Planning & Preparation  
E - Engage & Explain  
A - Account  
C - Closure  
E - Evaluation 
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which the respondent may choose. In general, closed questions 
(dichotomous, multiple choice and rating scales) are quick to complete and 
straightforward to code (e.g. for computer analysis), and do not discriminate 
unduly on the basis of how articulate the respondents are. (Wilson & McLean, 
1994) Conversely, however, they do not enable respondents to add any 
remarks, qualifications and explanations to the categories, and there is a risk 
that the categories might not be exhaustive and that there might be bias in 
them (Oppenheim, 1992).  Consequently, I decided to conduct semi-
structured interviews, which Mason describes as a “conversation with 
purpose” (2002:67).   
The questions would be answered one by one, without the interviewer 
jumping around the issues, possibly unduly influencing the answers, and also 
for convenience for responders (Bryman 2008:218). 
The questions followed the following themes: 
  
 What does mediation mean to the interviewee? 
 Engagement of those referred for mediation 
 What does a successful first meeting look like? 
 What methods are employed to facilitate engagement? 
 What information do mediators receive prior to the first meeting? 
 Are the most appropriate people referred for mediation? 
 Availability of additional transformational services 
 Does mediation work? 
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 What would enhance the programme? 
 Do those who engage always want to exit their gang lifestyle? 
 Are there different levels of mediation? 
 Mediation limitations 
 What does success look like? 
 What outcomes are those who commission the programme looking 
for? 
 
The first individual I interviewed was a Conflict Engagement Specialist (M1). 
M1 has set up a community interest not for profit organisation that provides 
high-level mediation. He works with individuals involved in gang violence, 
particularly in conflict situations. His aim is to establish the cause of the 
conflict and through a series of meetings with the individuals, try to get the 
subjects to agree to desist from future aggression towards either them or 
others in the gang. M1 provided me with a view of possible catalysts for gang 
violence, which will be discussed further in Chapter 5. He also provided me 
with the names and contact details of the additional conflict engagement 
specialists that I went on to interview, including one who was a former gang 
member in London. 
I went on to further interview 8 conflict engagement specialists, 1 youth worker 
involved in gang desistance programmes; 3 analysts; 4 police officers from 
the Specialist Crime Directorate at New Scotland Yard. At the time of this 
research, there were only four police officers and 3 analysts who worked full 
time on the mediation programme and would have the requisite knowledge to 
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participate in the research. The Specialist Crime Directorate (3) had only 10 
full time staff at the time of my research. This department has since closed 
due to realignment of services linked to the Annual Spending Review and 
subsequent budget cuts in the MPS.  
 Similarly, the small numbers of individuals involved in delivering mediation 
were chosen as they were engaged most in delivering the intervention and 
had sufficient involvement to inform the research.  
Data transcript and analysis 
Heeding advice from research conducted (Noaks & Wincup, 2004) regarding 
the time consuming nature of data transcribing and analysis, I did this 
immediately after each interview. Following on from the issues I experienced 
after the first interview, I ensured that each interview was transcribed as soon 
as it was conducted. I had permission to ask the MPS typists in my borough to 
assist me, and the typists were able transcribe the interviews within a day so I 
could reread them with the interview fresh in my mind. I thought it may be 
difficult to isolate the themes that would emerge from the interviews, but it was 
easier than I thought. Details of the thematic analysis can be seen below in 
the results section. 
The approach adopted for this aspect of the study, namely inductive 
qualitative research, involved a sequence of sample selection, data collection, 
and subsequently, data analysis. This was later reviewed, and expanded 
upon. This iterative method is core to the “flexible method” of research 
(Anastas, 2000). As mentioned in Chapter 4, 17 semi-structured interviews 
		 108
were conducted in London. By using a multiple methods approach to data 
collection it was my intention to strengthen the overall research, by blending 
data gleaned from interviews and observations with documents and 
interviews, or interviews, observations, to enhance the quality of the research 
through triangulated examination (Denscombe, 2009).  
 
The aim was to provide supporting data that would evidence linkage to the 
statistical enquiry, and qualify the statistical research findings (Burnard, 1991) 
whilst simultaneously obtaining a unique insight in part, due to my past role as 
operations manager in the Specialist Crime Directorate (SC&O3). I was able 
to identify the key individuals involved in all the relevant processes required.  
 
The 17 people whom I interviewed were involved sufficiently enough with the 
whole mediation process, to afford a unique insight into the intervention and 
explain the outcomes in a way that has not been undertaken before.  A 
thematic analysis was then undertaken, drawing recurring issues from the 
interviews conducted and the common themes that emerged will be examined 
below. 
 
The qualitative data I obtained must be understood and interpreted in the 
correct cultural and social context. The mediators interviewed in London, have 
first hand experience of delivering mediation as a tactic. As described below, 
they detail how subjects are selected for mediation, referred, contacted and 
how they subsequently engage or not.  
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The MPS police officers offer an account of how the subjects are identified 
and what level of detail is provided to the mediators to undertake the task. The 
police officers interviewed have the additional task of reassuring the 
community and their senior management team that mediation works; is a 
good use of public money and resources, whilst simultaneously delivering 
enforcement by bringing to justice those who have committed violent offences. 
They have to balance the requirement to disseminate information and 
intelligence that arises following a mediator’s visit, with preserving the 
confidentiality of the mediation process. As is discussed below, this can cause 
issues of credibility for the mediators as a result.  
 
The police staff analysts are responsible for evaluating the outcomes of 
mediation. Has it reduced crime? How much has the tactic cost and how is 
this interpreted in terms of safety and security in the community?  The youth 
worker whom I interviewed is involved with a variety of interventions in various 
boroughs across London and has commissioned mediation in Waltham Forest 
Borough. 
 
The conflict engagement specialists provide first-hand accounts of how 
mediation is delivered; the risks involved; the people whom they deal with; 
and the outcomes of the tactic. I will argue that this qualitative data obtained 
from these interviews is worth analysing. The findings of which has much 
identifiable significance to showing the outcomes of mediation as a tactic to 
reduce gang violence in London. 
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I conducted 17 semi-structured interviews; 9 with conflict engagement 
specialists; 1 with a youth worker; 4 with Police Officers; and 3 with Police 
staff. All have responsibility for delivering mediation, referring individuals for 
mediation or monitoring mediation.  As this is an intervention in its early 
stages, the numbers involved in mediation with sufficient knowledge of the 
process in its entirety meant that this was the maximum number of individuals 
available to be considered for this study at the time of this stage of the 
research. Their names have been changed to protect their identity. (See 
Figure 3 Below) 
 
Figure 3. Table of Individuals interviewed for qualitative analysis. 
Mediator Youth Worker Police Officer Analyst 
M1- Abraham Y1- Babs P1 – Mark PS1- Lydia  
M2 – Derrick   P2 – Anne  PS2 – Naomi 
M3 – Antonia   P3 – Daniel  PS3 – Steve  
M4 – Brenda   P4 – Sebastian   
M5 – Jason    
M6 – Barry    
M7 – Carl    
M8 – Edward    
M9- Virginia    
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All interviews were conducted on a one to one basis; in a mutually convenient 
place and tape-recorded. Following the interview, the tapes were transcribed, 
analysed and common themes identified. 
 
The more people I interviewed, the more I became cognisant that the 
interviewees discussed similar things in distinctive ways on different 
occasions, and it became my task to decide which conversation I wanted to 
use and argue for my decision to include this in the written study. The 
unstructured conversations I had during meetings held with practitioners in the 
USA produced additional information, but the thorough discussion of a semi-
structured interview provided more detailed accounts which I could probe and 
qualify through follow up questions and personal knowledge of mediation 
delivery in London.  
 
With regards to the sufficiency of data collection and analysis, as detailed 
above, for the quantitative research, I was able to determine in advance the 
scope of data required to estimate the parameters accurately enough for the 
purpose of the analysis. There are no comparable methods for estimating the 
range of qualitative data required in this part of the research. I relied on data 
saturation to determine when to conclude interviewing others involved in the 
mediation process. The data collection ceased when interviews no longer 
disclosed any additional new descriptions (Strauss & Corbin, 1988). 
 
The size of the sample for this qualitative aspect of the research is sufficient 
for the intended purpose. Mediation as an intervention to reduce gang 
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violence is at its infancy and as such, the numbers of professionals charged 
with delivering mediation is very small.   The selection and Interview of nine 
mediators out of a pool of about twenty trained specialists in CCM, whilst 
small, is not insignificant. The nine selected are responsible for delivering the 
majority of the interventions and have the most experience and exposure to 
gang members referred in London (Simon, 2013). The sample represents a 
significant proportion in terms of hours of delivered mediation in the capital. 
These individuals intervene with the most dangerous of offenders who belong 
to some of the most violent gangs operating in the most challenging of areas 
in the country.  No other group of people in the country who are not 
considered as first responder agencies 10 , are entrusted with sensitive 
sanitised information relating to the most dangerous groups of offenders and 
are given unfettered access to such individuals during live police 
investigations without being deemed as interfering with the investigation 
(Simon, 2013). 
 
It is important to explain why this data set is the most descriptive and practical 
to answer the research question posed. I picked the sample of interviewees 
based on personal knowledge and interaction during my time as head of 
operations in the Specialist Crime Directorate (SC&O3), where I was 
responsible for exploring the roll out of mediation as a tactic across London.  
 
The Operations manager at CCM who referred and passed me contact details 
of mediators most involved in delivering the programme guided my selection 
																																																								
10	A first responder agency is usually understood to be the emergency services, local authorities, NHS bodies. 
(Secreteriat, 2004)	
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choices for the semi-structured interviews.  With regards to the police officers 
and staff, this was less problematic. I identified the unit responsible for gate- 
keeping the referrals, that is, identifying future subjects through analysis of 
intelligence and information, and those responsible for collating the results or 
outcomes once mediation was underway. 
 
I was then able to compare the data sets to the other alternatives, which were 
the outcomes of the quantitative data sets for additional information, which in 
this case, supported the first set of quantitative data results. The lack of any 
important variations within the data set (for instance, age, ethnicity and gender 
distributions) made the analysis far simpler to process. I was able to take a 
comprehensive overview from all 17 interviews conducted to illustrate the 
common themes, which emerged as a result of analysis. 
	
Quantitative Research 
The MPS has collected and stored data for over 4 years in relation to those 
individuals involved with gangs, referred for mediation following a violent 
incident or threat of violence. This data is owned by the Specialist Crime 
Directorate and passed to Gangs’ analysts for processing (Tarrant, 2013). 
Using data extracted from the Police National Computer (PNC) I was able to 
compare the arrest rate of an evaluation cohort of offenders11 referred for 
mediation during the first 2 years of the project, against a comparable control 
group of the exact same number, drawn from a similar group of offenders. 
																																																								
11	The information relating to the evaluation cohort was stored on a standalone database at SC&O3 at New Scotland Yard.	
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This group were offenders not referred for mediation but were perceived to be 
gang members and formed part of the MPS Trident Gangs’ Matrix.  
 
The Trident gangs matrix is a scoring system of individuals involved in gangs 
that predicts their risk of committing violent offences. Information from the 
police and wider statutory partner intelligence (which is based on violence, 
criminal offending and gang membership) is used to contribute to the wider 
intelligence picture that populates the gangs’ matrix. Individuals are added to 
the matrix from police and partner agencies to ensure that the matrix does  
not  simply represent the single police perspective, but is a wider partnership 
document (MPS, 2014). 
Figure 4 below is an example of how information from the gang matrix is 
displayed and this is used by the MPS to rank individuals who are involved in 
gangs, based on threat, risk and harm and identifies the most harmful gang 
members. It scores Individuals who are in a gang. It is not the gangs that are 
scored.  As discussed, police and partners identify the individuals and 
information is assessed based on their previous violent history (last 3 years); 
based on the individuals recent Intelligence (violence/weapons last 6 months); 
based on our partners risk / harm score; based on the intelligence managers 
judgement.  Individuals are also scored and ranked as victims of violence. All 
32 boroughs in the MPS have their own matrix and every day these are 
combined to produce a London-wide matrix. 
Each day, the automated system analyses the gang nominal details contained 
in every borough gang matrix spread sheet and systematically compares all 
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nominals against the last rolling three years of crime recording data to arrive 
at a harm score. This automated process provides a consistent approach to 
scoring across all boroughs and ensures scores are kept up to date (as the 
scorings are re-done every time the process is initiated).  
In addition, the boroughs are provided with a list of any other of the MPS 
databases such as Merlin (information raised by police and partners in relation 
to concerns around children) or CrimInt records (MPS intelligence database) 
associated with their borough nominals that have been identified in the last 24 
hours. Contained within their submissions are details of any anti social 
behaviour orders (ASBOs) or any other judicial restrictions based on the 
Police National Computer (PNC) and data from the Courts. 
Also provided is a daily report of 'Potential' gang members, which is a list of 
people who are not currently on borough matrixes but who have an offending 
history which indicates they could be involved in gang activity. This is a 
suggestive list only, boroughs need to review these suggestions and make an 
informed decision based on all the available information and intelligence to 
determine if they are indeed gang members. A freedom of information request 
submitted to the Specialist Crime directorate reveals that as of 18th May 2014, 
there were 3459 gang nominals listed on the database (MPS, 2015). 
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Figure 4. Example of a Trident Gang Matrix 
 
There are some critics of the methodology used by the MPS, who argue that 
the matrix it is overly dependent on intelligence, which can be subjective and 
partial. A recent critique by Patrick Williams (2015) suggests the term ‘gang’ is 
being appropriated and used by criminal justice agencies to disproportionately 
criminalise black people and that the negative labeling of their being involved 
in gangs as gang members, significantly impacts on their subsequent 
treatment by criminal justice agencies.   
  Lee Bridges, a Professor at Warwick University suggests that,  
“The key question to be raised about gang databases is therefore 
whether they constitute ‘reliable information or intelligence’ (to borrow a 
phrase from the stop and search Code of Practice) on which to base 
policing policies and practices, as well as those of other criminal justice 
Status Name Gang Name Total Live
Rank 
Live
In MPS Top 
25
CRIS 
Sub 
Total
Intel 
Score
Intel 
Managers 
Score
Victim 
Score 
Live
Victim 
Rank 
Live
JR JR Expiry Date
Live Kevin TSHOMA Beckton Boys 35.6 1 MPS_no_9 29.1 6.5 0 0 49     
Live Stephen Lumedo Beckton Boys 27.7 2 MPS_no_20 18 9.7 0 8 9 GANGINJ UNLIMITE 
Live Aaron Johnson Beckton Boys 22.77 3   6.32 16.45 0 0 49     
Live Jahvad Irish Stratford Boys 22.7 4   22.2 0 0 10.7 5 Gang - Enhanced Prison Li 01/01/2000
Live Jullson Baron Stratford Boys 20.75 5   7.5 13.25 0 0 49     
Live Sean Hylton Green Gang 19 6   12.25 6.75 0 0 49     
Live Nsimba Malungo Green Gang 17.95 7   1.5 16.45 0 9.4 8     
Live Anthony Smith Green Gang 17.24 8   17.24 0 0 5.4 15 Gang - Enhanced Prison Li 21/02/2015
Live Adilson DosSantos Custom House 16.45 9   0 16.45 0 0 49     
Live Calvin LUMEDO Beckton Boys 16.25 10   9 6.75 0 0 49     
Live Kweku QUASHIE Stratford Boys 14.68 11   7.93 6.75 0 5.4 15     
Live Jerome Baah Custom House 14 12   4.3 9.7 0 6 13     
Live Lulu Casey Stratford Boys 13.75 13   12.75 0 0 2.7 29 ASBO 20/06/2019
Live Brendan Ssetyablue Stratford Boys 12.82 14   12.82 0 0 3 22     
Live Abdirahim Said Maryland Gang 12 15   12 0 0 0 49 CRASBO 14/08/2018
Live Awadh SALEH Chadd Green 11.8 16   10.8 0 0 0 49     
Live Hamza Kamali Stratford Boys 11.8 16   10.8 0 0 8 9     
Live Daniel Sakyi Beckton Boys 11.7 18   2 9.7 0 2.7 29     
Live Kye GEORGE Chadd Green 11.63 19   8.13 3 0 0 49     
Live Jaiden BARRETT Custom House 11.15 20   10.65 0 0 2.3 35     
Live Lamario Campbell Custom House 11.05 21   5.3 5.25 0 3 22     
Live Alex Austin Maryland Gang 10.7 22   1 9.7 0 0 49     
Live Olsen FILIPE Custom House 10 23   10 0 0 0 49     
Live Benediste LARBI Chadd Green 9.75 24   9.75 0 0 3 22 ASBO 04/12/2014
Live Terrell Paul Green Gang 9.7 25   0 9.7 0 0 49 Gang - Enhanced Prison Li 06/12/2016
Live Alex BERHANE Maryland Gang 9.7 25   0 9.7 0 0 49     
Live Richard ADEWUNMI Custom House 9.5 27   9.5 0 0 0 49     
Live Talha HAYAT Stratford Boys 9.5 27   8.5 0 0 15.9 2 Gang - Gang Injunction 01/01/2000
Live Adebowale Mafo Beckton Boys 9.45 29   9.45 0 0 2.32 34     
Live Earl WEBB Woodgrange 9.3 30   9.3 0 0 0 49     
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agencies” (2015). 
Bridges questions the identity of the partner agencies that contribute to the 
matrix and the selection of information that is subjectively used to populate it, 
concluding that the methods used contribute to the MPS becoming even more 
institutionally racist as the data collected targets BME individuals 
disproportionately. He goes on to say that many of the individuals who appear 
on the database “have not previously or recently been convicted of any 
serious criminal offence” (2015). 
 
As quantitative research has been closely associated with positivist and more 
recently, post-positivist research (Robson, 2011) and positivists believe the 
researcher and researched participant are independent of each other, there is 
an acceptance by post-positivists that theories, hypotheses, background 
knowledge and values of the researcher can impact on what is being 
researched (Reichardt & Rallis, 1994).  I adopted a post-positivist view when 
conducting the quantitative analysis of my study, having recognised the 
criticism of the old positivism path, mainly concerning my belief, which I share 
with Blaikie (2007) that I doubt direct experience is a sound basis for scientific 
knowledge and that facts and values cannot be separated. 
This assumption constitutes as the theory that has guided my research and 
from which the following hypothesis was developed:  “Being a gang member 
increases violent offending behaviour of individuals.” The concepts that 
need to be measured are gang offending as a whole and individual offending. 
This will be compared against non-gang members.   
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Quantitative research methods have the advantage of being less time 
consuming than qualitative data gathering and the standard procedures are 
more easily adapted to enable research to be replicated (Neumann, 2000).  
The disadvantages, however, are many. For example, if there are too many 
variables, analysis can become overly complex (Denscombe, 2009). 
Data collection and analysis 
In most social research qualitative data analysis involves three major steps: 
 Cleaning and organising the data for analysis (Data Preparation) 
 Describing the data (Descriptive Statistics) 
 Testing Hypotheses and Models (Inferential Statistics) 
 
Data preparation involves checking the data for accuracy, logging the data; 
entering the data into a computer; and transforming the data into something 
meaningful. 
Due to ethical considerations, which I will discuss further below, I utilised the 
services of a research assistant, an analyst from within the gangs unit to 
extract the data and compare the offending history with the evaluation cohort 
(those referred for mediation) with a comparable cohort from the gangs’ matrix 
(those not referred for mediation) 
The evaluation cohort (All those referred) 
The Mediation intervention programme was initially limited in geographical 
coverage to a set of wards (Six at the outset, but soon made available to the 
whole Metropolitan area of London). The criteria for referral meant that the 
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person was aged 16 to 30 and either involved in serious violence or 
information had been received that there was a threat of serious violence 
where they were either the instigator or victim (Tarrant, 2012). 
Their records have been drawn together to form the evaluation cohort. I 
decided on a cut off point for evaluation as October 1st 2011. There were two 
reasons for this. The first was down to data access. The department 
responsible for commissioning Capital Conflict Management (CCM) to deliver 
mediation were concerned about procurement issues for future tender of 
contract. 
The second issue, which I considered as being fundamental to the research, 
was to allow a full twelve months to elapse following the referral of an 
individual for mediation, to the checking of the Police National Computer 
(PNC) for any subsequent offending behaviour. This would provide a more 
realistic evaluation over a longer period of time and therefore provide a far 
more accurate examination of the data. Also, arrest data does not always find 
its way onto the PNC immediately.  There were a total of 123 offenders in the 
evaluation cohort. 
The Control Cohort (The Comparative Group) 
To be able to formulate a vigorous comparison cohort that in the absence of 
any intervention like mediation, could be expected to exhibit equivalent 
offending to the referral group, I set out to identify a group of offenders who, 
like the evaluation cohort, were perceived as being gang members and would 
have been referred for mediation had intelligence existed to suggest that they 
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were involved in serious violence or were threatening immediate violence. 
A borough and ward level matching process was used, to ensure that in 
addition to being perceived as gang members, the offenders selected for the 
controlled group lived in similar parts of London. 
Once the controlled group had been compiled, the quality of the match was 
individually verified to ensure theoretical rigour and ensuring the composition 
of the control group created was as comparable to the evaluation group as 
possible. 
The Offender Group Reoffending Scale version 3 (OGRS3) is a predictor of 
re-offending based on age, gender, and criminal history. Its accuracy has 
been validated and is widely used in Offender Management (Howard, Francis, 
Soothill, & Humphreys, 2009). OGRS3 predict that x% of the evaluation cohort 
and x% of the control cohort would reoffend within twelve months of release 
from prison. I ensured that the comparative group and the evaluated group 
had similar predictors for violent reoffending. 
I decided to choose an evaluation cohort and a controlled cohort following 
consultation with practitioners working in the Strategy and Performance Unit in 
the MPS. They had carried out a thorough evaluation of the Diamond Project 
(a project launched in thirteen MPS boroughs to provide one on one 
intervention with offenders who had received a twelve month custodial 
sentence) 
Like the Diamond Project, participation with mediation intervention is voluntary 
and from previous research it has been shown that those who are willing to 
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participate generally yield more positive outcomes (Holin, 2008). By selecting 
a control cohort of a similar number, who have not been offered participation 
in the mediation scheme, which was operating in their area and comparing 
them with the evaluation cohort (whether they participated or not) “allows for 
the motivational impacts on reoffending to be controlled for” (Dawson et al., 
2011).  
Furthermore, whilst it has been possible to create a control group of those 
individuals that would have satisfied the referral criteria (i.e. been a part of a 
gang and involved in serious violence), it would not be possible to establish 
whether they would have participated, therefore requiring the need to match 
the groups at the point of referral in order to maintain the integrity of the 
comparison. 
Mediation Referral Outcomes: Comparing reoffending 
between the evaluation and control cohorts. 
I took the decision based on experience as a crime manager at Camden to 
interrogate PNC for offending behaviour for any offence within one year of the 
date of their referral. Twelve months was deemed sufficient as using too great 
a time frame could skew findings and results unnecessarily. Research 
suggests that with time, gang members entering adulthood generally reduce 
offending behaviour. (e.g. in that time the suspect may have become involved 
in a long term relationship or have a family of his own and so would have 
more reason to desist from offending (Simon, 2012)).  
By adopting the approach taken will ensure a more realistic and credible 
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picture of the involvement (directly or indirectly) of the cohorts in offending and 
allows for a more vigorous comparison. 
Gang mediation analysis 
A total of 170 offenders were initially listed as having engaged in the 
mediation programme up to November 2011. This information was received 
from the MPS Specialist Crime Prevention Unit (SC&O3). Of these, four had 
no previous arrests and had no PNC record and so were excluded from the 
study.  Four were duplicates and were also excluded. Thirty-nine were 
excluded; as their previous offending did not include violence therefore a 
match was unable to be found using the matrix. The remaining 123 were used 
as the experimental group for this research (the evaluation cohort). 
 
A matched control group (the control cohort) was then obtained from the MPS 
Trident Gangs’ Matrix, which lists all known gang members in the MPS with a 
violent offending history. The matrix was used, as it is the only available tool 
that allows the identification of gang members and therefore a suitable cohort 
for this study. The control group was matched on the basis of age first and 
then violent offending history.  For example, an offender in the evaluation 
cohort (condition A) who was 18 years old at the time of the mediation referral 
(November 2011) was matched against a list of matrix offenders (condition B) 
who were also 18 years old in November 2011.  
 
From this list, a matched offender was chosen who had a violent offending 
history, which closest resembled that of the evaluation cohort individual. So in 
this example, where offender A had previous arrests for grievous bodily harm 
		 123
(GBH), robbery and affray he would be matched with offender B who was on 
the matrix and was also 18 years old with those antecedents. There were 
some instances where offenders could not be matched exactly on previous 
offending and age (this was particularly true as offenders got older).  
 
There are very few offenders on the matrix who are aged over 30, which limits 
the sampling pool. On these occasions offenders would be matched as 
closely as possible on age and offending history. For example, where a 30 
year old offender from condition A was unable to be matched to another 30 
year old in condition B, the age parameter was lessened by no more than two 
years so they would be matched to a 28 or 29 year old.  
 
Where offending history was unable to be matched exactly, they were 
matched on the most serious offences, i.e. instead of matching on GBH, 
robbery and affray, if an offender in their age group could not be found with all 
three antecedents but a suitable match was found who had only robbery and 
GBH, then they would be used as an alternative. 
 
Limitations of the matrix 
The Trident matrix only takes into consideration the most recent three year 
offending history. In the current study this was limited to 2010. Therefore 
matching only took into consideration offences since 2010. Offences are only 
included on the matrix where an offender has been charged or is currently on 
bail. Using the matrix as a sampling tool therefore excludes offenders who 
have been arrested for these offences but have been discontinued for various 
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reasons. Finally, the matrix only considers violent offences. As a result the 
mediation group could only be matched to the control group on the basis of a 
similar violent offending history in the past three years. Where offenders 
referred to mediation only had previous non-violent offending these were 
excluded from the sample. 
 
Ethical Issues 
Adopting and maintaining a transparent approach throughout the research 
project was an over-riding consideration for me. Having identified my topic for 
study and outlined my research strategy, the next step for me was to obtain 
approval for the continuation of my research, and in the first instance, this 
meant obtaining consent from the senior executive at the MPS. 
 I drafted a terms of reference for the study, outlining exactly what I would be 
doing, when, and with whom I would be speaking (Appendix C).  
In order to access MPS data, I was required to register my research with the 
Strategic Planning Unit and meet with a member of the team to be interviewed 
about the study. There were a number of detailed forms that I was required to 
complete including a discussion regarding data storage and confidentiality. I 
had to satisfy, not only the ethics policy of the MPS whereby similar standards 
of compliance for external researchers were applied to me as an employee, 
but also satisfy the University of Portsmouth’s ethics committee criteria. 
Having gained authority to proceed from the MPS, I embarked on my 
research. I began a diary, as suggested by Robson (2011) detailing 
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everything I would read, everyone I spoke to, emails out and in and telephone 
calls. I detailed my thoughts for my reflective account and listed all the 
problems and issues as they arose and what I had to do in order to move on 
to the next stage. I structured my research so that I kept organised data 
collection and files on my personal computer in structured orderly files for 
retrievable ease (Lee, 2008). My key goal was to maintain transparency 
throughout my studies (Densley, 2011) and in every case, I informed the 
interviewee that not only was I a Doctoral student, but also a serving police 
officer.  
I read the code of ethics for Researchers in the field of Criminology on The 
British Society of Criminology website, (2015) and as stated, I ensured my 
research complied with their code, that research is undertaken to the highest 
possible methodological standard and the highest quality in order that 
maximum possible knowledge and benefits accrue to society.	
Whilst I agree and abide by their codes, I was particularly drawn to the point 
made about the  
“obligation to avoid over-generalising on the basis of limited data, and 
to beware of the dangers of failing to reflect the experience of certain 
groups, or contributing to the over-researching of certain groups within 
the population” (2015). 
I decided not to interview anyone under 16 years of age, as that would require 
parental consent, both for ethical and time management reasons.  
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Anonymity 
I gave an undertaking to guarantee that the individuals, from whom I collected 
data through interviews, remained anonymous throughout, up to and including 
any potential public dissemination of the results. I did this by replacing names 
with labels, e.g. Respondent 1.  I did not go to the lengths of some gang 
researchers who have attempted to maintain anonymity at higher levels:  e.g. 
groups (the gangs themselves), localities areas, and even the cities in which 
research is conducted. I did consider the implications of not identifying the 
gang and the opportunity for someone to therefore identify an individual whilst 
working in a small area of London, but decided that the questions I had 
chosen would not enable individuals to be identified from the results of my 
data collections.  
Informed consent  
 I obtained written informed consent (Bryman, 2008:694) and included a 
declaration at the top of the consent form that gave my name and contact 
number; the reason for conducting the research; a consent slip; and an 
assurance of confidentiality. I also included wording, which stated that they 
were free to choose, which questions they answered and could stop at any 
time. Additionally, I gave the individuals sufficient information about the study 
at the top of the questionnaire as well as the disclaimer, which I read out prior 
to the interview. I emphasized the truly voluntary participation aspect of this. 
The data collected would be tape recorded and subsequently transcribed and 
held in electronic form on my personal computer. 
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Territoriality and neutral locations for fieldwork  
Territory and location proved to be most problematic in my research. I 
arranged for the interviews to take place in offices across London reducing the 
time I would take up of those I would be interviewing.  It also allowed those 
already working with gangs on a daily basis to continue doing so at their own 
offices. However, not wanting to interfere with their work commitments and not 
wanting to scare off any participants in the mediation project, I ensured that I 
booked an appointment with conflict engagement specialists at suitable times 
when they would not be involved in mediation. Eurogangs research indicates 
that “there is a small but growing ‘reflective’ academic literature surrounding 
the problems posed to social researchers conducting fieldwork in risky or 
‘dangerous’ contexts” (Treweek & Linogle, 2000).  In my study, the applicable 
issues centred on avoiding unnecessary exposure to dangerous situations, 
times, and places; issues; and ensuring confidentiality of participants and 
making clear to the participants the role of the researcher.  
With regards to the quantitative analysis, I overcame issues of access to 
restricted data by utilising the services of an analyst working within the gangs 
command. She was able to access the data in respect of those referred for 
mediation and also access the gangs’ matrix to compare offending for those 
not referred for mediation. This way, the confidentiality of the mediation 
process was maintained, as was the integrity of the data. 
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Limitations of the research 
The sample size for this aspect of the research was relatively small. However, 
mediation is a growing industry, and whilst the sampling method was 
purposive, with candidates deliberately chosen as being the most appropriate 
people to satisfy the research aims and objectives, the findings should not 
therefore be read as being representative of all interventionists delivering 
mediation. Despite these limitations, this study will contribute to a better 
understanding of the outcomes of mediation when used to reduce gang 
violence in London. As the literature review demonstrates, this research also 
represents the first major independent analysis focusing on this issue in the 
UK to date. 
It is also worth noting that if a person is amenable to one intervention they 
may be more amenable to others. In my experience, those individuals who are 
referred for mediation are very likely to be receiving all kinds of additional 
support from a range of social services and this may explain many of the 
positive findings.  
The referral of an individual is made on a need to know basis, and an 
individual’s involvement in the programme will not be shared with any 
specialist-policing unit other than the unit from where the referral came. 
Therefore, if the individual referred is being targeted by the operation Connect 
enforcement team or being investigated, then this will continue.  By accepting 
the mediation, this does not automatically mean that the individual referred will 
get access to other interventions, but it might mean that they are more likely to 
get information on how to secure the most appropriate intervention or support 
		 129
to meet their needs. Being referred for mediation does not guarantee a place 
on the safe and secure programme or a job scheme placement, but it may 
highlight options available that the individuals referred may never have been 
identified for, in the absence of all the relevant information required for such 
additional support.  
Having examined the methodology for this research, it is now necessary to 
examine how effective the intervention of mediation is and examine its 
outcomes. 
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Chapter 5 Is mediation effective?  
 
Findings and analysis from quantitative data 
 
The total sample of 246 was equally divided between the mediation group and 
non-mediation group (The evaluation and control cohorts). As both groups 
were matched on age, analysis of the distribution of age was done on the 
sample collectively.  The mean age was 18.27 years with a minimum age of 
14 and a maximum age of 40. Age was not normally distributed and had a 
positive skew value of 3.37 with the majority of offenders in the sample being 
under 20 years old as shown in Figure 5 below.  
 
Figure 5. Age distributions of the complete sample  
 
 
 
Age and delinquency is the subject of much research in the context of gang 
membership and violent offending. The vast majority of research into gangs in 
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London show that most gang members are aged between 25 and 29 (Bennett 
and Holloway 2004:307), with some gangs reporting members as young as 10 
(Mares, 2001).  In a study conducted by Bennett and Holloway, (2004) which 
reviewed the NEW- ADAM  (New English and Welsh Arrestee Drug Abuse 
Monitoring) programme, they specifically focussed on gang members and 
former gang members. Their research showed gang and former gang 
members had a median age for individuals currently part of a gang of 19 
years; for past gang members it was 24 years and for non-gang members it 
was 25 years. They suggest the difference in age between current and past 
may be due to “maturation” (p314). 
 
As stated earlier, as gang members get older, there appears to be a 
correlation between age and greater desistance in offending, generally.   
 
All offenders in the evaluation and comparative cohort were male. The 
majority as shown in figure 6 were of black ethnic appearance.  This coincides 
with research already conducted, which suggests a typical gang member in 
the UK is black and male (Mares, 2001; Bullock and Tilley, 2002). However, 
heeding advice from Aldridge, Medina and Ralphs, (2008) in their enlightening 
study entitled the “Dangers and problems of doing ‘gang’ research in the UK.  
Street gangs, migration and ethnicity”, I was cognisant not to read to much 
into the ethnic make up gangs in London from the set of data I was working 
with.  They suggest, “Media accounts (e.g. Davison, 1997) and police 
accounts of British Gangs emphasise the ethnic dimension of gangs” (Marshal 
et al. 2005).  
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They go on to say that this stereotyping has been heavily criticised by 
sociologists who suggest this over simplifies the issues of gang membership 
and “contributes to the stereotyping of ethnic minorities (e.g. Alexander, 
2000:35).  
 
Figure 6. Ethnicity of offenders 
 
 
Key 
EA1 = White skinned European 
EA2 = Dark Skinned European 
EA3 = African-Caribbean appearance 
EA 4= Asian Appearance 
EA5 = Chinese / Japanese appearance 
EA6 = Arab / Egyptian appearance 
 
I decided to break down the crime types into eight crime types. This is more to 
do with the practicalities of being able to search the relevant databases that 
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hold such data and includes the crime areas that the Gangs’ Matrix is 
concerned with recording. 
 
Bennett and Holloway, (2004) research showed gang and former gang 
members were responsible for 31% of all reported offences. More 
significantly, they found these gang members were responsible for 89% of all 
robberies, 49% of all dwelling burglaries; 38% of all non-dwelling burglaries 
36% of drug supply offences (p317).  
 
Figure 7 below shows the rates of reoffending generally and for different crime 
types.  68 individuals from the mediation sample reoffended (a total of 117 
offences). Some offended on more than one occasion. The most common 
reoffending type was for drugs related offences (n=40), followed by acquisitive 
offending (n=39) and violence (n=38). Comparisons can be drawn between 
the findings of the NEW ADAM programme and the types of crimes 
associated with gang members in this study. 
 
Figure 7. Reoffending levels by crime type for complete sample 
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I decided to choose an evaluation cohort and a controlled cohort following 
consultation with practitioners working in the Strategy and Performance Unit in 
the MPS. They had carried out a thorough evaluation of the Diamond Project 
(a project launched in thirteen MPS boroughs to provide one on one 
intervention with offenders who had received a twelve month custodial 
sentence) 
Like the Diamond Project, participation with mediation intervention is voluntary 
and from previous research it has been shown that those who are willing to 
participate generally yield more positive outcomes. (Holin, 2008). By selecting 
a control cohort of a similar number who have not been offered participation in 
the mediation scheme which was operating in their area and comparing them 
with the evaluation cohort (whether they participated or not) “allows for the 
motivational impacts on reoffending to be controlled ” (Dawson et al., 2011).  
Furthermore, whilst it has been possible to create a control group of those 
individuals that would have satisfied the referral criteria (i.e. been a part of a 
gang and involved in serious violence), it would not be possible to establish 
whether they would have participated, therefore requiring the need to match 
the groups at the point of referral in order to maintain the integrity of the 
comparison. In summary, the evaluation cohort consists of gang members 
involved in serious violence and referred for mediation. The control group is 
made up of gang members involved in serious violence but not referred for 
mediation. 
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Reoffending Analysis 
Chi Square (symbolised by the Greek letter chi, squared χ2) is a test of the 
independence of the association amongst nominal or categorical variables. It 
questions whether the two variables are independent, have no relationship or 
any association due to coincidence, or are dependent where the relationship 
exists and would rarely occur if left to chance alone (Hagen, 2006). 
 
It was used here to compare whether offenders were arrested for further 
offences once they received mediation against those that did not receive 
mediation.  Chi Square was most suitable in this analysis, as it allows the user 
to examine the relationship between two categorical variables.  
 
In the current analysis both the independent and dependent variables were 
categorical; whether the offender was referred for mediation (yes or no) and 
whether they reoffended in a particular crime type. The chi square statistic 
also allows you to work out an odds ratio, which gives a practical measure of 
the size of the effect of the independent variable. Their reoffending is based 
on arrests for offences rather than convictions or charges. Data systems and 
analysis enabled offending to be divided into seven categories. These are the 
categories that were used at the time the data was extrapolated to measure 
the level of offending behaviour and risk of individuals involved in gang 
criminality. An increase in offending in any of these areas affects the 
prioritisation of an individual or a gang in the gangs’ matrix. The categories 
are: 
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 General reoffending – reoffending of any kind 
 Violence – Murder, Attempted Murder, GBH, ABH, Affray, Battery, 
Common Assault, Assault on a constable, Violent Disorder, Threats to 
Kill 
 Serious Violence - Murder, Attempted Murder, GBH 
 Minor Violence - ABH, Affray, Battery, Common Assault, Assault on a 
constable, Violent Disorder, Threats to Kill 
 Weapon related offending – Possession of an offensive weapon, 
Possession of a firearm, Possession of a Bladed Article, Points/Blades 
 Acquisitive offending – Burglary, Robbery, Theft offences, Handling 
Stolen Goods 
 Drug related offending – Possession and Possession with Intent to 
Supply  
Beginning with the null hypothesis:  Mediation has no significant impact on 
whether an offender will be recidivist. I present an objective opening 
statement in an attempt to show the effect mediation actually has on violent 
reoffending. Additionally, whether the null hypothesis is established or 
disproved can establish whether or not a relationship exists between the 
variables being examined. When carrying out the chi square test on the 
results, the significance level will determine whether or not the hypothesis is 
rejected or accepted. 
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Figure 8. Levels of reoffending with and without Mediation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8 shows the following: 
 
 
The first column shows those individuals where contact had been made by 
mediators and subsequently did not go on to reoffend, i.e. Mediation and no 
offending (M_NO). The outcome is not just above average but also above the 
upper limit12 meaning that there is a causal factor (mediation) causing the high 
volume of no offending.  When you compare M_NO to those who had not 
been referred for mediation but did not go on to reoffend, i.e. No Mediation, 
No Offending (NM_NO) in column 3, it can be inferred that the causal factor 
increases the level of no offending. 
																																																								
	
12	The upper limit is calculated using standard deviation and the average.  The upper limit is one standard deviation 
from the average; the extreme upper is the average plus 2 standard deviations.	
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Conversely those who had been referred for mediation and subsequently went 
on to offend, Mediation and Offending (M_O) in column 2, is below the 
average and the lower limit13 indicating that there is a causal factor resulting in 
a significantly low number of offenders.  When you compare M_O to those 
who were not referred for mediation and subsequently went on to offend, No 
Mediation and Offending (NM_O) as shown in column 4, it can be inferred 
that the causal factor decreases the level of reoffending. 
The chart also tells us that without mediation (NM_NO and NM_O) offenders 
are just slightly more likely not to offend, however the difference between 
offending and not offending is just 76 offenders (8% of the NM total). 
The difference between those that offend or not with mediation (M_O and 
M_NO) is 482 offenders, which represents almost 50% of the total that 
received mediation. 
On further analysis, there are nuanced differences if we analyse by crime 
type. Generally the largest proportion of the pie charts below, are M_NO with 
the exception of sexual offences and general offending.  However with 
general offending the absence of mediation is clearly linked to offending.  The 
Sexual offences category of offending is an anomaly showing almost a 50:50 
split for no offending with or without mediation.  Potentially indicating that for 
offending in the sexual offences category, there needs to be additional 
services to decrease recidivism. 
																																																								
13 The lower limit is calculated as the average minus one standard deviation, the extreme lower limit is the average  
 
minus 2 standard deviations	
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The chi squared statistical test indicates that we can completely reject the null 
hypothesis.  With this in mind and the above evidence, it is clear that 
mediation has a significant impact on reducing recidivism.  Analysis of the 
data demonstrates that when mediation is initiated, an offender is 1.8 times 
less likely to reoffend and 1.38 times more likely not to offend. Looking at 
each crime type analysed, the following can be established. 
General Reoffending 
76% of the sample reoffended in some way (n=187).  Out of the 187 who did 
re-offend, 119 individuals or 63.6% did not receive mediation.  68 of those 
who had reoffended had been referred for mediation. This means that 55% of 
those referred for mediation reoffended again as compared with 96.75% of 
those not referred for mediation.  
The relationship between general reoffending and whether an offender 
received mediation was highly significant χ2 (1) = 55.57, p < .001.	 When an 
offender was not referred for mediation, the likelihood of them reoffending 
generally was 1.24 times higher. 
Figure 9. General Offending 
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Violence 
45.93% of the total sample committed violent offences post November 2011 
(n113), of these 66.4% had not been referred for mediation (n=75). 33.6% 
who committed violent offences had been referred for mediation (n38). 
134 of the sample did not commit violent offences post November 2011, of 
this 63.4%, mediation had been instigated (n=85). 69% of the evaluation 
cohort did not commit violent offences following mediation. In comparison 
39% of the controlled cohort desisted from violent offending  
There was a significant association between offenders not having been 
referred for mediation and committing violent offences χ2 (1) = 21.78, p < .001. 
Where an offender was not referred for mediation the likelihood of them 
committing violent offences were 3.40 times higher.  
Figure 10. Violence 
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Serious Violence 
22% (n54) of the sample committed serious violent offences, 70.4% (n38) of 
these did not receive mediation. 29.6% (n16) who went on to commit serious 
violence, mediation had been instigated.  
What this shows is that of the 123 individuals where mediation had been 
instigated, 14% went on to commit serious violence. In comparison, 31% who 
were not referred for mediation committed serious violence. 
There was a significant relationship between offenders not having a mediation 
referral and committing serious violent offences χ2 (1) = 11.24, p < .01.  
The odds of offenders committing serious violent offences were 3.17 times 
higher when they did not receive mediation.  
 
Figure 11. Serious Violence 
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Minor Violence 
35% (n86) of the sample committed minor violent offences. Of these, 66.3% 
(n57) had not been referred for mediation. This equates to 46.3% of the total 
not referred for mediation, who went on to commit a minor violent offences, 
whilst only 23.58% (n29) of those where mediation had been instigated went 
on to offend in this category. 
65% (n160) did not commit minor violent offences. 58.4% (n94) of the 160 
received mediation. What this shows is that 76.4% of those referred for 
mediation as a whole, did not go on to commit minor violence compared with 
53.6% of those who were not referred. 
There was a significant association between offenders who had not been 
referred for mediation and committing minor violent offences χ2 (1) = 13.64, p 
< .001.   
When offenders were not referred for mediation they were 2.74 times more 
likely to commit minor violent offences.  
Figure 12. Minor Violence 
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Weapon Related Offences 
The majority of offenders did not commit weapon related offences (n=182). Of 
these 55.5% received mediation (n=101). 64 offenders were arrested for 
weapon related offences, 67.2% of them had not received mediation (n=43). 
21 individuals were arrested for weapon related offences and had received 
mediation. 
What this means is that 82.1% of the evaluation cohort did not go on to 
commit weapon related offences compared with 65.9% of the control cohort. 
Being referred for mediation significantly contributes to an offender not being 
arrested for weapon related offences χ2 (1) = 8.98, p < .01.  
Where an offender is not referred for mediation the likelihood of their being 
arrested for weapons related offences increases by 2.41 times. 
 
Figure 13. Weapon Related Violence 
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Sexual Offending 
Counts in two of the cells were less than five indicating that chi square 
analysis was not suitable. The majority of the sample was not arrested for 
sexual offences (n=240). However 6 were arrested for sexual offences, these 
were split equally between the mediation and non-mediation group (n=3). 
There are no significant findings between those cohorts referred for mediation 
and not referred. 
Figure 14. Sexual Offences 
 
Acquisitive offending 
38.2% (n94) of the sample were arrested for acquisitive offending, 58.5% of 
these were not referred for mediation (n=55). 39 of those referred for 
mediation were arrested for acquisitive offending. 152 were not arrested for 
acquisitive offending. Of these 87 (57.23%) received mediation.  
What this demonstrates is 70.7% of those referred for mediation were not 
arrested for acquisitive offending, compared with 52.8% of the control cohort. 
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A significant association was identified between offenders receiving mediation 
and not being arrested for acquisitive offences, χ2 (1) = 4.19, p < .05.  
Based on the odds ratio, the odds of an offender being arrested for acquisitive 
offences were 0.58 times higher if they were not referred for mediation. 
 
Figure 15. Acquisitive Offending 
 
 
 
 
Drugs 
41% (n101) of the sample was arrested for drug related offences. Of these 
63.4% were not referred for mediation (n=64). 37 were arrested for drug 
related offences and had received mediation. 59% (n145) were not arrested 
for drug related offending, 59.3% (n86) of who had received mediation.  
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What this shows is that 70% of the sample that had been referred for 
mediation was not arrested for drug related offences, compared with 45.5% of 
those not referred for mediation. 
There is a significant relationship between offenders being arrested for drug 
offences and not receiving mediation χ2 (1) = 11.64, p < .01.  
The odds of an offender being arrested for drug related offences were 2.44 
times higher if they were not referred for mediation. 
Figure 16. Drug related offending 
 
 
So, in summary, for every crime type, other than sexual offences, there was a 
significant relationship between being arrested for reoffending and not having 
been referred for mediation. This research indicates clearly, that being 
referred for mediation impacts significantly on an individual’s future offending 
behaviour. 
 
 
		 147
Engaged with mediation 
Also of interest was whether an offender engaging with the mediation process 
significantly affected their reoffending generally and in any particular crime 
type. No relationship was found between participation in the programme and 
reoffending generally or in any crime types: 
 No significant relationship was found between engagement in 
mediation and general reoffending, χ2 (1) = 0.01, p = .92 
 No significant relationship was found between engagement in 
mediation and violent reoffending, χ2 (1) = 1.52, p = .22 
 No significant relationship was found between engagement in 
mediation and Serious violent reoffending, χ2 (1) = 1.27, p = .27 
 No significant relationship was found between engagement in 
mediation and minor violent reoffending, χ2 (1) = 0.47, p = .49 
 No significant relationship was found between engagement in 
mediation and weapon related reoffending, χ2 (1) = 0.97, p = .32 
 No significant relationship was found between engagement in 
mediation and drug related reoffending, χ2 (1) = 0.69, p = .40 
 
This suggests that offenders do not necessarily need to wholly participate in 
the full mediation programme in order for it to have a positive effect on their 
likelihood of reoffending. Rather it appears that it is enough for them to be 
referred for mediation and initial contact made.  
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This is also a common theme arising out of 17 semi-structured interviews 
conducted with conflict engagement specialists, which will be discussed 
further in the next chapter. 
 
Logistic Regression Analysis 
Also of interest to this study was the combined impact of age and mediation 
on an offender’s likelihood of reoffending. Logistic regression was used to 
examine this as it allows the prediction of a categorical variable (offending) by 
categorical and continuous variables. In this case these are mediation and 
age. Age alone did not significantly affect general reoffending, which does not 
correlate with empirical research which shows for each year of age there is a 
two per cent reduction in the odds of general reoffending (Ministry of Justice, 
2013:6). 
 
However, in this study, age and mediation interacted to produce a significant 
effect on general reoffending b = .17, Wald χ2 (1) = 32.74, p = < .001. Older 
offenders who had been referred for mediation were less likely to reoffend 
generally. 
 
 A similar effect was found for: 
 Violence b = .07, Wald χ2 (1) = 18.28, p = < .001. 
 Serious Violence b = .05, Wald χ2 (1) = 7.71, p = < .01. 
 Minor Violence b = .06, Wald χ2 (1) = 11.65, p = < .01. 
 Weapon related offending b = .04, Wald χ2 (1) = 6.48, p = < .05. 
 Drug related offending b = .05, Wald χ2 (1) = 10.17, p = < .01. 
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Only age alone had an effect on acquisitive reoffending b = -.26, Wald χ2 (1) = 
9.63, p = < .01. As an offender’s age increased, their likelihood of committing 
acquisitive offences decreased, regardless of mediation referral.  See figure 
17 below. 
 
Figure 17 – Offending, Age and Age and Mediation comparisons 
 
 
 
What this research demonstrates, following initial contact from a conflict 
engagement specialist to instigate the mediation process, there is 
overwhelming evidence to suggest that mediation has positive outcomes. 
There appears to be significant evidence to suggest the mediation process 
has a profound influence on violent offending and compliance with the rule of 
law in general.  Similar positive outcomes are noted in other types of 
mediation situations. Roehl and Cook (1985) report 67% to 87% compliance 
to agreements reached in neighbourhood justice centres. Mediation has also 
B (SE) Lower Odds ratio Upper
General Reoffending Age ‐.05 (.04)  0.883 0.95 1.02
Age * Mediation .17 (.03) 1.11 1.18 1.25
Violence Age ‐.02 (.04) .91 1.04 1.06
Age * Mediation .07 (.02) 1.04 1.07 1.10
Serious Violence Age ‐.10 (.080 .77 .90 1.05
Age * Mediation .05 (.02) 1.02 1.05 1.10
Minor Violence Age ‐.02 (.04) .92 .99 1.08
Age * Mediation .06 (.02) 1.02 1.06 1.09
Weapons Age ‐.08 (.06) .82 .92 1.04
Age * Mediation .04 (.02) 1.01 1.05 1.08
Drugs Age ‐.26 (.08) .65 .77 .91
Age * Mediation .01 (.02) .98 1.01 1.05
Acquisitive Age ‐.01 (.04) .92 .99 1.07
Age * Mediation .05 (.02) 1.02 1.05 1.08
95% CI for odds ratio
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been associated with greater compliance than has adjudication in divorce 
disputes (Pearson & Thoennes, 1984a) and significantly so in small claims 
cases (McEwen & Maiman, 1981).  Interestingly, this does not appear to be 
the case when mediation was used in criminal cases (Davis, Tichane, & 
Grayson, 1980), where individuals referred for mediation do not generally 
comply with non-offending. 
 
However, the data analysed here suggests that mediation is an effective tool 
in reducing violent offending. Analysis conducted demonstrates that there is a 
significant 3.4 times less probability of individuals committing a serious violent 
offence once they have been referred for mediation and contact is 
established, compared with those individuals who have not been referred for 
mediation. Individuals are more prone to comply with societal norms and 
desist from offending generally. 
 
In summary, in determining whether mediation is effective, this is dependent 
on the identification of individuals who are involved in serious violent offending 
in the first instance, and who are part of a street gang or group or who appear 
to offend collectively. Once the mediator has made contact, the quantitative 
data analysed suggests that reoffending is less likely to follow. This suggests 
that mediation is an effective tactic. There is a significant correlation between 
being referred for mediation and desistance from crime. In the next chapter, 
the factors that contribute to effective mediation will be examined in more 
detail. 
 
		 151
Chapter 6 What are the factors that contribute to 
effective mediation? 
Findings and analysis of the qualitative data. 
 
 
Qualitative research report(s) must always tell the story of the project, richly 
convey the views of others, and detail implications. (Denscombe, 2009: 589)  
 
Having established through quantitative analysis in this study, that mediation 
when used to resolve violent conflict situations involving gangs can be 
effective, the next course of action is to establish through qualitative analysis, 
what factors contribute to effective mediation, and thus contributes to the lack 
of academic research that exists in this area. Chapter 5 was concerned with 
the statistical outcomes, which demonstrated mediation is effective in 
reducing violent offending. This chapter will get behind the statistics and 
discover why mediation can be effective. 
 
Much of the literature that deals with mediation addresses its use in 
employment disputes (Bingham, 2004), international conflicts (Malanczuk, 
2002; Merrils, 2011); divorce proceedings (Boulle and Rycrof, 1998); and 
community clashes (Pruitt et al, 1993). Further academic understanding of 
effective mediation use in gang conflicts is required.  
 
Seventeen individuals involved in the mediation process were interviewed and 
the conversations transcribed.  Four overarching common themes emerged. 
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These were a) Engagement in the process; b) Limitations of mediation; c) 
additional support that could enhance the mediation process; and d) 
outcomes of mediation.  
 
In order to interpret the significance of these findings, the following system 
was adopted. Where nine or more asserted a fact, then this is deemed a 
majority; where twelve or more assert, it’s is a significant majority. Where the 
number is less than nine, this will be considered a minority and five or less will 
constitute a significant minority. 
 
Understanding the meaning of “mediation” in the context of 
gang violence 
 
It was important to establish at the outset from those interviewed what they 
understood mediation to be.  It would have been remiss to assume that each 
individual understood the process of mediation in the same way, without 
probing what mediation actually meant to each interviewee.  
 
A significant majority understood mediation to be an individual based 
intervention that targets those involved in gang violence. Its aim is to help 
clarify a conflict situation and assists individual(s) in finding common ground 
even if they continue to agree to disagree.  Those involved in the mediating 
are totally impartial and have no or little knowledge of the alleged dispute. 
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A police officer involved in the mediation process; who is also a trained 
mediator stated the following: 
 
“Mediation cuts across various levels. … Mediation for me is a vehicle 
for people to air their positions and interests and to come to some 
accommodation and comprise if possible.” (P1, November 2012) 
 
A conflict engagement specialist stated the following: 
 
Mediation is helping to bring about peaceful resolution to all parties 
involved in the conflict that they may be experiencing. (M1. October 
2012) 
 
An analyst from the MPS described mediation as: 
 
“a tactic to lower the temperature or get some understanding between 
two or more parties.” (PS3) 
 
So there is consistency within their accounts that is steeped in literature. 
Mediation is interpreted in this context as assistance to two or more 
interacting parties (Kressel and Pruitt, 1989; Wall, Stark & Standifer, 2001; 
Moore, 2014) by a third person not involved in the dispute or conflict (Folberg 
& Taylor, 1984) with the ultimate aim of diffusing a situation involving conflict. 
(Lafontaine, Ferguson, Wormith, 2005).  
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A significant majority mentioned that mediation is not always about mediating 
with two or more people together (Classic mediation), but very often ‘to-ing 
and fro-ing’ between parties in conflict (Shuttle Mediation). A significant 
majority mentioned that classic mediation was about getting two or more 
people together in a room, to agree on a course of action, whilst shuttle 
mediation was where mediators negotiated on an individual level between two 
or more parties and revisited each party to establish common ground from 
which to broker peace.   These different aspects of the mediation process are 
echoed, by scholars such as Umbreit, Coates, and Vos, (2004), as being 
effective. 
 
Satisfied that there was a consistency in accounts and that mediation was 
being interpreted in its usual context, the next issue addressed concerned the 
level of engagement between those referred for mediation and the mediators.  
 
Themes 
The overarching common themes that emerged as a result of the 
conversations are: 
1. Engagement in the process 
2. Limitations of the mediation process 
3. What additional support is required to support the mediation 
process 
4. Outcomes of the mediation process 
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Within each overarching themes, sub themes developed and these will be 
analysed further, below 
 
1. Engagement in the process 
Wanting to explore if those individuals referred for mediation always engaged, 
a significant majority stated that not everyone engaged in the process.  
 
P1 stated: 
“Certainly we do find the people who don’t want to engage are just as 
surprising as those that do.  So there’s nothing set in stone about who 
takes up the offer of mediation.” 
 
M1 claimed, “… 75% engage and then engage to certain levels. 25% do not 
engage”.  
 
The various levels of motivators for engagement and involvement in the 
process appear to be linked to the level of the conflict and the feelings of 
desperation of those involved in the dispute (Lim & Carnevale, 1990). 
 
The findings here appear to be at variance to current academic findings with 
regards to levels of engagement in mediation. Wall and Lynn (1993) posit 
where the levels of conflict were most serious, there was a lesser chance for a 
successful outcome to ensue and quoting Phear (1985) they observe that 
many violent conflict cases were screened out in mediation centres as they 
felt these types of disputes could not be settled by mediation (p174).  
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Contrary to those academic findings discussed, a significant majority in this 
research stated they experienced greater involvement with individuals who 
had nowhere else to turn; that were desperate or feared for their safety, or the 
safety of their families. These individuals engaged more in the process than 
those who felt they had nothing to lose or who were not openly concerned 
about the level of danger. M3 provided an explanation around at what point do 
individuals engage, suggesting,   
 
“There’s a sense of desperation, a lot of them when they’re at that point 
of engaging, and actually in fear of their lives, or indeed in fear of the 
lives of their family members.” 
 
Then interestingly, M1 intimated that engagement is not always necessary to 
yield results: 
“…according to the research we have done, (those contacted) do not 
get involved in the perceived violence that they were going to get 
involved in. There’s something powerful about knocking on someone’s 
door, saying who you are and what you do. Even if they say, “go away!” 
it sticks in their head there is something coming out of this.” 
 
 M8 added,  
“Sometimes the knock on the door by one of us is enough to stop any 
conflict. The very fact we have made contact and we tell them, “we 
know what you are up to”, is enough for them to stop.” 
		 157
 
M9 added,  
“Just your presence alone… calms situations down. Just knocking on 
that door. They know other people are involved…”  
 
This links back to the evidence provided by the quantitative analysis which 
showed no significant evidence for level of engagement in the mediation 
process and desistance from offending.  M1 suggests that in his experience, 
contact made by mediators is enough in some circumstances to stop the 
intended violence occurring or existing violent incident from reoccurring. There 
does appear to be a lack of literature on the levels of full engagement in 
intervention programmes and the effect on subsequent offending. 
 
A meeting with the Head of Unit at SC&O3, Michael Taylor, on 9th February 
2015, to discuss mediation outcomes to date, ultimately led to the topic of 
engagement with the programme. Between January 2014 and October 2014, 
Michael stated that CCM made contact with 150 individuals with the intention 
of engaging in the mediation process. 86 engaged, whilst 64 did not. With 
regards to those who did not engage, on further analysis of the victimisation 
and offending levels three months before the referral and three months 
following the referral, the data showed a 68% reduction (n28 pre and n9 post 
referral) in the numbers whose name appeared on a crime report as a suspect 
and 92% reduction in their names appearing as a victim (n39 pre and 3 post). 
The findings of the analysis of individuals who did engage showed a slightly 
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better outcome, namely 51% reduction (n41 pre and n20 post) as a suspect 
on a crime report and 89% reduction (n35 pre and n4 post) as a victim. 
 
In summary, a key finding of the research suggests when mediators make 
contact with individuals involved in gang violence; this contact has a greater 
impact on individuals being involved in criminal activity, (either as a victim or 
suspect) than actual engaging in the mediation process itself.  There has to be 
engagement or contact at least, from the mediators. The positive outcomes of 
mediation are not dependent on any individual completing the mediation 
programme.  
 
Wanting to find out more about the engagement process, a discussion 
followed, exploring the lengths to which the mediators go to in order to 
exhaust all avenues before walking away.  A significant number suggested 
approaching family or friends in order to secure an introduction to the process 
of mediation. P1 remarked, 
 
“So, although one person doesn’t want to engage, we might find that 
mediation is applied to them via (their) mother, father or other people in 
the group. “ 
 
M8 refers to family members as “key facilitators”, suggesting the value of 
having their support in continued engagement. 
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So by securing pressure to engage from family members or friends, the 
mediators are sometimes able to make a breakthrough and start some level of 
dialogue.  However, a significant majority acknowledged that the initial 
response they get on a first encounter differs very much from person to 
person. Quite often, a first meeting is not a positive one. The family are 
usually sceptical of the mediators and very often frustrate their attempts to 
engage.  
 
Worthy of note are Klein’s and Maxson’s observations that familial influences 
on gang involvement, have far less of an impact on an individual’s offending 
than peer pressure in belonging to a gang (2006). However, what Klein and 
Maxson do cite as being a positive influence over youth behaviour is parental 
supervision and monitoring of the youth’s activities (p148). Aldridge, Shute, 
Ralphs and Medina (2011: 379) note: 
 
“The parents of gang members we spoke to were fearful of blame, 
sensitive to stigma, critical of statutory agencies, and often denied or 
were confused about the problem behaviour of their children”  
 
A recurring theme mentioned by mediators interviewed, identified 
encountering parents who shared a sense of shame or blame on being told 
that their child was at risk of being seriously harmed, as a result of the 
violence within which they were caught up. Another issue identified was 
parents not accepting that their children belonged to a gang (see Jensen, 
2008, Aldridge et al, 2011). 
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Conversely, a significant number of those involved in delivering mediation, 
mention being introduced to individuals via family members as a positive 
impact overall, on individuals engaging with the intervention programme. 
 
Mediators did discuss in some instances, how having family members present 
during the process can be a barrier to engagement. Not only can parents be 
suspicious of the process as a result of falsely believing the mediators to be 
statutory agencies; but juvenile gang members are also reluctant to open up 
in the presence of their parents, as M9 suggests:  
  
“Sitting in a room with their mum and dad, they might not talk, they may 
not feel comfortable talking in front of their parents…the mum goes out 
to make a cup of tea or something, but as soon as the parents walk 
back in the room they shut up” 
 
M4 suggests individuals who are vulnerable and at the point of despair are 
more inclined to engage with the process: 
 
“ You will have people engage in mediation because they’re desperate 
to get out of a situation that they don’t actually see a way out of…when 
you’re looking at key moments for mediation, it’s when you do catch 
somebody when they’re most vulnerable and therefore more likely to 
grab the lifeline we’ve thrown at them.” 
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This echoes suggestions from scholars such as Lim and Carnevale (1990) 
who propose interventions are most effective if people are targeted in high-
level conflict situations and “substantive pressing techniques” are initiated 
(Wall and Lynn, 1993: 174). The speed at which mediators are brought in also 
appears as a critical success factor (Conlon and Fasalo, 1990). 
 
In a gang dispute context, this could be interpreted as mediators attending a 
hospital bed following a violent incident, when individuals are at their most 
vulnerable. At these types of scenes, the police have a duty to secure and 
preserve evidence and so the presence of a mediator could provide that much 
needed support that is usually absent during such times.  The mediators are 
also able to establish because of their neutrality, what exactly has happened. 
Rarely do gang members tell police who was involved in the incident of 
violence that led to their being shot or stabbed, when lying in a hospital bed, 
let alone talk to the police at all. The mediators are able to attend in the 
position of concerned members of the community. 
 
Speaking with Lieutenant David Auner of the Los Angeles Sheriff’s office in 
October 2014, he stated that one of the toughest challenges facing any law 
enforcement personnel following any gang related activity is the effective 
delivery of meaningful messages to the community. One of the biggest risks 
facing those charged with keeping communities safe is reprisal attacks. Very 
often, these types of attacks are as a result of misinformation or 
misunderstandings. The presence of the mediators who can quickly establish 
exactly what has gone on, offers a workable solution to community 
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messaging. This final point was echoed by a significant majority of those 
interviewed.  
 
Exiting the gang 
A sub theme that emerged from this overarching theme of engagement is that 
not everyone who engages in the mediation programme wishes to exit the 
gang lifestyle. Being in a gang, is seen to be a tangible opportunity to ‘make it’ 
and be something where status and wealth can be achieved far easier being a 
part of a gang, than through the conventional routes of education and 
employment; routes which many of these young people feel, cannot be 
legitimately accessed by them (Fagan and Freeman, 1999; Vankatesh, 1997; 
Hagerdorn, 2007).  
 
Some do not want to exit the gang due to issues of protection. Many gang 
members, who CCM comes into contact with, already reside in some of the 
most densely populated gang-affected areas of London. They are 
continuously threatened by rival gangs and often reside in very deprived areas 
in London, where the most dangerous elements of society already reside and 
operate, such as drug dealers; drug users; ex-convicts and those at large for 
committing crime. (Taylor, 2008; van Gemert, and Decker, 2008) 
 
P1’s views were that  
some do and some others enjoy the lifestyle.  
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M1 had a view that,  “people engage in mediation when they’re ready and 
went on to say,  “a lot of people want to resolve the conflict and carry on their 
lifestyle. But we get a lot of people who have had enough. Quite often they’re 
older gang members”.  
 
M9 stated, 
 Some engage when they need a statement for court, for a case 
they’re involved in. They think it will help. 
 
What is clearly evident from the intelligence collected and interviews 
conducted, is that those who do engage may not exit their lifestyle (46.4% 
went on to offend again), but the violent offence that they were originally 
believed to be involved in and were referred for did not take place.  
Conversely, there are those who fully engage and are relieved when they first 
encounter CCM staff.  
 
“It is as if they no longer have to hide anymore. The game is up. They 
often operate under the illusion that no one knows what they are up to. 
Once we become involved, we tell them, “If we know this about you, 
imagine what the police and the authorities already know!” This is their 
wake-up call” (M3) 
 
So, in summary, the levels of engagement vary and appear dependant on the 
perceived mental state of the individual approached. If they are desperate and 
have nowhere else to turn, there is evidence to suggest that they are willing to 
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engage at some level. The more vulnerable they are, the more chance there 
is of having an interaction. This would suggest that the more serious and 
immediate a situation involving an actual or real threat of violence, could 
provide better opportunities to engage the services of the interventionists, as it 
could yield better results. This could have far reaching implications regarding 
the use of conflict engagement specialists in the early stages of serious 
investigations and posits an argument for their presence at Gold Group14 
meetings that often convene in times of extreme emergency or following a 
critical incident15. An individual’s motivation and commitment to engage in the 
mediation process varies from case to case. In relation to mediation generally, 
successful outcomes are more likely to occur when both parties are seeking a 
resolution (Brett and Goldberg, 1983; Skratek 1990). This may also be 
pertinent when looking at gang membership. 
 
Prior knowledge of the incident 
A sub theme emerging from engagement in the mediation process was how 
little information the mediators had prior to commencing the process. A 
significant majority suggested that very often, the true reason for the dispute is 
not known. This means that mediators have to be ready to modify the process 
																																																								
14 The purpose of the Gold Group is to provide strategic leadership and direction.  
17Any incident where the effectiveness of the police response is likely to have a significant impact on the confidence 
of the victim, their family and/or the community  
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based on the information that becomes apparent during the intervention.  
Scholars have argued that “mediation is a dynamic and flexible process and 
adaptability is its prized attribute and its key to its success” (Bercovitch, 
1996:4). 
 
A significant majority stated that the mediators were passed “enough 
information” from what those commissioning the intervention knew 
themselves.  From personal involvement in the initial programme, I was aware 
that the co-ordinating police officers in SC&O3 are given a certain level of 
information, which is then sanitised before being passed to the operations 
manager. This information is then sanitised again before it goes to the 
mediator.  
 
P1 suggested the mediators are given enough information to assess risk: 
 
“Most assume there’s firearms, most assume that there is 
danger…therefore some of them at that stage are quite happy just to 
know, give me the names and I will turn up on the doorstep and cold 
call, which is a benefit, because they’re not making any decisions on 
preconceived ideas and on the other side of business, some others will 
be told a lot more detail because they want to understand the nuts and 
bolts before they walk in and have an approach”.   
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M1 echoed, the amount of information given to a mediator is sufficient to get 
them started: 
 
“You’re given about as much as you need to know.  The age of the 
referral, name, you’re given the nationality sometimes, any criminal 
offences that they may have had, if they’re violent individuals, access 
to firearms; of course we need to know those things going in as 
mediators, ‘cos obviously it’s a very high risk job.  A bit of background 
information; whatever information the referee has is what they give us.” 
 
M7 also commented, 
 
“ I am given enough information to make the initial contact” 
 
This suggests that where there are concerns from investigating officers or first 
responder agencies around disclosure of information and prejudicing a live 
enquiry, a substantial amount of information is not necessary. If the team is 
given enough information to make an informed risk assessment and define 
the necessary approach for an initial meeting, this will suffice. They already 
assume the issue is a violent conflict; a threat to life issue, or one involving 
serious violence. “We always go in pairs”, (M6), and in extreme high-risk 
cases, local police cars are nearby should things go wrong. To date, this has 
not occurred.  
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In order to deliver effective mediation, mediators need to “understand the 
context of the conflict as well as the background, interests, needs and 
resources of the participants” (Berkowitch, 1996:9). This information, to date, 
is best gleaned from dialogue between mediator and participants in the 
programme.  A significant majority when interviewed stated that very often, 
the information about the feud given by those commissioning the intervention 
was incorrect.  
  
The initial meeting 
A sub-theme emerging out of the overarching theme of engagement in the 
mediation process was a successful first meeting. A significant majority 
described making contact with the individual by meeting in person as being 
critical to further engagement. M8 stated that a successful first meeting is 
when the family are on board and the individual engages fully with no barriers.  
 
P2 saw success as: 
“The fact that they’ve established whether the person is willing to 
engage…if they are at least talking to the mediators and are open to 
future meetings. It doesn’t always happen straight away…” 
 
P1 argued 
…a good meeting would be any meeting where the mediator is able to 
explain the process, explain who they are, ready to take the next steps 
and those steps will involve building trust, building an honesty between 
the mediator and the person that’s actually giving the information or 
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wanting to help and that moves on to building a proper agreement at 
the end of the day, when people can trust the confidentiality, trust that 
the mediators are there for the reason of mediation and nothing else.” 
 
An analyst (A3) saw success as,  
 
“someone who is able to first of all, get their attention, sit down and get 
them to say what’s going on, even if they don’t seem to want to engage in 
mending any fences, but someone they feel they can talk to.”  
 
These statements reinforce the idea posited by all mediators when 
interviewed and a significant majority of the total interviewed - simply making 
contact is seen as a positive step.  It is evident that following an initial 
meeting, there are various levels of appreciation towards the mediator and 
different levels of understanding as to why the mediators are there and why 
they are getting involved in their private matters. Some individuals do not 
appreciate the process and resent what they see as an intrusion into their 
lives and activities (Rubin, 1980; Vidimar, 1985). Some engage totally and 
appear relieved  
 
Conversely a sub theme emanating from efforts around engagement, 
mediators take when things do not go so well, and whether or not the 
mediators adopt a consistent approach to referrals.  M1 stated, 
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“If you have someone who is really abusive at the first meeting, I tell 
the mediators to walk away…if you phone someone to get a meeting 
and they say they’re not interested, I don’t encourage someone to 
knock on their door. It’s almost disrespectful… I say, try another tactic. 
If they’re of school age, particularly, go through a parent, teacher, or 
someone who knows them. This resonates with them. Reinforces and 
reassures them that you’re a ‘trier’. If you walk away on the first 
occasion, they will think, “well they didn’t care anyway”…try, try again” 
 
M3 stated,  
 Is (sic) about saving lives and reducing risk of further harm, so its never 
an option for me personally to walk away. I’ll try and try again. Clearly you 
don’t want to harass people, you don’t want to bully people into it…I wouldn’t 
walk away if I were shut down. I would try again” 
 
P1 stated the following: 
 
“… So they’ll … see the individual on the first attempt, they can gauge 
the willingness or the dangerousness of that individual at that stage, so 
it has to be risk managed…  I don’t think, as a general rule, they give 
up on the individual then and there.  It is a matter of, okay, they’re not 
listening to us, but maybe they’ll listen to their parents, maybe they’ll 
listen to their friends, maybe, if we go back to them and say, you are in 
extreme danger, we can help you, do you want to take that help?  Then 
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it gives them another opportunity to say, okay then, you’re persistent; 
you’re back here…”  
 
A significant majority placed importance on being persistent and not deterred 
by an initial refusal. All the mediators interviewed stated that they would try 
several times before closing a referral.  
 
2. Limitations of Mediation 
Another overarching theme emanating from the interviews is a significant 
majority believe mediation has its limitations 
M1 however, had a different view, claiming  
 
“There is nowhere where the mediators will not go. There is no one that 
they will not talk to. There are no limitations.” 
 
M2 stated that there are limitations. She commented, 
 
“…most of the cases that we have, are with young people, gang 
affiliated young people. And I guess they shut you down at the first 
hurdle, because the idea of talking to a rival gang member seems 
ludicrous to them. The issues they’ve been experiencing are so deep 
rooted and its been going on for so long that they just can’t grasp the 
idea of mediation as a concept. That’s a big limitation. Trying to make 
them understand that, yeah, you can talk through your problems. It’s a 
massive limitation”. 
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M5 concurs, “There are individuals that are lost to society. I do believe there’s 
a certain age group as well that you just cannot get through to.”  
M5 provides more detail to qualify this comment, 
 
“…it sometimes takes those sixteen / seventeen year olds a long time 
to then suddenly become clear of what that is, but in a multi-national 
city that London is, where you’ve got people that have come from war 
torn countries. It’s hard for them to trust others. The Congolese, 
Somalian for instance can be quite insular…it’s hard to sort of 
stereotype people, but there are a group of people where sometimes 
it’s just too difficult to get through to.” 
 
M4 concluded,  
“We ain’t going to be able to solve all conflicts. I wouldn’t say it 
happens very often, but it does happen some of the time. An individual 
will cease to engage”. 
 
When asked about individuals referred to mediation and whether the correct 
people were being put through the programme, there was resounding 
consistency in all the answers. A significant majority, which included all of the 
mediators, answered in the affirmative.  
 
In an effort to establish whether or not there was a risk of the wrong people 
being identified for the process and agencies referring people with a stronger 
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chance of engaging, all were asked if they believe that the individuals being 
referred were at the most risk of harm to either society or themselves.  
 
P1 answered:  
“We have seen referrals made to the company both from school 
playground incidents to dealing with serious villains at the top end of it, 
with threats to life issues and that’s been reported to us and we’ve 
managed that with the company… the tactic is aimed at preventing the 
most serious violence around - murder, GBH, wounding, serious public 
disorder 
 
However, an analyst suggested that some people refer individuals for 
mediation just to show that their borough has made a referral and have “ticked 
the box” (A1) 
 
P3 explained that there is strict gate-keeping process in place, managed by 
SC&O3, which ensures that the most violent people are being referred and 
prevents these lower level issues from being referred to the company, 
 
” We have other interventions, better suited to less violent and lower 
threat incidents. The money we have allocated for this programme 
means that we must target the higher risk offenders and most violent 
offences” (P4). 
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A3 explained that a gang that had had a lot of attention was not a high-risk 
gang. However, due to the number of referrals and attention it was getting due 
to information reports and intelligence submissions, they were rising up the 
gangs’ matrix in levels of importance and risk, because there was a lot of 
gang infighting. A3’s role is to ensure that if the infighting is perceived to be a 
high-risk threat of immediate violence that the referrals are passed on. But as 
A3 stated, “I was really worried that we were actually sorting out their internal 
HR issues as a gang, as an organisation, and maybe making them a better 
gang at the end of it!” 
 
This is a very pertinent point to make. The ‘importance’ of a gang can be 
artificially increased by the mere fact that it is getting a lot of police attention. 
That is why it is important to consider a range of factors when grading a gang 
in terms of harm and risk and prioritising individuals at most need of 
immediate attention and intervention. Together with the gangs unit’s analytical 
capability, SC&O3 gatekeepers do all that they can to ensure the right 
individuals go forward for help and intervention. 
 
So it appears the conflict engagement specialists are prepared to instigate 
mediation as an intervention with anyone, anywhere. There are no limitations 
with regards to which individual(s) they will instigate the intervention with. The 
risks are apparent and measures are taken to mitigate the risk (operating in 
pairs; notifying the police of their location and time of meetings etc.). But they 
recognise that there are a selection of people who will not engage with the 
process, whether this be due to cultural norms and confidence in the process 
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of mediation or because of deep-rooted rivalry with a cycle of violence which 
cannot be broken through this means. This is particularly common when 
mediators face situations of long running enduring rivalries, where the conflict 
is deep rooted. Enduring rivalries is seen as a barrier to successful mediation 
in the context of international disputes. (Goertz & Diel, 1992; Bercovitch & 
Diel, 1997).  However, the mediators interviewed state that they remain 
persistent but know when to walk away, understanding that in certain 
circumstance, some people just cannot be reached through mediation.  
 
3. Additional support that could enhance the mediation 
process 
  
Another major theme that emerged was the support available to mediators. I 
was keen to explore if the company had sufficient community assistance to 
enable them to effectively deliver the tactic. What would improve service 
delivery? What support was out there that could enhance the whole process 
and boost success? There were a variety of responses.  
 
P1 mentioned a lack of safe neutral venues for “ a classic mediation, a sit 
down, face-to-face mediation”. M1 stated that in some boroughs, their 
services were not correctly aligned and there is a lack of clarity around 
accessing services and funding to deliver supporting services. M9 suggested 
that the identification of community leaders that represented community 
interests was an issue. Very often, the only way to make contact with an 
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individual is through a teacher or community based volunteer; knowing whom 
to go to is an important issue.  
 
“We don’t always get the details of points of contacts who can facilitate 
communication” (M9) 
 
This suggests more needed to be done to compile a directory of trusted 
individuals who were willing to serve as go-betweens and act in the best 
interests of the communities. Faith based leaders, such as Imams, rabbis and 
priests are sometimes appropriate, but other times a youth club leader or 
football coach would be far more effective. Research shows that effective 
community support yields better results in a mediation setting (Harrington and 
Merry, 1988). This is linked to a mediation technique known as compensating. 
The mediators I spoke to talked about the ‘carrot and stick’ approach. A 
significant majority of those interviewed discussed the frustration about having 
so few ‘carrots’ that could lead to a successful outcome. M7 spoke about 
having to be resourceful and use established contacts to access training, 
education and job placements. If there was a win or a gain for the individuals 
in conflict, the better chance the mediators had of engaging the individuals in 
the process and an increased likelihood in a positive outcome to the dispute 
(Carnivale, 1996).  
 
Transformational services that complement mediation 
Transformational services are additional interventions or tools that can 
complement an initial intervention. When thinking about mediation, this could 
		 176
be a service like getting individuals back into education, or job training, 
housing support or access to medical support. I was interested to discover 
what type of additional support sat alongside mediation and what types of 
services could be accessed once the mediation had finished. 
 
 
P1 asserted, 
“Certainly in the Metropolitan Police Service we have “Safe and 
Secure”, which is an opportunity for people to be, let’s say relocated 
and start again to a degree.   That is not without its problems, in that 
you’re never moving one individual, you’re moving the family, siblings, 
mother, father who may or may not have jobs, schools, doctors, so it’s 
not a quick solution.”   
 
When looking at opportunities for gang members to exit their gang lifestyle, a 
study conducted by Young, Fitzgibbon and Silverstone (2013) found that:  
 
“A change in physical location (family-assisted or not), away from local 
gangs and criminal opportunities, was seen by family members to be 
the most effective strategy for gang exit. “ (p6). 
 
I wanted to explore what support would enhance the current service 
provisions. What would make it all work better?   
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P1 reinforced the need to have centrally administered but locally delivered 
services: 
 
“You could have a more universal approach… one size will fit all, 
across thirty two London boroughs for example, (but) sometimes (this) 
would not work, because what’s required for a youth perhaps in 
Merton, is different from one that would be required in Lambeth or even 
Newham or Islington.  It needs to have a localised response at times 
but also there needs to be a co-ordinated group that says, this is what 
we need for these individuals, this is where we can source the help for 
these individuals.” 
 
M1 explained that over the four years CCM had been in operation, they had 
built up a “portfolio of people” that they could go to for help. The problems 
cited in London appear to be the lack of uniformity and consistency around 
services provided in the 32 boroughs. M1 is convinced that most of the time, 
the services are “out there”, and “they do exist”. But accessing them is a 
bureaucratic nightmare, requires tenacity and many years of operating within 
the conflict resolution service, to learn about who can provide what and for 
how much. Unfortunately, the lack of continuity of staff in the public service 
often proves a headache for CCM. Just when they think they have a system 
for dealing with gang members involved in violence, a new Borough 
Commander or Head of CID is appointed and they have the arduous job of 
explaining the whole process again, and securing buy in. 
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M5 discussed a small project called, “Communities against Gangs” where 
CCM received funding to provide additional mentoring beyond mediation. M5 
explained, 
 
“We moved one individual from a football team in the area, as the 
football team he was in …was getting him into trouble. We put him into 
a young leadership programme”. 
 
M8 explained,  
 
“A lot of individuals are looking for jobs and they’re looking to exit their 
environment, i.e. they need to move out of the area. Some of them, you 
can see, they just want a flat, so you can see straight through that. But 
a lot of the individuals that we’re dealing, (sic) they’re entrenched so far 
in the gang stuff and its hard for them to mediate with the faction 
they’ve got conflict with, so they need to move out of the area, and a lot 
of time, initially we cannot really give them that. There’s a lot of regular 
people not involved in crime who need to be moved and so they have 
to take that into consideration.” 
 
P2 remarked,  
“One of the big problems I’ve identified is, it’s quite clear you’ll have 
mediation that go in and hold people’s hands, they almost become a 
crutch for the individuals. What then happens is the mediation stops 
and the mediators want to do some transformational services, but 
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obviously we (the MPS) cannot pay for that. We can’t afford to, it’s not 
part of the contract, and they’re suddenly left in limbo. So you might 
have got them away from some sort of gang culture and aim them 
towards education or employment, but that support they’ve had is now 
stopping. 
 
P2 suggests that “mentoring” should follow the mediation process.  He 
reiterates, 
 
“CCM can do mentoring and that way, you’ve got an end-to-end 
product with hopefully, the individuals not involved in gang crime” 
 
It is apparent that the consensus is that there should be something sitting 
alongside or following on from mediation, such as, directing individuals into 
education, training or employment. Mentoring of an individual appears to be a 
solution offered by mediators and police officers alike and CCM appear to be 
equipped to carry out this also. (M5, P2). 
 
Other mediation options available  
P1 stated that: 
”I am aware that there are other companies that say are working or 
operating at a lower level.   The difficulty comes with that is deciding 
which is the most appropriate approach; pure mediation or mentoring 
or a mixture of both.  From our perspective or from my perspective, 
CCM operate at the high risk end of it, with all of the necessary 
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safeguards around risk, around trade craft, around information 
handling; whether that is consistent with let’s say lesser levels, is 
another issue.  I am aware that there are some other levels below that, 
that there are individual companies that will operate to a degree”. 
 
M1 approached the issue in a different way, stating,  
 
“There are two types: the classic and the shuttle. With the shuttle, you 
don’t get the two parties together. This is generally about those parties 
wanting the other to know they are not interested in getting involved in 
the beef. The classic is face-to-face. Quite often, those want out of the 
gang completely. Conflict resolution is not about us finding the solution; 
it’s about them finding their solution”. 
 
Y1 explained,  
“Mediation is used to broker some of the biggest conflicts in the world. 
Why on earth would we choose to ignore using it as an intervention to 
prevent gang violence? If it is good enough for the UN to prevent world 
wars, it should be good enough for London’s gang conflicts.” 
 
What is clear is that there are companies in London who purport to offer 
mediation as an intervention in gang disputes. However, the MPS, nor any 
other department in the Criminal Justice Service, co-operate with these 
associations in the same way as they do with CCM. This is because CCM has 
the required security and risk management measures in place that meet the 
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minimum operating standards required by the Mayor’s Office for Policing and 
Crime and data storage and collection complies with data protection 
legislation. 
 
4. Outcomes of mediation 
There was a resounding consistency between responses. All the conflict 
engagement specialists; the police officers and the youth workers believe 
mediation works and prevents violence occurring. They believe it to be a very 
effective gang control intervention delivered through individual targeting. P1 
stated, 
 
“…a high proportion of those that we actually see and engage with, do 
not commit the offences or do not commit the acts that we’re afraid that 
they’re going to go on and commit, within three months of us closing 
down mediation…yes it works”. 
 
M1 stated,  
“I would say in the four years that I have been doing this, it does work. 
We have a 100% success rate. Every individual who has engaged, 
they have not participated in the level of violence that they were 
expected to engage in after we have closed the case, so yes it does 
work. It stops quite a lot of violence” 
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M1 continued,  
“We have proof that we have prevented several murders. We have 
proof that we have stopped a lot of violence. We have moved people 
back into education and employment. Yes it does work”. 
 
This is a bold statement to make; a 100 percent success rate and the 
prevention of several murders. Maxson and Klein (2006) discussing individual 
reductions in crime offending as opposed to gang unit offending state, “If 
anyone has empirically demonstrated the capacity to achieve this goal (e.g. 
violence reduction), we are unaware of it” (p235). 
 
Recognising the sensitivity that exists around disclosing actual cases, I asked 
M1 if he was able to elaborate further on evidence of successful individual 
level violent offending reduction. M1 discussed a mediation involving a young 
gang member from South London who became involved with a notorious drug 
dealer. The individual had lost drugs belonging to the dealer and things got 
out of hand: 
 
“The dealer called the kid to a meeting and the dealer turned up with a 
gun. The kid was street wise and turned up with a knife. When the gun 
didn’t go off, the kid stabbed the dealer. The dealer went to hospital, 
and as you know when someone turns up in hospital with knife wounds 
the police are notified. The dealer thought that this kid had grassed on 
him and so put a contract out on the kid’s life. We know in these 
situations these kids either end up seriously injured or dead. The kid 
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thought that this was going to happen to him. The kid called his 
probation officer, who called the police and they contacted us. We went 
and spoke to them both and negotiated a settlement for the kid to repay 
the money. The dealer was happy, the kid was happy. We got the kid 
moved. He’s alive and walking around. We prevented a murder”. 
  
This type of outcome is something that the authorities, such as the Police or 
probation could never have legally secured without huge criticism or outcry. 
Green interprets the effects of a strong police presence in intervention 
programmes: 
“Individual officers’ behaviour and role identification are shaped by 
departmental organisations rather than the problem to be solved. This 
results in the police agency itself being a powerful obstacle to 
effectively introducing problem solving for youth or other problems.” 
(Greene, 2003: 13) 
 
In the case study evidenced by M1, without a significant level of intervention, 
a cyclical level of retaliation violence could have ensued.  Lieutenant David 
Auner of the Los Angeles Sheriff’s office cited gang-related ‘tit-for-tat’ reprisals 
as being of significant concern to public safety. He explained that when a 
gang related murder occurs, very often, retaliation occurs shortly afterwards.  
 
There will be rumours and street information. Often, the information is incorrect. 
Retaliation assaults tend to target the wrong gang. This type of gang related 
shoot-outs are cyclical and tensions increase. The challenge facing the 
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authorities is to determine “how can a process be developed that facilitates 
communication with a third party without endangering any real suspects who 
would face retaliation should their identity be discovered?” Lieutenant Auner 
explained a system has been developed that aims to facilitate accurate 
community briefings. The briefings are open and state “This was a dispute 
between family or business or domestic violence incident.” The difficulty arises 
when deciding what messages to release to the community when a gang related 
incident does occur to ensure the feud is not fuelled and escalates further. The 
cyclical event of violence is difficult to close.  
 
The evidence presented here by the conflict engagement specialists and police 
officers in London, suggest, not only can gang-related murders be prevented 
through the use of mediation, but also there is the added benefit of preventing 
reprisals occurring as a result of the initial violent event. 
 
Those interviewed talked more about the success of mediation rather than the 
outcomes. Success means different things for different people involved in this 
process. The Police Officers identify success when they receive a referral that 
they can pass on to CCM. They are actively seeking outcomes also. P1 states,  
 
“Success truly for me, when we receive referrals and pass them on…  
From a police perspective it’s about crime reduction.   That joins in with 
everybody else’s outcomes of trying to get this person back into 
mainstream education, or back into mainstream employment or 
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basically to function in society without being the next victim or the next 
assailant.” 
 
 
A3 stresses, 
 
“I think mediation doesn’t actually prevent these clients having a life of 
crime. I think it can have an impact on their violent life of crime and I 
think that would be success if we can actually show that there are less 
murders, killings and serious physical harm to our population. I think 
that would be success”. 
 
A2 believes, 
‘Success is an absence of their names appearing on the suspects field 
for violent crimes and if their name does not appear within three 
months of the mediation close, we can say, that was successful for that 
mediation. We can’t say it’s successful for all time, ongoing, but we can 
say, that particular issue has been successfully mediated.” 
  
M1 says that defining success “ is the hardest question (to answer)”. He 
elaborated,  
 
“One level, if we knock on the door and get five minutes with an 
individual where no one has got this before and this is success. Just 
five minutes of their time. On another level, you get a face-to-face 
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meeting with two people in a room. They shake hands, leave and 
decide that they’re not going to be friends, but they’re not going to try 
and kill each other anymore. And they’re going to call off all their 
friends. And then there is success, where someone comes to you and 
says, ‘I want out of this lifestyle’. Success depends on the individual. “ 
 
M1 explained that success means different things for all involved. He stated, 
 
“Success for the operations manager (at CCM) is if all the mediators 
come home safe at night. As far as local authorities are concerned, 
they are, “how do we make sure our community is safe? If we don’t 
have the level of violence in our community, we will be seen to be 
better. The police, the goal is to stop these individuals harming each 
other. That’s the end goal. Stop the violence. Whatever policing you 
want to do around that, they can keep doing that”. 
 
M1 continued, 
“2 days ago, they talk about how violence is reduced and how murder 
has gone down and then they highlight the most violent area in 
England is Lewisham 16 . Now I can tell you we don’t receive any 
referrals from Lewisham. If you look at Boroughs who refer to us a lot, 
Southwark, Lambeth, Waltham Forest, they have less violence, less 
activity even though they have more gangs than Lewisham.” 
 
																																																								
16	According to Channel 4 News report, Lewisham has a homicide rate that is twice the national average, at 2.5 
people per 100,000.  
http://www.channel4.com/news/crime-violent-murder-lewisham-broadland-stephen-lawrence	
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M3 explains, 
 
“The area that I live in myself is quite heavily affected by gangs.  I have 
young family members, I’ve got a nephew, I’ve got a little brother who 
was been involved in gang lifestyles with quite dire consequences at 
times.  I’ve got an eighteen year old daughter, I’ve seen a number of 
her friends lose their lives over the years, she’s eighteen years old, so 
I’ve seen a number of her friends lose their lives, that’s obviously quite 
horrific, I’m sure you can imagine.   Personally, I am just sick and tired 
of seeing young people being killed.” 
 
She continued 
“Success looks like to me when you have managed to contact all the 
individuals on a referral, engaged successfully with them, by this I 
mean over a period of time and get some sort of dialogue going 
between the two because that’s the main thing, whether it’s in a classic 
medication setting or whether it’s shuttle mediation, that’s success to 
me, when I know that we’re now talking.   Even agreeing to disagree is 
success for me.  Some sort of resolve, any sort of resolve, even if it’s to 
agree to disagree.  That’s success.” 
 
Academic research, referring to intervention programmes suggests, 
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“a tendency… to judge success more particularly by violence reduction 
than by general delinquency reduction, offender rehabilitation, or 
integration into the community “ (Klein, Gordon, Maxson, 1986: 683) 
 
So, what is apparent is, whilst everyone concerned with the intervention wants 
the violence to stop; the outcomes and successes are more personal. For the 
police, it is about getting a referral in from a borough and it passing the criteria 
so that it can be shared; For the analysts, it’s about the individuals referred for 
mediation not appearing in their research and intelligence associated with 
further violent offending; for the mediators, it is about establishing contact, and 
the varying levels of interaction and engagement they can have with their 
clients. A successful outcome can be just establishing contact right through to 
two individuals sitting down and shaking hands agreeing to stop the violence- 
a classic intervention. 
 
And for the local authorities and communities, who they represent, a 
successful outcome I would suggest is a proven intervention which 
demonstrates it can reduce violent reoffending so that their borough does not 
feature in the media as being listed as one of the most violent places to live in 
England. 
 
P1 concludes when examining the outcomes of mediation post-delivery very 
often, those commissioning the service or involved in the commissioning want 
information as to what is going on. This can be problematic for the mediators. 
They operate on the premise that the meetings will be confidential. They have 
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a caveat that if the individuals disclose any offence that seeks to put or places 
any individual in danger or risk of harm, they will notify the authorities. That 
being said, the purpose or by-product of mediation is not to amass intelligence 
to feed back to the authorities. P1 states, 
 
“Unfortunately, it would be nice to understand, be able to pass that 
information around, but the problem is credibility. If there is a further 
conflict and that information has been passed around then it totally 
negates the trust that’s been built up, to be honest and open about the 
issues that are actually in the background.  …Sometimes it’s the level 
of those outcomes that we have difficulty presenting.” 
 
And this difficulty in quantifying and qualifying the outcomes of mediation has 
been addressed by this study. The overwhelming evidence from this aspect of 
the research is that mediation has some real positive outcomes. This will be 
addressed in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 7 Discussion 
 
 
So what has this research presented as the outcomes of mediation as an 
intervention to reduce gang violence in London and what has been its impact 
on violence reduction? How do gang members in London engage in mediation 
and what is a successful outcome? This chapter will discuss the findings of 
the qualitative analysis and quantitative analysis in the context of these 
overarching research questions. 
 
Establishment of mediation and engagement. 
Qualitative analysis identified a common understanding amongst practitioners 
as to the meaning of mediation and the concept of conflict management. The 
type of mediation and its effectiveness is predicated very much on the nature 
of the dispute, the length of the conflict and the individuals involved. Essential 
to its success however is that the mediators themselves understand exactly 
what the conflict is about. Without getting to the crux of the issue, a long-term 
resolution is unlikely. The research demonstrated that there are not only 
challenges of embedding the concept of mediation within the conflict situation, 
i.e. involving those in dispute, but challenges associated with those in 
authority and public service responsible for referring individuals for 
intervention.  
 
Once an individual is identified and satisfies all the relevant criteria for referral, 
the challenge then begins for the mediator to make contact and establish a 
rapport. The qualitative research identified that individuals do not always 
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engage in the process. There are many reasons for this such as; general 
mistrust of the mediators, not understanding their role and mistaking them for 
another authority interference, or pressure from family and friends not to 
engage. 
 
The mediators discussed their experiences where individuals engaged totally 
with the process and occurrences where they refused to engage completely. 
However, there was an unequivocal claim that once contact had been made, 
the original dispute which was either a serious violent confrontation or threat 
of such, either did not occur or did not resume. The quantitative analysis 
provides some weight for this claim as all types of reoffending involving any 
type of violence was significantly lower amongst the evaluation cohort 
compared with the control sample.  
 
Individuals’ engagement with the mediation process could be attributed to 
cultural efficacy theory  (Ohbuchi, 1998) which suggests that in some 
societies the process of mediation is well embedded and those in conflict are 
familiar with the concept of turning to third parties for assistance when in 
dispute (Wall, Stark and Standifer, 2001).   
 
This concept is shared by the LEAP foundation, a charitable organisation that 
since 1987, has worked within schools to embed the concept of mediation by 
training young people to mediate in issues of conflict at school by “giving 
young people and the professionals that work with them the skills to 
understand the causes and consequences of conflict” (LEAP, 2015). One 
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outreach worker interviewed stated that LEAP’s aim was to work with young 
people and develop skills in conflict resolution, conflict management so that 
the very concept of mediation would become ingrained into their life and 
would be the norm when resolving conflict situations (Babs, 2013). 
 
Violence desistance and opportunities to exit 
Looking first at the quantitative analysis, the statistics demonstrate a clear 
difference between all types of violent offending for those referred for 
mediation and those who are not.  In every offending type analysed (except 
sexual offending, where the total reoccurrences measured 6 in total), it clearly 
demonstrated that those referred for mediation offend less and therefore 
conform to societal norms of a law-abiding routine. 
 
With regards to data analysis, all 246 individuals were on the Trident gang 
register and as such would warrant additional police attention as a result of 
being so identified. As it can be argued the most dangerous and most violent 
offenders should be referred for mediation as a matter of policy, the evaluation 
cohort should be the most violent individuals’ involved in gang violence 
operating in the MPS area. The fact that this research demonstrates they 
commit less crime is a significant finding.  
 
With regards to gang violence, the challenge facing law enforcement 
personnel is to prevent the cycle of violence continuing, which often occurs 
unless interventions can “ calm the nerves of the community, and get them to 
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understand what has happened” (Auner, 2014). Desistance from gangs can 
occur either at the point criminal offending or whilst being a gang member.  
 
Research suggests that with time, gang members entering adulthood 
generally reduce offending behaviour, e.g. in that time the suspect may have 
become involved in a long term relationship or have a family of his own and so 
would have more reason to desist from offending (Simon, 2012). This is 
supported by social control theory, which asserts that individuals engage in 
criminal behaviour when social bonds are weak or disrupted (Hirschi, 2002). 
Hirschi claims that in early childhood many young people form a societal 
bond, which stops many of them from becoming involved with law breaking 
while others who are unable to form this bond become delinquent. Hirschi's 
theory concluded that an individual’s participation in delinquency was 
inversely related to the strength of an individual's relationship to society. As 
gang members leave adolescence and acquire long-term partners or become 
fathers, their social bonds strengthen (Sampson and Laub, 1990:625) as they 
experience an important turning point in their life (Elder 1985:17) and this 
turning point can lead to a reduction in criminal offending or a total desistance 
from crime. (Laub and Sampson, 1993). Horney, Osgard and Marshall found 
that men committed more crime when using drugs and less crime when they 
were with their wife (1995:655). 
 
Benefits and limitations 
In this study, attention has been focussed on mediation provided by Capital 
Conflict Management (CCM). This is because there are many organisations 
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purporting to offer mediation services within the metropolitan area of London. 
However, unskilled individuals lacking the support necessary to deliver such a 
crucial intervention provide many of these services on an ad-hoc basis. Very 
often, this type of intervention can be more damaging to an already unstable 
situation. If individuals delivering mediation are unable to identify the reason 
for the dispute, the motivation of the warring parties to reach a resolution and 
be able to detach their own interests for reaching a solution, then their efforts 
can lead to failure.  The very fact that different groups are delivering mediation 
can also have a detrimental effect on violent offending that can result in 
interference rather than assistance. Many of these organisations are unable to 
impose a settlement as they lack access to the transformational services 
needed to sustain any on-going peace. 
  
“Failures basically result from the application of an inappropriate strategy and 
the application of a strategy by an inappropriate person or group” (Bercovitch, 
1996:231). 
 
CCM has been able to satisfy regulator’s requirements and operate to industry 
standards with regards to accredited training and security systems. Their 
conflict engagement specialists are vetted and approved and there is on-going 
training and checks and balances to ensure the most appropriate people are 
delivering mediation to those at most risk and those who pose a significant 
risk to London.  
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The interviews conducted with the specialists identified their motivations for 
using the tactic. There are those from the community who are personally 
affected by gang violence. (Antonia). There are those who were part of that 
offending network, imprisoned and now wishing to ensure other members of 
the community do not go down the same path (Barry) and there are those that 
have seen the outcomes of senseless violence as former police officers and 
now in retirement want to use their knowledge and connections made over a 
thirty year career to limit the numbers of individuals killed senselessly on the 
streets of the capital. (Abraham and Jason). 
 
Successful outcomes 
The quantitative analysis demonstrated that there are positive outcomes 
associated with mediation. It can be seen to positively impact on offending 
generally, and significantly impact on violent offending. There could be many 
reasons for this. As mentioned, those referred for mediation are at the most 
risk of committing violence or being involved in violence. As a result, these 
individuals may be subject to many other interventions sitting outside 
mediation. One of the challenges for those charged with keeping our 
communities safe is establishing what has been done already, who are the 
persons involved with an individual or family and how coordinated are the 
agencies in delivering their intervention. Without this knowledge, it will be 
difficult to establish what works in isolation, and as such it is difficult to claim 
that mediation in isolation is the panacea to violence reduction. What we can 
conclude is those referred to mediation are less likely to be involved in 
subsequent violent offending overall.  
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In all crime types analysed, except sexual offending, the gap between 
offending for those referred for mediation and those not referred was 
substantial. What is also interesting is, as all the evaluated cohort did not 
engage with the mediation process fully, we are unable to lay claim that those 
who are willing participants generally yield more favourable results. What we 
do know, from interviews with those responsible for delivering mediation, is 
that individuals are more likely to engage when they are desperate; at their 
wits end; or have nowhere else to turn. It may be at this point that they have 
an epiphany and conform to societal norms.  
 
In this study, all those referred for mediation desisted from the original 
violence for which they were referred in the first place (Simon, 2012).  Many of 
the individuals who engage want something out of the process, such as a job, 
training or somewhere to live. What the findings of the quantitative and 
qualitative analysis were able to demonstrate in this research is that mediation 
has many positive outputs. It offers individuals the opportunity to get involved 
in a holistic approach to violence reduction whereby impartial people will give 
individuals the time and space to discuss specific conflicts and issues that are 
a cause for concern, not only on an individual level, but community level. 
Those who commission and deliver mediation recognise many intractable 
social conflicts are impervious to the more traditional methods of enforcement, 
disruption, intervention and prevention. This research shows there are many 
benefits associated with the approach but much more work is needed in order 
to tease out the critical success factors that mediation purports to deliver as 
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per the claims of those delivering it. This will be discussed further in the 
concluding chapter. 
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Chapter 8 Conclusion 
 
 
At the beginning of this study, I explained why I undertook this area of 
research: to examine the outcomes of mediation when used as an intervention 
following an occurrence or threat of gang violence.  Following the UK riots of 
2011, there was significant media coverage, which identified large numbers of 
London gang members being responsible for much of the looting and violence 
in the capital. Headline grabbing titles filled Internet articles and newspapers 
with statements such as “London riots: Rival gangs join forces” (BBC, 2012) 
and Tottenham riots: police let gangs run riot and loot (The Telegraph, 2011).  
 
The Government response was to establish a Riots, Communities and Victims 
Panel (Department for Communities and Local Government, 2013). In their 
report, entitled, Government Response to the Riots, Communities and Victims 
Panel’s final report, the issue of gangs received much attention. The report 
stated that at least one in five of those convicted following the riots were 
“known to be part of a street gang” (p13).   
 
The cross-Government “Ending Gang and Youth Violence” report was 
published in November 2011, three months following the riots, and outlined a 
set of principles and good practices that should complement enforcement 
activity. This activity, it said, should be available to provide support for 
individuals who wanted to exit their gang lifestyle and transform their lives. 
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Teams of practitioners with experience of working with gangs were 
established to work in gang affected areas, with a focus on improving 
opportunities for partnership working and respond to gang violence in the 
community.  Legislation was introduced to specifically deal with under - 18 
year olds in the form of gang injunctions and the Youth Justice Board 
established gang panels across the country.  
 
The NHS were told to improve the way in which it “contributes to reducing 
violence, in particular by improving the way the NHS shares information about 
violent results” (p13).  So, in summary, the Government response not only 
focused on interventions associated with individuals, groups or gangs, and the 
community, but also took measures to address gaps in suppression activity 
and preventative opportunities aimed specifically at gangs and violence 
reduction.   
Having been involved in prevention and enforcement activity to reduce gang 
violence in one role or another for 24 years, I hope that the findings of this 
research could ultimately be used to inform those involved in commissioning, 
directing and funding successful workable interventions, by demonstrating 
how mediation may have a significant effect and impact on violent gang 
offending in London.  
 
Additionally, I hoped that the findings could be used to provide the various 
Local Authorities with a more informed view on where to direct or divert 
resources and funding for such initiatives that set out to tackle serious youth 
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violence, and consequently, prevent further murders of young people by 
young people in the capital.  
  
The aim of this thesis was to explore the outcomes of mediation when used as 
an intervention with gangs in the context of escalating youth violence in 
London, with a view to assessing the impact it has on violence reduction and 
to address the gap that exists in academic literature around outcomes of 
violence reduction and violence prevention when mediation is instigated. 
This research explored a single intervention method, namely mediation, and 
presented the yet unknown indicative outcomes and benefits when used to 
reduce violent gang offending in London through detailed qualitative and 
quantitative analysis.  This research looked at the work of a single company, 
Capital Conflict Management (CCM) who operate in London, and are the only 
Home Office approved enterprise that has legitimacy to function within the 
whole of the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) area, where intelligence 
sharing protocols have been established, and their services are encouraged in 
every London borough. The data examined cover a 12-month period, which 
allowed for sufficient analysis of offending behaviour from the point of referral, 
using two samples made up of 246 individuals in total - an evaluation cohort 
and a controlled cohort. This analysis was conducted to see if mediation had 
any effect on violent offending and general offending through statistical 
analysis. 17 individuals involved in delivering the tactic were then spoken with, 
using semi-structured interviews as an approach to data gathering. The 
sample was chosen due to their expertise and contribution to delivering, 
commissioning or analysing the outputs of mediation. This approach was 
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adopted to ensure that those who are most involved in the process could give 
an insightful view into the intervention and enable the research to discover 
whether or not the service provided is effective mediation. 
 
The purpose of this thesis was achieved by asking two research questions; 
how do members of gangs in London engage with mediation tactics when 
instigated, and what are the outcomes of successful mediation? These 
questions were answered by addressing five key objectives dealing with 
specific aspects of the research. These distinct objectives were not examined 
in isolation, as the outcome of each objective impacted on the subsequent 
phases of the research strategy.  The first objective determined how 
mediation was established as a tactic for diffusing gang tensions and reducing 
violence.  The second objective arising from the analysis of Met Police data 
illustrated the varying depths of the gang member engagement with this 
process. The third objective determined the benefits and limitations of 
mediation and transformational services, illustrating how immediate and 
practical interventions can be implemented if inappropriate responses develop 
or reactive behaviours become apparent during the mediation programme.  
 The fourth objective drawing on the outcomes of 1 to 3 above and congruent 
with the aims of a professional doctorate, identify the implications for practice. 
 
 
With regards to the findings of the quantitative analysis conducted, I was able 
to demonstrate that individuals referred for mediation subsequently commit 
less violent crime.  I was able to show through qualitative analysis that 
mediation is an individual level intervention used in the context of violent 
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offending at group or gang level. By targeting individuals, mediation does not 
seek to disrupt or frustrate gang membership or even gang activity. Mediation 
seeks to reduce violent offending. If, as a by-product of mediation an 
individual chooses to exit their gang lifestyle and engage with subsequent 
transformational services, then this is an unintended consequence but a 
welcome one.  Mediation can be seen as a concept in the context of a 
prevention strategy for future reoffending. Once the process is instigated, 
violent reoffending reduces. 
 
The present government are sill proceeding on an enforcement route 
regarding gangs (see the changes to Gang ASBOS, the Serious Crime Bill) 
and the UK is still influenced by activities and interventions used in the USA, 
(see Operation Shield).  Given the direction of policing it is likely that the 
police will make referrals to mediators in the future but for a holistic approach 
to violence reduction, I would argue referrals need to come from the Health 
service, prisons, probation and community safety partners within local 
councils.  
 
Suppression strategies tend to utilise the full force of the law in order to deter 
and regulate gang issues in the community. The police practice directed 
patrols and planned arrests. They habitually increase focussed intelligence 
gathering through surveillance of known gang areas and employ other 
techniques, which suppress gang activity. The formation of specialised gang 
task forces and use of experienced gang prosecuting lawyers increase the 
likelihood of gang members being arrested, prosecuted and imprisoned.  The 
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introduction of anti-gang legislation is an additional tool used to improve the 
ability of the police and courts to arrest and prosecute gang members. (Miethe 
& McCorkle, 2002).  
 
Street gangs exist for a variety of reasons; be this to do with social ostracism 
or perceived social exclusion, poverty, poor housing, or lack of opportunities.  
By tackling individuals, this tactic will have little effect on the fabric of society 
and their existing environment, which creates opportunities for individuals to 
seek out gang membership or involvement. Suppression tactics often involve 
targeting individual major gang members, with the aim of frustrating their 
activity. The goal is to know what they are up to, identify their associates and 
crack down hard on any offending behaviour. The overarching objective is to 
reduce crime. Increased police activity is the result in certain gang-inhabited 
areas, and sometimes, this intensification of police presence can result in 
resentment and a backlash from the community. The qualitative research 
demonstrates that mediation does not aim to suppress the activity of gang 
members or gangs.  Rather, the aim of Mediation, through dialogue, is to 
provide an opportunity for those involved in conflict to desist from violent 
offending.  
 
By providing an individual who is prepared to listen to the suspect or victim of 
violent offending, the mediators aim to create space, to give individuals the 
opportunity to seek clarity and rationalise the reason for the conflict or dispute. 
This is not something that those charged with keeping communities safe could 
envisage doing. These agencies would be forced to act. Forced to suppress 
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the activities or planned activities of the gangs. A short term gain maybe, but 
the “beef’ remains far longer than the presence of police, probation and social 
workers.  
 
My research contributes to knowledge in the area of Desistance Theory. 
Desistance from crime is the long-term abstinence of criminal offending 
among those where offending has become a way of life. Understanding how 
and why people desist (and why it takes some longer than others) is crucial 
when determining what tactics to use or which strategies to follow to reduce 
violent offending. It is a complete mystery to many practitioners and 
researchers why some desist earlier than others. 
 
In the same way as there appears to be a lack of consensus as to what 
constitutes a gang, similarly, there is little agreement on the definition and 
measurement of desistance from crime.   Some see desistance as the 
permanent cessation of offending, monitoring several years, whilst others take 
a less constrained description of desistance, accepting sporadic re-offending 
may occur.  For these reasons, in the research literature there has been as 
much debate about how to measure desistance as there has been about how 
to use the insights gleaned from studying it.  
 
In my research, desistance was measured 12 months following the referral for 
mediation and 12 months following the offence coming to light for the non-
referred cohort. The vast majority of people who offend eventually stop over 
time. There are many reasons for this, which include maturation, death, 
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imprisonment or disease to name a few. In their report entitled, Understanding 
Desistance from Crime, Laub and Sampson note “termination is the point 
when criminal activity stops and desistance is the causal process” (2001:1) 
 
Understanding the factors that lead to desistance is important in shaping 
interventions that reduce reoffending amongst those already involved in crime. 
“Insights from the experiences of desisting individuals can help to refine 
criminal justice efforts to help people stop offending” (McNeill, 2006: 45-6) 
 
Several theoretical frameworks can be used to explain the process of 
desistance such as, maturation and ageing, developmental, life events; and 
rational choice. The life course perspective provides a very compelling 
framework and it can be used to identify institutional sources of desistance 
and the dynamic social pressures inherent in stopping crime. Mediation offers 
a life course changing window and an opportunity to make a rational choice.  
Individuals are given space and time re orientation of the cost and benefits of 
their continuing offending behaviour and in this case violent offending. They 
are given some perspective. This was not something I considered when I 
began my research, but it became evident once my findings emerged from the 
analysis.  The dynamics of desistance have only recently become the subject 
of intensive study. 
  
Cusson and Pinsonneault (1986) provided some support for this idea with a 
small, qualitative study of former robbers, identifying the following as factors 
influencing desistance: shock (such as being wounded in a bank raid); 
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growing tired of doing time in prison; becoming aware of the possibility of 
longer prison terms; and a reassessment of what is important to the individual.  
  
Similar findings have been reported by other researchers like Leibrich (1993: 
56-7), Shover (1983: 213) and Cromwell et al (1991: 83), which all identified 
the importance of a ‘decision’ to give up crime. Whilst such decisions may not 
be sufficient on their own for desistance, they are likely to be necessary. . 
 
Another dimension of desistance concerns the relationship between the 
individual and society. Sampson and Laub (1993) developed the notion of a 
bond between an individual and society. The bond is made up of the extent to 
which an individual has emotional attachments to societal goals, is committed 
to achieving them through legitimate means, believes these goals to be 
worthy, and is able to involve themselves in the attainment of such goals. 
Sampson and Laub theorise that engagement in offending is more likely when 
this bond is weakened or broken. In addition to this, they argue that at various 
points during the life-course, various formal and informal social institutions 
help to cement the bond between the individual and society. 
 
 For example, for adolescents, school, the family and peer groups influence 
the nature of the bond between young people and their wider communities, 
whilst employment, marriage, and parenthood operate in a similar way for 
adults. Thus, avoidance of crime is often the result of relationships formed for 
reasons other than the control of crime.  
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The outcomes of mediation compliment the recent evidence which has 
emerged about the importance of self-identity in the desistance process. 
Maruna (2001: 8) aimed to ‘identify the common psychosocial structure 
underlying [ex-offender’s] self-stories’. He identified that ‘to desist from crime, 
ex-offenders need to develop a coherent, pro-social identity for themselves’ 
(2001: 7). This draws on his finding that individuals who were able to desist 
from crime had high levels of self-efficacy, meaning that they saw themselves 
in control of their futures and had a clear sense of purpose and meaning in 
their lives. They also found a way to ‘make sense’ out of their past lives and 
even find some redeeming value in lives that had often been spent in and out 
of prisons and jails. The desisting ex-prisoners he interviewed often said they 
wanted to put these experiences ‘to good use’ by helping others (usually 
young people in similar circumstances to their own) avoid the mistakes they 
made.  
 
Mediation supports Giordano et al  (2002:999-1002) where the ‘theory of 
cognitive transformation’ is argued. They maintain that the desistance process 
involves: 
A ‘general cognitive openness to change’ 
Exposure and reaction to ‘hooks for change’ or turning points 
The envisioning of an appealing and conventional ‘replacement self’ 
A transformation in the way the actor views deviant behavior 
 
Mediation seeks to identify the issue - the beef. Why is there a dispute? 
Through open dialogue, they aim to steer the individual back  
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on track and to highlight what the outcomes of violent offending will mean for 
the individual and for the family. Also, what the impact will be on all those 
involved. 
 
 
Another significant finding is that full-blown engagement in the mediation 
process is not necessary. The sustained knock on the door is as important as 
completing the mediation process and this could have significant implications 
for those commissioning interventions, moving forwards, Particularly when 
considering the cost of delivering mediation in a wider context, embedded as 
business as usual and also developing additional opportunities where 
mediation could be seen to be effective, such as an intervention when threats 
tare made against a person’s life, which currently is extremely police resource 
intensive. 
 
The use of mediators could facilitate the changing role of police as posited by 
the current MPS Commissioner, Sir Bernard Hogan-Howe, who has repeated 
that in the current climate, the police will have to “make informed choices 
about our priorities” (The Guardian, 2014). His vision is for officers to deliver 
more crime fighting capability rather than community policing and mediation 
and the service delivered by these trained professionals could be seen as a 
move in the right direction. The results of this research certainly suggest that 
this is something that should be explored further. 
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Those who deliver mediation services believe its limitations are dependent on 
individuals interacting with the mediators. However, from the quantitative 
analysis, it can be seen that once contact is established, even with non-
engagement, positive outcomes ensue, with those referred 3.17 times less 
likely to commit serious violent offences than those not referred.  
 
100% of the specialists concur that the reported violent incident predicted did 
not occur or the threat to violence against another did not happen once the 
specialists made contact. So, conceptually, mediation appears to do what it 
sets out to do, which is to stop violent incidents occurring or prevent violent 
incidents recurring and spiralling out of control once instigated.  
 
The reason for this appears to be individuals involved in gang violence very 
often believe no one knows what they are doing. They believe they are 
operating undetected. Once someone makes contact and informs them they 
are being watched or monitored, then very often, the dispute stops.  
 
Further research is necessary in this area of work which was outside the 
scope for this research, but a comparable study of violence following the 
delivery of a Reverse Osman warning and subsequent violent offending 
following contact from mediators would be an interesting area of research that 
could save police forces many millions of pounds if comparable results can be 
drawn, by securing the services of mediators to deal with threat to life issues 
as opposed to round the clock surveillance of suspected victims and 
perpetrators of threats to life. 
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Having determined how mediation was established as a tactic for diffusing 
gang tensions and reducing violence in London, it is evident from the relatively 
low levels of take up, particularly amongst local authorities, that there is much 
scepticism surrounding its use. Commissioning the services of the current 
main service provider is becoming more problematic - particularly in the 
current climate of economic austerity. The MPS and local authorities have had 
stringent financial reductions imposed, and the Mayor’s Office for Policing and 
Crime (MOPAC) require increased accountability from the MPS before 
approving the commissioning of services delivered at a London - wide level.  
 
The political will is currently inclined to favour a more localised approach to 
intervention. Individual boroughs are still inclined to adopt a “we know best” 
attitude when deciding what interventions and programmes they wish to 
deliver in their communities. Unfortunately, the risks associated with this 
approach include commissioning poorly thought out programmes, without 
acknowledging empirically measured outputs simply because they can, and 
are, indeed, encouraged to do so by current Government policy. The 
government has, to date, espoused locally delivered solutions that are 
community driven as a preferred model to the one size fits all regional / 
national approach. 
 
The MPS had historically funded the commissioning of CCM’s mediation 
skills, having acknowledged and understood the impact its services have on 
serious violent offending. With the Coalition Government imposed reductions 
		 211
in the policing budget for 2014, the capacity of the MPS to secure CCM’s 
services in the years ahead look uncertain.  The MPS have to approach 
MOPAC in order to get approval for any significant spending, of which 
mediation is. In the absence of any compelling evidence that mediation fits 
into existing gang exiting initiatives, securing mediation services in its current 
form could be quite challenging.  
 
Interviews with the mediators suggested that not all those who engage in their 
programme want to exit their lifestyle, but quantitative analysis demonstrates 
that those who do engage in the programme are 3.4 times less likely to 
commit a violent offence. So it will be interesting to see how those holding the 
purse strings view the outputs of mediation as a stand-alone programme. 
 
Work conducted by the Specialist Crime Directorate (SC&O3) at New 
Scotland Yard has shown that 25% of individuals referred for mediation ask 
for additional help. This is not to say that all of these individuals want to exit 
their lifestyle immediately, but, according to the head of unit, Michael Taylor, 
one in four referred want additional support around housing; education or job 
training for example.17 This would suggest that mediation has a greater role to 
play.  
 
The signposting of individuals towards other transformational services that 
they may otherwise have missed, or never found out about appears to be an 
important by-product of the mediation process. There is much evidence to 
																																																								
17	Meeting	with	Michael	Taylor	9th	February	2015	at	New	Scotland	Yard.	
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suggest that older gang members who gain employment and/or education 
opportunities are far more likely to exit their lifestyle than those who do not. 
(Decker and Van Winkle, 1996). Klein and Maxson (2006:257) suggest, 
“careful targeting” of older leavers of gangs can be helpful.  
 
CCM has been awarded separate funding to deal with this aspect of 
assistance following the conclusion of the mediation process. To date, there 
has been no analysis or evaluation of this aspect of the intervention and 
would constitute a whole new piece of research to determine the outcomes. 
 
The second objective arising from the analysis of Met Police data was to 
illustrate the varying depths of the gang member engagement with the 
mediation process. From analysis conducted to date, engagement varies from 
none to total engagement. A recent study by SC&O3, which looked at closed 
cases of mediation referrals between January 1 2014 and 31 October 2014, 
identified that out of 205 individuals referred, 135 or 68% engaged with the 
mediators. 18  86 met and engaged with the mediation process at varying 
levels; 64 met and would not engage in the process and 55 received no 
contact, meaning the individuals referred could not be traced or failed to 
engage. Unfortunately, no records existed regarding levels of engagement for 
the sample analysed. The 123 members of the sample who had been referred 
for mediation were selected because contact had been established with the 
mediators. Records at that time did not measure detailed levels of 
engagement. However, evidence from this sample demonstrated that making 
																																																								
18	MOPAC	Conflict	Management	Briefing	Note	2015.	
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contact with an individual compared to those individuals who engaged with the 
process, made no difference to the outcome. The findings suggest that initial 
contact had a positive effect on subsequent serious violent offending. 
 
The third objective was to determine the benefits and limitations of mediation 
and transformational services. This illustrates how immediate and practical 
interventions can be implemented if inappropriate responses develop or 
reactive behaviours become apparent during the mediation programme.  It is 
apparent that mediation yields many positive outcomes. A reduction in harm 
and risk for the individuals referred and the individuals involved in the dispute 
is the main positive outcome that has arisen from this study.  It is highlighted 
that not all individuals referred will engage in the process. However, even if 
they do not, the mere fact that they have been referred appears to have a 
positive impact on the potential for future or repeat violent offending.  
 
Mediation deals with individual offending behaviour, even though this is in the 
context of the individual acting as part of a gang. The limitations to mediation 
then become apparent. The emphasis on targeting individuals to the detriment 
of focusing on the gang as a group, will not deliver the far-reaching 
transformation on gang structures and group offending that is required. That 
being said, by identifying and targeting multiple individuals who are at the 
most risk to society and themselves, I assert that those individuals who 
engage with mediation and wish to exit their lifestyle, ultimately impact 
significantly on the make up of gangs, especially if those targeted are leaders 
and prominent gang members.  
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Sustainability 
Mediation is not the solution to all of London’s social problems like poverty, 
marginalisation, discrimination; lack of access to social services, education, 
employment or training. However, with the proper resourcing and funding, a 
by - product of mediation can be the direction of the most vulnerable and most 
at risk to exit their gang lifestyle and becoming a productive member of the 
community. 
 
Mediation interventionists were quite candid in their interviews, stating that 
mediation is not about individuals wanting to exit their gang lifestyle. Indeed 
many have no intention of so doing. Mediation is clearly about reducing repeat 
violence or reducing escalating violence caused by gangs and gang 
members.  This is one of mediation’s strengths. It clearly articulates its goals, 
outcomes and limitations. On their website, CCM describe what they deliver. 
Mediation is about “dealing with complex and varied situations”, where 
mediators focus on assisting communication, improving understandings, 
support creative thinking and exploring accommodations that is, more implicit 
and than explicit understanding and finally, facilitate the process of the 
agreement (CCM, 2015). 
 
The benefits that have been realised to date include that those referred for the 
intervention are over 19 times less likely to engage in general offending. Tribal 
concluded that a murder had been prevented and instances of serious 
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violence avoided or significantly reduced, saving the treasury huge financial 
sums. 
 
The fourth objective drawing on the outcomes of 1 to 3 above and congruent 
with the aims of a professional doctorate was to identify the implications for 
practice. From the research conducted and interviews completed those 
involved in the mediation process are able to: 
 Identify that there is a conflict 
 Identify what the conflict is about 
 Identify who is involved 
 Identify what has been done already and more importantly, what has 
not. 
 Establish contact with those involved 
 Instigate dialogue 
 Continue Dialogue 
 Reach an understanding whereby the subject of mediation agrees not 
to pursue a course of action that involves violence or harm against 
anyone or anything. 
 Refer the individual for post mediation support, such as housing, 
employment, training or access to health care. 
 Report the outcome to those involved in commissioning the 
intervention for future learning and development. 
Mediation has a positive effect on violent offending. Effective mediation 
delivered by impartial highly trained specialists, who are able to communicate 
with those in dispute in a language they understand, also has a profound 
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affect on violence desistance and the provision of support and 
transformational services for those involved in gangs. The outcomes of this 
research are evidence based.  I explained early on in my research how 
answers to the questions posed (how do members of gangs in London 
engage with mediation tactics when instigated, and what are the outcomes of 
successful mediation?) in current literature is vague, generally due to the fact 
that the use of mediation in the UK to counter gang violence is relatively new 
and only recently has sufficient data become available which enables an 
informed comparative study possible.  
 
In Chapter 2, it was firmly established the context of the research by exploring 
what is a gang and study the world of gang membership, with a particular 
focus on street gangs in London. It began with a description and definition of 
gangs for the purpose of this research, before examining the make up of 
gangs in London.  It was established that much of the research into gang 
membership and gang interventions was still very much heavily referenced in 
the USA, accepting some smaller scale studies have taken place in the UK in 
recent years. 
 
In order to answer the questions posited, four key objectives were addressed 
that dealt with specific aspects of the research.  Chapter 3, dealt with the first 
objective, which was to determine how mediation was established as a tactic 
for diffusing gang tensions and reducing violence. An examination of other 
types of gang interventions and an evaluation of outcomes was completed 
before moving on to discuss mediation as tactic to reduce gang violence in 
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London. This discussion was contextualised in how mediation as a tactic was 
introduced into the Metropolitan Police area at a time of perceived rising 
incidents of violent intra gang disputes and falling public confidence in the 
police pre and post the London riots.  
 
How mediation was introduced as a tactic in the MPS was then discussed. 
How it was initially introduced into six boroughs considered gang crime 
hotspots, and then subsequently rolled out across London to all thirty-two 
Boroughs. The challenges of obtaining buy-in from senior police officers who 
would commission the intervention, and the local authorities and partners was 
examined and it was shown that the provision of a much-needed wrap-around 
support service was necessary in order to support the mediation process.  
 
 
In Chapter 4, a comprehensive account of the research design was 
presented, looking at data sources and methods used. A discussion around 
the philosophical position to the research was presented together with an 
explanation as to why an approach of inductivism to this research was 
adopted.  
 
A clear and transparent account of these methods was presented and a 
discussion of how adopted police procedures such as methodology and 
intelligence-gathering processes were not disclosed in this study. There was 
an acceptance that the limitations and reliability of the qualitative research 
methods adopted, such as the samples and the sampling strategy, the 
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parameters of the research site and the limitations of the analysis. In the 
research process there was a description of the approach to the analysis. I 
examined the journey of interviewee selection to practicalities around the 
actual taped interview process. There is also a section on ethical matters, 
which required careful consideration.  
 
In chapter 5, the substantive analytical work is described, with an investigation 
into the outcomes of mediation and in particular, the difference in outcomes 
on reoffending for those who were referred for mediation and those who were 
not. The results of the data sets that I analysed were examined and in chapter 
6 the common themes emerging from the interviews conducted with the 
various stakeholders and conflict engagement specialists were identified. 
Evidence was provided that demonstrated mediation to be one effective gang 
control intervention and suggested how effective mediation contributed to this 
successful outcome. 
 
It was demonstrated that, very often, an individual who had been referred for 
mediation was often enough, to trigger a change in behaviour and 
subsequently cessation in violent offending. An examination of the third 
objective in this chapter, determined the benefits and limitations of mediation 
and transformational services. An illustration of how immediate and practical 
interventions can be implemented was presented, particularly if inappropriate 
responses develop or reactive behaviours become apparent during the 
mediation programme.  
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In chapter 7, the implications of the findings in relation to answering the 
overall research question was discussed and concluded that a major 
challenge for the future is to continue studying the outcomes of mediation and 
benefits of transformational services in context and determine whether my 
findings are apparent over a longer period of assessment 
 
Chapter 8, the Conclusion, is a reflective account of both the overall 
processes and particulars of the study, and discusses the practical 
implications of the research. This final chapter further positions this study in 
the context of escalating youth violence in London and asks judicious 
questions about the future opportunities for gang desistance and workable 
interventions. 
 
Why the research is important for researchers and 
practitioners? 
 
“Society needs objective investigations and evidence, not ‘moral panic’- in 
short, facts not fears” (Vigil, 2002:14). 
 
Vigil rightly attests that knee jerk attempts to implement gang programmes 
should be avoided. Evidence based and intelligence led interventions should 
be seen as the most effective options.  Klein, Maxson and Miller state  
  
“The saddest message of all is simply this: little that has been done can 
be demonstrated to be useful. Thus, the clues for the future have less 
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to do with what might work, than with avoiding in the future what has 
not worked” (1995:249). 
 
So in agreement with eminent academic gang experts, I suggest practitioners 
are able to “avoid” doing that which we know does not yield positive results 
and repeat (and hopefully, improve on) those interventions that do. And when 
implementing any intervention, this should be done in accordance with 
detailed research and prior problem solving analysis, as opposed to a reaction 
to populist opinion fuelled by media sensationalism.  
 
In the case of the intervention of mediation, by establishing the effective 
outcomes of the mediation process and demonstrating the impact it has on 
violent offenders and gang members as per this study, I would posit mediation 
is something that needs to be rolled out and implemented in a wider context 
than it currently is. At the moment, the police are the main sources of referral. 
Over 90% of current referrals come from local police officers working in 
London’s boroughs. There are very small numbers of local authority referrals, 
which have significantly reduced in the aftermath of the swingeing cuts, 
imposed since 2012. Probation and prison referrals are at zero. This seems 
incredulous given the findings of this report and the levels of violence 
committed by gang members whilst on probation. Violent offending in prison is 
rarely reported to the police. 
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What are the practice implications for the research? 
 
The research conducted for this study suggest that policymakers and those in 
charge of funding to date, appear not to have been inclined to support efforts 
to document intervention efficacy or to roll out evidence-based interventions 
on a larger scale. There do not appear to be any real concerns that the impact 
of such intervention might be limited or that the programme may not be cost 
effective. I encountered countless recommendations and ideas on the best 
means to significantly reduce gang related violence in the absence of any real 
validation.   
 
This study demonstrates that mediation as a tactic when properly used and 
when identifying the most at risk individuals, does produce some promising 
outcomes. This is important, as the data produced from this research can be 
used to build further effective interventions in the future. 
 
There will always be gangs and there will always be gang members. When a 
gang is dismantled or its numbers reduced significantly to prevent its 
successful operation, another rival gang will fill the vacuum and take over the 
illegal workings of its predecessor. The lack of opportunities for young 
disenfranchised individuals in London today; poor housing; pitiful education 
opportunities for those in deprived areas of London; and significant 
underfunded social services provision, all contribute to pushing young people 
into ventures where they can use the skills they know best, which very often 
are illegal and involve violence.  
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Policy makers and researchers need to better understand the problems 
associated with gangs and gang violence, which is a social problem.  
	
“For researchers, it is important to refine measurement: to assess the 
validity and reliability of the measures being used. For theorists, it is 
important to better understand factors associated with gang 
membership and associated behaviours, whether testing or 
constructing theory” (Braga, 2010:122).		
	
Scholars such as Esbensen, Winfree, He and Taylor (2001), recognise the 
significance of information sharing and collaboration between policy makers 
and academics; although I would suggest, that those involved in gang 
suppression and interventions should be involved in the development of 
research, as they experience first hand which different interventions work and 
do not within their organisations. 
From the research I have conducted, I would suggest further problem solving 
analysis is required prior to the implementation of any gang intervention. In 
particular, the findings suggest that particular individual gang members are 
more amenable to mediation, whereas others are unreachable. This 
demonstrates that an intervention focussing on individuals may be more 
productive than interventions that concentrate on tackling a collective. That is 
not to say that the collective group should be ignored. Gangs operate in 
groups and therefore interventions that tackle groups are important. What 
		 223
mediation offers is a branch to those individual(s) who do wish to engage, 
even if they do not ultimately want to exit their gang lifestyle. 
 
There is an unintended consequence of mediation, which is the powerful 
deterrence message delivered by the mediator on initial contact. When it 
comes to analysing the outcome or effect that first meeting has on an 
individual referred for mediation, the results are the same, whether the 
individual engages or not. The initial violent incident that prompted the 
intervention does not escalate or occur.  
 
The mediator has the ability to act as the mouthpiece for law enforcement 
personnel, and to deliver a deterrence message (the pushing levers), in 
addition to offering support and advice (the pulling levers) and possible 
assistance for the future  
 
Interventions that address, not only gang offending, but collective violence in 
general, particularly committed by young people require further research. This 
type of violence differs from the violence that exits on our streets as a result of 
alcohol or drug consumption. It is a type of violence that is habitually 
administered by collectives against another individual or individuals, on the 
pretext that someone has been disrespectful to another. It will be interesting to 
monitor the outcomes of Operation Shield (for more information, see below) in 
London in the future. 
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Regrettably, up until now, typical gang intervention literature was not in a 
position to make any strong statements about “what actually works (McGloin, 
2005). Indeed, many interventions continue without any proper evaluation, 
and start before any real problem analysis, which in turn may lead to the use 
of inappropriate and ineffective interventions (Braga, Kennedy, Piehl and 
Waring, 2001). In addition, Decker (2003) concurs that the efficacy of the 
approaches to reduce violent gang offending typically has not been thoroughly 
evaluated.  However, this original research makes a significant contribution to 
gang intervention literature and asserts mediation as an effective intervention.   
 
A concern that I would highlight, which requires careful consideration for 
future research is, to what lengths can communities provide credible options 
that are more appealing to the safety and status that gangs offer? (Decker & 
Curry, 2002) 
 
Intervention programmes, like mediation, provide long lasting results such as 
violence desistance, which will contribute towards violence reduction and can 
be effective in preventing the continuing spiralling levels of violence, inflicted 
by gang members on the community. But even mediation needs to be 
supplemented with diverse levels of transformational services that offer 
mentoring and support to those engaging with the mediation process. I would 
argue that there needs to be an increase in community-based intervention 
programmes, that will provide on-going support to those wishing to exit their 
current way of life.  
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Mediation does identify gang members who wish to exit their gang lifestyle 
and wish to make the transition into established society.  “Safe and Secure” is 
an intervention programme intended to assist in re-housing gang members 
and their families, usually out of London or to another area of the capital to 
enable a fresh start. Training, education or work placement is arranged and 
can provide gang members with the necessary skills required to function in 
society and break down existing barriers that prevent or deter gang members 
from competing for employment opportunities. This is particularly crucial since 
most gang members are identified as having low academic achievement and 
indeed has been a strong predicator of gang membership (Wyrick and Howell, 
2004) 
 
Between January 1st 2005 and December 31st 2014, 164 young people have 
died in violent circumstances on the streets of London. Most of these deaths 
can be attributed to gang related violence. (Citizens’ Report, 2014). 
 
Nine young people were murdered in the capital during the first nine days of 
2015. The present Government is under immense pressure mainly due to the 
continuous coverage of violent gang activity published in the media to reduce 
gang related violence.  
 
In January 2015, The Mayor of London, Boris Johnson launched the much-
lauded Operation Shield, where legislation has been introduced to collectively 
punish the activities of some of the most violent and prolific gang members in 
Haringey, Lambeth and Westminster Boroughs, for the activities of their gang, 
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even if they are not involved.  Boris Johnson in a BBC interview on 15th 
January 2015 stated,  
 
“It’s time we gave these gang members a clear ultimatum – the police 
know who you are and if anyone in the gang steps out of line then 
every member will face consequences" (BBC, 2015). 
 
However, just £800,000 has been pledged to fund the operation, which is a 
drop in the ocean when considering the number of interventions that this 
amount will actually pay for. 
 
The key findings emanating from this research conclude that, individuals do 
not always engage in mediation. However, the most appropriate people do 
tend to be referred - i.e. those at most risk. My research shows that the more 
at risk an individual is, the more likely they are to engage. 
 
Transformational support is essential to the on going process. Mediation alone 
is not the panacea to solving violent conflict, but delivered effectively, 
mediation works. The ideal outcome for the whole mediation process is a 
classic mediation where the two parties meet and agree not to carry on the 
conflict but understanding this is not about making friends. 
 
All of the mediators who were interviewed feel that, often it is enough just to 
make initial contact. By disclosing that a “beef” is known outside of those 
involved in conflict is sometimes enough to reduce the seriousness of the 
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event and prevent it culminating into tragic situation. A successful first meeting 
is dialogue between the mediator and the participant. A successful outcome is 
the reported incident not escalating or threat of violence not taking place.   
 
The mediators interviewed have real-life experiences of growing up in London 
and living among those involved in gangs and recognise that conflicts can 
arise from the most innocuous situation. From a classroom spat where a boy 
refuses to close a door because one is cold and the other is not, which then 
escalates into routine violent attacks, which almost resulted in a death, to an 
organised criminal network squabble over business rivalry with contracts put 
out on an individual’s life. (M1) 
 
Too many people with a responsibility for the safety and security of young 
people in London still do not ‘get it’. Family and friends support in the process 
enhances the mediation programme, is crucial and mediators believe their 
support delivers better results. Families are often in denial over the issues 
facing their children and many families have a lack of any positive male role 
models for those involved in gangs. 
The lack of credibility and commitment of other intervention programmes and 
those responsible for delivering them makes an initial meeting for a mediator 
very problematic. At an initial meeting, the mediators are often seen as 
another attempt by the authorities of interfering. But the mediators interviewed 
have a real passion for delivering the service at CCM.  
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“I don’t want to see another young person die in a senseless attack. I 
cried my first night in prison and defy anyone to say anything to the 
contrary. It is a scary place. I didn’t know what was going to happen to 
me.” (M2) 
 
Respect or rather a lack of, is a recurring theme that mediators come upon as 
being the instigating factor for the conflicts, which emanate out of a perceived 
lack of respect between two or more individuals. For mediation to work, there 
has to be a mutual respect for the process and the participants in conflicts 
views of each other. They are never going to be friends, but they must come 
to an understanding for the conflict to dissipate. 
 
The issue of funding strongly features. Mediators rely on their own personal 
contacts to provide the carrots or pulling leavers as Klein describes them, 
necessary to complete the mediation process. Opportunities for; better 
housing, training, jobs, are vital to help individuals to exit their lifestyle. 
 
Some individuals see mediation as being a way of amplifying their status. If 
they are referred for mediation this means that,  
 
“they are a serious ‘bad ass’ gang member, at the top of the tree“ (M3).  
 
They are acutely aware that the MPS refer high-risk individuals. The inability 
to allow self referrals or referrals from the community places an enormous 
burden on the police to ensure they identify the right people. 
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Collectively, as an organisation, there needs to be an understanding that 
increased enforcement activity on a particular individual or gang will move that 
person higher up the gang matrix risk register, thus potentially skewing the 
real level of harm and risk that those individual(s) pose to society and to 
themselves. 
 
Only a handful of the 32 boroughs in London understand mediation and have 
their own contracts in place to deal with violent conflicts. Many others pursue 
their own individual brands of mediation in isolation to the current approved 
system. This is often due to mistrust of the one-model fits all approach; and 
local authorities having the autonomy to commission any project they see fit to 
address violence reduction. Many of these interventions are not tested and 
poorly thought out. They are parochial and work in isolation to many of the 
other services being offered by many of the agencies operating in London.  
Waltham Forest and Camden cited as good examples of using mediation to 
reduce violence. They understand the benefits, are more joined up, and have 
the requisite multi-agency approach to violence reduction. 
 
Implications for practitioners  
The current system of mediation referral is too inflexible. The inability in 
London for individuals to self-refer or for referrals to come from the 
community, places an enormous burden on the police to ensure they identify 
the right people at an appropriate time.   
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The issue surrounding what constitutes a gang causes more complications to 
what should be a straightforward implementation of social measures designed 
to address the cause, treat the problem and prevent its reoccurrence (Ball & 
Curry, 1995). Transformational support is essential to the on going process. 
Generally, a single intervention programme in isolation is not the solution to 
solving violent conflicts.  
Those charged with delivering an intervention should have real life 
experiences of growing up in gang prevalent areas and lived or are still living 
among those involved in gangs – which will lend credibility to their position 
and gain the trust of those whom they are trying to support. 
When considering interventions that are currently being implemented in the 
USA, there needs to be an understanding of the key difference between 
London gangs and US gangs. US gangs are mainly multi-generational. This is 
a phenomenon yet to be seen in London street gangs. The programmes 
currently being implemented in the US focus on communities where the multi-
generational gangs live and operate. Before implementing these types of 
multi-generational focussed interventions, outputs need to be clearly 
articulated and understood by those charged with delivering the programmes. 
Using statistical analysis, I established that individuals referred for mediation 
in London commit less serious violence than those not referred for mediation. 
This is a significant finding that requires further analysis and greater research. 
In the first year of mediation delivery, analysing the first four cases to be 
closed entirely, CCM demonstrated that, through mediation, they had 
prevented one murder and one serious violent incident and had probably 
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(80% probability) prevented a further murder and violent incident occurring.  A 
total cost savings of £3,007,092 (Tribal, 2010). 
 
There are varying degrees of engagement in the mediation process with 
various outcomes. Engagement ranges from total engagement to non-
engagement and outcomes suggest there are positive results emanating as a 
result of contact. More significant though, are the outcomes following the 
actual referring of individuals for the intervention as opposed to their level of 
engagement. There is strong evidence to suggest making contact with an 
individual involved in gang violence and the offering to support the referred 
person through repeated meetings over a period of time actually reduces 
violent offending and violence occurring. 
 
I have concluded that there is much more research needed in this complex 
area of gang and group offending and identifying what works in an effort to 
reduce opportunities for reoffending and protect young people from this 
vicious cycle of violence.  
I also conclude that there are too many interventions used on an ad-hoc 
basis; without co-ordinating the efforts of other agencies, a lack of proper 
controls in place; and a general sticking plaster mentality adopted by those 
charged with commissioning the interventions. It appears that the problem is 
being passed from agency to agency, without any real cognisance of who is 
and more importantly, who should be responsible for what.  
Whether the activity taken to date works or not is academic. The very fact that 
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agencies have taken decisive action to address the ‘problem” will mean that 
they can move onto the next issue that requires their attention. I would 
advocate that stricter controls should be implemented and far more vigorous 
checks conducted before any funding is released for such programmes so 
that the following can be established: 
 What is the issue that needs addressing? 
 What work is currently being undertaken to address the issue?  
 What should we be doing? 
 How can we engage other agencies (the right agencies) in our activity? 
 How long should this activity last? 
 Why is this activity necessary? 
 What is the outcome we are seeking? 
 What next. What transformational support is required to sustain the 
progress made? 
Once these questions can be answered satisfactorily, then and only then, can 
agencies claim that they are doing their best to address the issues and that 
they are not undertaking this task in isolation. They need additional support, 
working together with supporting agencies whose initiatives and interventions 
complement each other’s activities. The common goal is to reduce violent 
offending occurring on London’s streets and to share learning at home and 
abroad ensuring those interventions that have the greatest impact and affect 
on reducing violent offending are used wherever they are needed. 
To date, no single intervention programme has been able to demonstrate 
complete success.  Agreeing with findings of a literature review conducted by 
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Jeanne Stinchcomb in 2002 looking at intervention programmes, I conclude 
that there are particular elements of various initiatives that are worthy of notice 
and are capable of being replicated or modified to suit specific issues. The 
critical component of any intervention is the ability to determine what works in 
a particular area, focussing on a specific type of gang problem, dealing with 
an actual identifiable group or gang of juveniles. Reiterating Maxson and 
Klein’s conclusions (2006), through the analysis of community needs, we are 
able to develop the necessary appropriate frameworks, having conducted a 
problem profile prior to the implementation of any strategy aimed at reducing 
gang related violence. Stinchcomb notes that the programmes that seem to 
have little success are ones with detached street workers and police 
suppression strategies. Programmes that appear to have encouraging 
outcomes are ones that are relevant to the needs of the community, and have 
proactive transformational strategies aimed at discouraging youths from 
joining gangs in the first place, with school-based intervention and support 
programmes, and comprehensive community programs. In conclusion, a 
major element for success, it seems, is to pursue interventions that offer a 
range of tactics and initiatives to address various aspects of the problems 
associated with violence and gangs. Mediation has demonstrated that it can 
have a massive impact on reducing repeat violence. Used together with other 
successful intervention programmes in the right context, could yield even 
better results. But in order to truly understand its impact, mediation will need 
to be undertaken far more widely across the capital with constant monitoring 
and evaluation processes in place to better understand the impact it is having 
on violence in London. 
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What this study demonstrates is that violence desistance or reduction can 
rarely be solely attributed to mediation alone, however, clear evidence exists 
in this research, which reveals this tactic’s significant qualities contribute 
towards a successful outcome, namely saving lives. 
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Post Script Reflection on the process 
 
I found data collection, organising and storing was more complicated than I 
envisaged. There were many reasons for this. I was conducting semi-
structured interviews with educated professionals who were passionate about 
working with those involved in gang disorder and violence. They were 
interested in what I was doing and keen to help. They provided me with so 
much information and data that when it came to determining and abstracting 
the significant and common themes, my task became extremely time 
consuming. I wanted to use it all, but was restricted by not only the topic I had 
chosen for my research, but the word count. I know however, I have much 
data that will enable further articles and journals to be published in the future. 
With regards to my quantitative research, however, it was necessary to secure 
the assistance of a researcher in order to access the data I needed to carry 
out this part of the research. This provided me with the opportunity to talk 
through what was needed and the limitations of such research. Through the 
advice and guidance of my research assistant, an analyst from the Trident 
Gangs Unit, my expectations were managed and I was able to collect exactly 
the type of data needed to answer my research question. 
  
I certainly found the quantitative and qualitative research designs challenging. 
I have learnt that I need to build in far more time in the future for similar 
projects. However, that being said, I have truly learnt much about research 
methods, patience, diplomacy and tenacity when completing this project. The 
need for contingency planning should be a fundamental component of any 
research strategy. I travelled across London, the South of England and then 
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across the length and breadth of the USA to meet law enforcement personnel, 
academics; community workers; and mediators. People I met were very 
generous with their time, but I will never underestimate the amount of planning 
and preparation it takes to actually travel, introduce the study and purpose of 
the meeting; carry out the semi structured interview; write it up and feed back 
to the interviewee prior to publication. That being said, this was the most 
enjoyable part of the whole process. 
 
I faced many challenges along the way, most notably with time management.  
I felt my interviews conducted with the experts, on the whole, went very well. I 
am confident that I spoke to the right people who provided me with the rich 
data that I needed to enhance my knowledge on gangs and mediation. The 
snowball-sampling method was an excellent way of accessing people I would 
not have been familiar with and certainly gave me expert views from additional 
angles.  
 
I am happy with my choice of questions, confident that they addressed the 
relevant areas and issues that I wanted to cover, and still allowed unrestricted 
and tangential conversations, which provided me with valuable additional 
information. I am pleased with the cross-section of participants - conflict 
engagement specialists; a youth engagement worker; and officers and staff 
involved in mediation referrals. These individuals possess a wealth of 
knowledge, many spanning over 30 years of working at the front line, dealing 
with gang violence and murder. 
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There were things that did not go well such as technical and logistical 
difficulties around initial interviews, but I believe I overcame those obstacles 
successfully. There were issues around finding a suitable venue to conduct 
the interviews, which ended up taking place. 
   
I was mindful to avoid research bias (Robson, 2011) and thus had to ensure 
that the lines of questioning I proposed did not offer the participants a 
particular path to suit my needs, but allowed them offer me their honest 
opinions and experiences. I was also cognisant of the Hawthorn effect19, in 
which interviewed people answer questions in a particular way, to please me.  
Data collection proved time consuming, and the summer holidays presented 
scheduling challenges in light of self imposed deadlines.  
  
With regards to non-probability purposive sampling of participants, I believe 
this is the most suitable way to obtain the information I required. I am aware 
that this method is not designed to provide “generalisability “e.g. data 
representative of experts’ opinions of all gang members and their level of 
offending, but I believe my chosen method is suitable, fit for purpose and 
reliable.  I was searching for the best information (Denscombe, 2007:17) and I 
believe I found it. 
 
																																																								
19 The Hawthorne effect is a form of reactivity whereby subjects improve or modify an aspect of their behaviour being 
experimentally measured simply in response to the fact that they are being studied, not in response to any particular 
experimental manipulation. The term was coined in 1950 by Henry A. Landsberger when analysing older experiments 
from 1924-1932 at the Hawthorne Works a Western Electric factory outside Chicago. 
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I found it really useful to use both qualitative and quantitative research 
methods for this area of study as it emphasised the empirical clash of 
epistemological stances when employing these two methods, which are often 
viewed as adversaries. However, upon reflection, I believe a mixed method 
approach to study offers a more holistic view and they ultimately complement 
each other, capturing the strengths of both styles (Cresswell 2009)  My 
recommendations will need to be persuasive and convincing if they are to be 
adopted (Bryman, 2008 :661). 
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University	of	Portsmouth	
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141	High	Street	
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Study	Title:	 Mediation and Gangs: A study of violence reduction using 
conflict resolution in the Metropolitan Police area in London 
REC	Ref	No:		....................................................................	
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involve	for	you.	Talk	to	others	about	the	study	if	you	wish.	Ask	us	if	there	is	
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CCM	currently	have	the	contract	to	provide	mediation	following	on	from	
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are	the	outcomes	of	your	interventions.	
Do I have to take part?  
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describe	the	study	and	go	through	this	information	sheet.	If	you	agree	to	take	part,	
I	will	then	ask	you	to	sign	a	consent	form.		
What will happen to me if I take part?  
If you agree to take part, I would like to interview you on tape. The only reason I will be 
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during the interview. Also, I would like to listen to the interview to ensure that I have 
understood what you are saying. I will ask your permission to use any quotes that you give in 
relation to my research, and will take all steps possible to ensure anonymity is retained. I will 
not identify you by name and will assign a number to every mediator whom I speak with. I 
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will also take the greatest of care to ensure individuals to whom you refer to cannot be 
identified by sanitising any data. 
The tapes will be transcribed and then destroyed. The tapes will be kept in a locked and 
secure cabinet to which only I have a key until they are transcribed. Transcripts will be kept 
in the same place and destroyed once my Thesis has been submitted and meets the 
requirements for my doctoral award. 
 
Expenses and payments  
All	interviews	will	be	conducted	in	your	normal	place	of	work	or	at	a	place	of	
your	choice	in	Central	London.	
What will I have to do?  
If	you	agree	to	take	part,	I	will	conduct	a	semi‐	structured	interview	that	should	
last	between	30	minutes	and	an	hour.	The	interview	will	be	in	relation	to	your	
experiences	as	a	mediator	
What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part?  
The risk of taking part may result in you being identified by direct quotes. Prior to their 
inclusion, I will send you a copy of the quote and confirm if you are happy for it to be used. I 
will not mention you by name and will assign numbers to all those participating from CCM. 
There is no perceived risk to CCM’s contract with MPS as a result of this study as a) the 
tender process for the renewal of the mediation process for the next 2 years is being 
implemented in October 2013; and b) This study is looking at outcomes and not successes 
per se. 
 
What are the possible benefits of taking part?  
The benefit of taking part will hopefully be a better understanding of the outcomes of 
mediation and quantifying what success looks like. 
 
Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential?  
 
 If you join the study, I will ensure that any quotes will be anonymous and that individuals 
interviewed will be given pseudonyms to prevent data collected being looked at by 
authorised persons from CCM or the Metropolitan Police Service.  
This data may also be looked at by authorised people to check that the study is being carried 
out correctly. Again, you will not be identifiable by this.   
 
With regards to all data collected from the interviews, please be assured : 
 that it will be stored securely in a locked cabinet. Your name will not appear on any 
documentation and you will be assigned a number to differentiate you from other 
participants. 
 The information gained from the interviews will only be retained for as long as is 
necessary and will be destroyed once the requirement of the professional doctorate 
submission has been satisfied. It will not be used for any future research. 
 The only individuals that will have access to sanitised research data where you will 
not be identifiable will be my tutors and the ethics committee at the university, 
should they request access. 
 
What will happen if I don’t want to carry on with the study?  
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If you decide that you no longer wish to take part once you have given consent, that is 
entirely your right. I will also give you the opportunity to  remove any data thus far obtained 
from the research and give assurances that it will be so destroyed immediately. 
 
 
What if there is a problem? 
 
If you have a concern about any aspect of this study, you should ask to speak to the 
researcher or their supervisor, who will do their best to answer your questions [0)23 9284 
3933]. If you remain unhappy and wish to complain formally, you can do this by writing to Dr 
Phil Clements, Head of the Institute for Criminal Justice Studies at the address at the top of 
page 1. 
 
What will happen to the results of the research study? 
The findings of my research will be used to complete my doctoral thesis. I will complete a 
summary of my findings and provide copies to CCM for distribution to participants. You will 
not be identified in any report/publication unless I have your written consent to do so. 
 
Who is organising and funding the research?  
My research will be sponsored by the University of Portsmouth and the Metropolitan Police 
Service. This research will inform both organisations of the outcomes of using mediation as a 
tactic to reduce gang violence in London.   
 
Who has reviewed the study? 
 Research in the University of Portsmouth is looked at by independent group of people, 
called a Research Ethics Committee, to protect your interests. This study has been reviewed 
and given a favourable opinion by the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences.  
 
Further information and contact details  
 
Eric Phelps – 07950 683565 
Dr Phil Clements‐ 023 9284 3933 
If you have any questions as to whether you should participate, please also contact the 
above, or Andy Simmons at CCM on 07787 278785 
Capital Conflict Management is supporting this research and will be given access to its 
findings. 
This will be done by way of a report which does not identify any individuals or attribute any 
direct quotes to them in a way that could so identify them. 
 
 
Concluding statement 
Thank you for taking the time to read the information sheet. If you decide to participate you 
will be given a copy of the information sheet to keep and your signature of consent will be 
required on a separate consent form. 
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Appendix D: Semi – Structured Interview Questions 
Semi‐Structured	Interview	Questions	
1	 In	your	experience,	do	individuals	referred	for	mediation	always	engage?	
	 Are	there	levels	of	engagement?	
	 Do	they	open	up	straight	away?	
	 Why	do	you	think	this	is	so?	
2	 What	does	a	successful	first	meeting	look	like	for	you?	
	 Why	was	it	successful?		
	 What	outcomes	are	you	seeking	in	an	initial	meeting?	
	 What	do	you	do	if	it	does	not	go	well?	If	they	do	not	readily	engage?	
3	 Have	you	a	personal	example	of	a	less	successful	first	meeting?	
	 What	were	the	reasons	for	the	lack	of	success?			
	 Do	you	know	why	this	was?	
4	 What	information	are	you	usually	given	to	begin	mediating?	
	 Is	it	always	enough	for	you	to	get	started?	
5	 Do	you	ever	consider	alternative	tactics	to	mediation	after	an	initial	meeting?	
	 If	yes,	what	tactics	
6	 What	additional	support	could	enhance	the	mediation	process?	
	 Do	you	always/	ever	have	access	to	such	support?	
7	 Do	you	ever	think	that	you	are	dealing	with	the	most	appropriate	people	for	mediation	purposes?	
	 By	this	I	mean,	are	the	correct	individuals	being	identified?			
	 Are	you	ever	referred	the	wrong	people?	
	 If	yes,	do	you	identify	the	correct	people	and	start	the	process	with	them?	
8	 Does	mediation	work?	
	 How?	
9	 What	additional	support	is	available	to	those	who	engage	in	the	mediation	process	to	exit	their	
lifestyle?	
	 Is	it	easy	to	get	extra	support?	
	 What	would	enhance	this	process?	
	 Do	those	who	engage	want	to	exit	this	lifestyle?	
10	 Are	there	different	levels	of	mediation	available?	
	 Is	there	a	tiered	approach?	
	 If	not,	could	this	be	adopted?	
	 What	would	this	look	like?	
11	 What	are	the	limitations	to	mediation?	
	 Are	there	occasions	when	you	know	this	tactic	is	not	suitable?	
	 If	yes,	what	do	you	do?	
12	 Overall,	what	does	success	look	like	for	you?	
	 How	do	you	know	when	mediation	has	worked?	
	 Do	you	think	that	success	means	the	same	for	you	as	it	does	for	those	who	commission	the	service?	
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Appendix E: Evidence of Favourable Ethical Opinion 
 
Mr Eric Phelps Professional Doctorate Student Institute of Criminal Justice 
Studies University of Portsmouth  
REC reference number: 12/13:22  
Please quote this number on all correspondence.  
July 3rd 2013 Dear Eric,  
Full Title of Study:  
Documents reviewed:  
Project title: Mediation and Gangs: A study of violence reduction 
using conflict resolution in the Metropolitan Police area in London.  
Consent Form Interview Questions Invitation Letters Participant 
Information Sheet Protocol  
Further to our recent correspondence, this proposal was reviewed 
by The Research Ethics Committee of The Faculty of Humanities and 
Social Sciences.  
I am pleased to tell you that the proposal was awarded a favourable 
ethical opinion by the committee.  
Kind regards, FHSS FREC Chair  
David Carpenter  
Members participating in the review:  
   David Carpenter   
   Jane Winstone 
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Appendix 8 – Ethic Check List 
	
FORM	UPR16	
Research	Ethics	Review	Checklist	
	
Please	complete	and	return	the	form	to	Research	Section,	Quality	
Management	Division,	Academic	Registry,	University	House,	with	your	
thesis,	prior	to	examination	
	
 
 
Postgraduate Research Student (PGRS) Information 
 
 
Student ID: 
 
116392 
 
Candidate Name: 
 
 
Eric Phelps 
 
Department: 
 
 
ICJS 
 
First Supervisor: 
 
Dr. Phil Clements 
 
Start Date:  
(or progression date for Prof Doc students) 
 
Sept 2010 
 
 
Study Mode and Route: 
 
 
Part-time
 
Full-time 

x 
 
 
 
MPhil  
 
MD 
 
PhD 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Integrated Doctorate  
(NewRoute) 
 
Prof Doc (PD) 
 
 
 
 
x 
 
 
Title of Thesis: 
Mediation and Gangs: A Study of Violence Reduction in the Metropolitan 
Police Area in London 
	
	
	
 
Thesis Word Count:  
(excluding ancillary data) 
 
	
	
50966	
 
 
If you are unsure about any of the following, please contact the local representative on your Faculty Ethics 
Committee for advice.  Please note that it is your responsibility to follow the University’s Ethics Policy and 
any relevant University, academic or professional guidelines in the conduct of your study 
Although the Ethics Committee may have given your study a favourable opinion, the final responsibility for 
the ethical conduct of this work lies with the researcher(s). 
 
       
 
UKRIO Finished Research Checklist: 
(If you would like to know more about the checklist, please see your Faculty or Departmental Ethics 
Committee rep or see the online version of the full checklist at: http://www.ukrio.org/what-we-do/code-of-
practice-for-research/) 
 
 
a) Have all of your research and findings been reported accurately, honestly 
and within a reasonable time frame? 
 
 
YES  
 
 
b) Have all contributions to knowledge been acknowledged? 
 
 
YES 
 
